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This thesis studies mechanism design from an optimization perspective.
Our main contribution is to characterize fundamental structural properties of
optimization problems arising in mechanism design and to exploit them to design
general frameworks and techniques for efficiently solving the underlying problems.
Not only do our characterizations allow for efficient computation, they also reveal
qualitative characteristics of optimal mechanisms which are important even from a
non-computational standpoint. Furthermore, most of our techniques are widely appli-
cable to optimization problems outside of mechanism design such as online algorithms
or stochastic optimization.
Our frameworks can be summarized as follows. When the input to an optimization
problem (e.g., a mechanism design problem) comes from independent sources (e.g.,
independent agents), the complexity of the problem can be exponentially reduced by
(i) decomposing the problem into smaller subproblems, each one involving one input
source, (ii) simultaneously optimizing the subproblems subject to certain relaxation
of coupling constraints, and (iii) combining the solutions of the subproblems in a
certain way to obtain an (approximately) optimal solution for the original problem.
We use our proposed framework to construct optimal or approximately optimal
mechanisms for several settings previously considered in the literature and to improve
upon the best previously known results. We also present applications of our techniques
to non-mechanism design problems such as online stochastic generalized assignment
problem which itself captures online and stochastic versions of various other problems
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Over the past decades, the growth of computer science has resulted in overlaps with
economics, operations research, and related fields. Many problems arising in such
fields can be posed as optimization problems, yet each field studies such problems
from a different perspective; for example economics focuses on studying qualitative
and structural properties of the solution, whereas computer science deals with the
computational aspects of finding the solution. In the past decade, the massive growth
of internet and computers has led to an increase in market mechanisms which are
controlled and run by computers, which has consequently heightened the importance
of considering the computational aspects of solving the corresponding optimization
problems. Online and dynamic pricing, electronic financial markets, and algorith-
mic trading are some of the most prominent examples of this trend. While the new
technology has allowed for far more complex market mechanisms, it has also accen-
tuated the computational issues pertaining to designing optimal mechanisms, finding
optimal strategies, and characterizing equilibria.
In solving optimization problems, we typically assume that the input to problem
is not affected by how we compute the output. However this assumption is not true
when the input comes from strategic agents that have their own preferences over
the possible outcomes of the optimization. For example, consider the problem of
matching a set of items to a set of agents. The problem can be cast as a weighted
2
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matching in a bipartite graph in which the weight of the edge from an agent to an
item represents the valuation of the agent for that item. The input to the problem
consists of the edge weights which are reported by the agents. However, a strategic
agent would try to manipulate the matching outcome by misreporting her valuations
in order to receive a better item (i.e., over reporting her value for the most preferred
item or under reporting her value for the less preferred items). It can be shown that
the weighted matching algorithm can be accompanied by a payment scheme that
would incentivize the agents to report truthfully. In this case the matching algorithm
together with the payment scheme comprise a truthful mechanism. A mechanism
design problem, in general, is an optimization problem where the input comes from
self interested and strategic agents who may misreport their information to manip-
ulate the outcome in their favor. Consequently, the optimality of a mechanism is
measured with respect to the true input and not the reported input. To design an
optimal mechanism, without loss of generality, one can restrict attention only to
truthful mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that incentivize the agents to report truthful.
Unfortunately enforcing truthfulness largely increases the computational complexity
of designing optimal mechanisms, except for welfare maximizing mechanism (e.g.,
mechanisms whose objective is to maximize the total welfare of the agents). This
increased computational complexity is due to the requirement of truthfulness. En-
forcing truthfulness requires simultaneously optimizing the mechanism’s outcome for
all possible inputs and not just the reported input, however the number of possible
input profiles grows exponentially in the number of agents.
Truthful mechanisms. In mechanism design, we often restrict our attention to
truthful (a.k.a, incentive compatible) mechanisms. A truthful mechanism incentivizes
the agents to report truthfully. By revelation principle, restriction to truthful mech-
anisms is without loss of generality as any non-truthful mechanism that has a Nash
equilibrium can be converted to an equivalent truthful mechanism as follows. Pick
any set of equilibrium strategies for the agents and embed them into the mechanism;
in other words, the new mechanism collects the private information of the agents
3
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and simulates their equilibrium strategies on behalf of them. The resulting mecha-
nism is obviously truthful and leads to the same equilibrium outcome as the original
mechanism.
Mechanism design objectives. Welfare and revenue maximization are the two
most common objectives considered in mechanism design. Welfare maximization
aims to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the combined welfare of the society; whereas
revenue maximization aims to optimize the revenue of the principal running the mech-
anism (e.g., the auctioneer). Although welfare maximization is the most well studied
and well understood objective in mechanism design, it is the objective of interest
perhaps only for governments an non-profit organizations (e.g., spectrum auctions,
medicare auctions, natural resources, etc). On the other hand, revenue maximiza-
tion, despite being less well studied, is a more common objective of interest in today’s
markets (e.g., dynamic pricing, airline tickets, hotels, online retailers). This thesis
considers a general and abstract class of objectives that include both welfare and
revenue maximization. In particular, most of the results of this thesis apply to any
objective that can be linearly separated overt the set of agents; both welfare and
revenue objectives satisfy this requirement. There are however other less common
objectives which do not satisfy this requirement, such as minimizing make span in
job scheduling problems.
Mechanisms with/without money. Mechanisms can be divided in two classes
based on their dependence on money. Money can be defined as any common medium
for measuring or exchanging utility among agents in a system. Money plays a vital
role in mechanism design as it allows a mechanism to measure, to compare, and to
aggregate agents’ preferences while incentivizing the agents to report their preferences
truthfully. Mechanism design without money is quite limited as suggested by Arrow’s
impossibility theorem. . However, there are scenarios were a monetary transfer is
inappropriate or prohibited so a mechanism without money is required; such scenarios




Bayesian vs. prior free. The two general approaches to mechanism design,
based on prior assumption about agents’ preferences, are Bayesian and prior free. A
Bayesian mechanism makes use of the available stochastic information about agents’
preferences to optimize its average performance (i.e., to maximize the expected value
of an objective). On the other hand, a prior free mechanism guarantees a certain
level of performance for all possible realizations of agents’ preferences. For a large
class of welfare maximization problems, the VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism (VCG)
obtains the optimal outcome. However almost for any other objective, including
revenue maximization, any incentive compatible mechanism has to sacrifice its per-
formance under some realizations of agents’ preferences in order to maintain incentive
compatibility. In other words there is no incentive compatible mechanism that is op-
timal under all possible realizations of agents’ preferences. Sacrificing optimality is
inevitable in order to maintain incentive compatibility. A Bayesian mechanism, hav-
ing access to the distribution of preferences, optimizes for the most likely realizations
of preferences; whereas a prior free mechanism, not making any assumption about
the distribution of preferences, has to guarantee a certain level of performance for all
possible realizations of agents’ preferences. Consequently, Bayesian mechanisms are
typically far superior to prior free mechanism in terms of approximate optimality for
non-welfare objectives. The first half of this thesis discusses and develops techniques
for constructing optimal or approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms. Most of
the techniques presented here can be applied to environments without money as well.
The second half of this thesis considers prior free mechanism design and is mostly
limited to two sided matching markets.
Theory vs. practice. Many of the results presented in this thesis may appear to
be more of theoretical interest and hard to apply literally in practice. For example,
optimal mechanisms often (a) randomize over outcomes, (b) discriminate against
agents based on their priors, or (c) require complex or unconventional interaction
between the mechanism and the agents. However, many of the theoretical results can
be translated into practical approaches by indirect means. Here are some examples:
(a) Online surveys often solicit participants by offering them to enter a lottery to
5
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win a prize; this can be considered as a mechanism with a randomized outcome.
(b) Retailers often provide discount coupons, holiday sales, or student pricing; all of
which can be considered as discrimination based on the prior (e.g., wealthy people
often don’t use any of these options due to the extra time and effort they will have to
spend). (c) Penny auctions implement an ascending form of all pay auctions. While
such mechanisms were hard, if not impossible, to implement in the past, the advent
of computers and internet has allowed for mechanisms with complex behavior.
1.2 Preliminaries
Common notation. The following general notations are used throughout this the-
sis. Capital letter and/or Sans Serif font indicate random variables (i.e., X or x). Bold
letters are used when multiple agents are involved whereas non-bold letters indicate a
single agent (e.g., t = (t1, . . . , tn) denotes a type profile of all agents where ti denotes
the type of agent i). For a vector (e.g., t) and an index (e.g., i) we subscript the
vector with minus the index (e.g., t−i) to denote the vector resulting from removing
the indexed entry. We use [n] to denote the set of integer numbers {1, . . . , n}.
Agent’s type. An agent’s type consist of any part of the agent’s information that
is relevant to the outcome of a mechanism. For example, in a single item auction,
an agent’s type may consist of her valuation for the item and possibly her budget.
We often represent the type of an agent i with ti ∈ Ti where Ti is her type space,
i.e., the space of all possible types for agent i. An agent’s type space can be either
discrete or continuous. A type profile of n agents is often denoted by t = (t1, . . . , tn).
We typically assume that an agent’s type is her private information, although in
designing Bayesian mechanisms we assume that the distribution of agent’s types is
publicly available.
Mechanism. A mechanism can be mathematically defined as a function that maps
type profiles to outcomes. For mechanisms with money, an outcome often consists of
an allocation and a payment for each agent. For example, in a single item auction,
6
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an outcome specifies for each agent (a) whether the agent receives the item or not,
and (b) a payment. A deterministic mechanism maps each type profile to an out-
come; whereas a randomized mechanism maps each type profile to a distribution over
outcomes. A Bayesian mechanism optimizes its objective in expectation where the
expectation is taken over the randomness of the agents’ types, i.e., optimizing the av-
erage performance. Consequently, a Bayesian mechanism needs to make assumption
about the distributions of agents’ types. On the other hand, a prior free mechanism
optimizes its objective for all possible profiles of agents’ types, i.e., optimizing the
worst case performance.
Utility function. An agent’s utility function maps the types of the agents and
the possible outcomes to real valued utilities; hence, it allows comparing the agent’s
preferences over different outcomes. We often denote the utility function of an agent
i with ui(xi, pi) for allocation xi and payment pi. Agent i has quasilinear utility if
her utility function can be written as ui(xi, pi) = vi(xi) − pi in which vi(xi) denotes
the valuation of agent i for allocation xi. In an environment with a set J of items




i) ≥ vi(xi ∩ x′i) + vi(xi ∪ x′i), ∀xi, x′i ⊆ J
Incentive compatibility (IC). A mechanism is incentive compatible iff truthful
reporting is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent. The various classes of
incentive compatibility, which are often considered in the computer science literature,
are listed below in the decreasing order of their restrictiveness.
• Universally truthful (UT). Truthful reporting is a (weakly) dominant strat-
egy even if an agent knows the random choices of the mechanism.
• Truthful in expectation (TIE). Truthful reporting is a (weakly) dominant
strategy in expectation over the random choices of the mechanism.
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• Dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). Truthful reporting is
a (weakly) dominant strategy even if an agent knows the types of the other
agents. This is also referred to as ex post incentive compatible
• Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC). Truthful reporting is a (weakly)
dominant strategy in expectation over the types of the other agents. This is
also referred to as interim incentive compatible
Note that the above definitions are not completely disjoint. In particular, UT often
includes DSIC, and BIC often includes TIE, whereas DSIC may or may not include
TIE. Throughout this thesis, we assume that both BIC and DSIC indicate TIE.
Individual rationality (IR). A mechanism is individually rational if every agent,
regardless of her type, makes a non-negative utility by participating in the mechanism.
A mechanism is interim individually rational if the utility of each agent is non-negative
in expectation over the types of other agents. A mechanism is ex post individually
rational if the utility of each agent is non-negative under every profile of types.
Combinatorial Auctions. A combinatorial auction is any market mechanism for
allocating a set of heterogenous items (often indivisible) to a set of agents. In this
case, agents have valuations for bundles of items. Combinatorial auctions are among
the hardest mechanism design problems since even computing an optimal allocation
(i.e, an allocation that maximizes the total valuations of the agents) is NP-hard.
1.3 Mechanism Design as an Optimization Problem
We present an example of a Bayesian mechanism design problem in the form of an
optimization problem (e.g., a linear program). Consider the problem of allocating a
single indivisible item to one of n budget constrained agents with the objective of
maximizing revenue. For each agent i ∈ [n], Ti denotes her type space (discrete), ti ∈
Ti denotes her type (private), fi(ti) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of her type being
ti, vi(ti) ∈ R+ denotes her valuation for the item conditioned on her type being ti, and
Bi ∈ R+ denotes her budget (public). Agents types are distributed independently.
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Also T = T1×· · ·×Tn denotes the space of type profiles, t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T denotes
a type profile, and f(t) = f1(t1)×· · ·×fn(tn) denotes a joint probability mass function.
An optimal mechanism can be computed by the following linear program in which
the variables xi(ti) and pi(ti) denote respectively the probability of allocation and the
payment for agent i conditioned on reporting type ti and xi(t) denotes her probability







subject to vi(ti)xi(ti)− pi(ti) ≥ vi(ti)xi(t′i)− pi(t′i),∀i ∈ [n] , ∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti (IC)
vi(ti)xi(ti)− pi(ti) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n] , ∀ti ∈ Ti (IR)




f−i(t−i)xi(ti, t−i), ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀ti ∈ Ti
X
i
xi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T
x ∈ [0, 1] T×n
xi ∈ [0, 1] Ti , ∀i ∈ [n]
pi ∈ RTi+ , ∀i ∈ [n]
An optimal assignment for the above LP yields an optimal mechanism as follows.
Given the reported profile of types t, allocate the item to agent i with probability
xi(t) and charge her pi(ti) for each i ∈ [n]. Note that an agent is charged regardless
of whether she wins the item or not. In other words, the mechanism collects the
payments first and then allocates the item at random. The resulting mechanism is
interim incentive compatible (i.e., BIC) and interim individual rational. Observe that
the size of the above LP grows exponentially in the number of agents because the
size of x is proportional to the size of T. In Part II of this thesis we present various




Part II of this thesis studies structural characteristics of optimization problems arising
in Bayesian mechanism design problems and proposes various approaches for solving
such problems efficiently. The size of such optimization problems usually grow expo-
nentially in the number of agents. chapter 2 and chapter 4 present two fundamental
approaches for solving such optimization problems. chapter 5 abstracts away some of
the main technical contributions of chapter 4 and present direct applications of them
to problems outside of mechanism design.
Part III of this thesis considers prior free mechanism design. chapter 6 studies
competitive equilibrium in matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utilities.
1.4.1 Bibliographical Notes
Most of the results of chapter 2 have appeared in Alaei et al. (2012a). A preliminary
version of the results of chapter 4 have appeared in Alaei (2011). Some of the results
of chapter 5 have appeared in Alaei et al. (2012b) and Alaei (2011). A subset of






Multi to Single Agent Reduction (Interim)
2.1 Introduction
The main challenge of Bayesian mechanism design arises from the fact that the corre-
sponding optimization problem has to consider all joint type profiles of agents simulta-
neously due to incentive compatibility constraints, and the number of such joint type
profiles grows exponentially in the number of agents. We aim to address this chal-
lenge by providing a general decomposition technique for mechanism design problems
where (i) the objective is linearly separable over the agents (e.g., welfare or revenue),
(ii) agents’ types are distributed independently, and (iii) inter agent constraints only
consist of allocation constraints (e.g., supply constraint).
Our decomposition approach relies on the assumption that the utility of each
agent only depends on her own type/outcome, and not the types/outcomes of other
agents. Every multi agent mechanism induces a single agent mechanism on each agent
which can be obtained by fixing one agent and simulating the other agents as follows:
draw the types of the other agents at random from their corresponding distribution;
run the multi agent mechanism on the designated agent and the simulated agents;
and ignore the outcomes for the simulated agents. The fundamental idea behind
the decomposition is to optimize over single agent mechanisms simultaneously, while
ensuring that the resulting single agent mechanisms can be combined into a feasible
multi agent mechanism.
The main challenge faced by such a decomposition approach is that the joint
12
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feasibility constraints over the allocations introduce couplings in the outcome of the
optimal solution. The joint feasibility constraints are typically the supply constraints.
For example, when agents are independent, a revenue maximizing seller with unlim-
ited supply can decompose the problem over the agents and optimize for each agent
independently; however, in the presence of supply constraints, a direct decomposition
is not possible. Our decomposition approach is based on characterizing the space of
jointly feasibly allocation rules and simultaneously optimizing the single agent mech-
anisms subject to the feasibility of the joint allocation rule.
Related Work. Myerson (1981) characterized Bayesian optimal auctions in envi-
ronments with quasi-linear risk-neutral single-dimensional agent preferences. Bulow
and Roberts (1989) reinterpreted Myerson’s approach as reducing the multi-agent auc-
tion problem to a related single-agent problem. Our work generalize this reduction-
based approach to multi dimensional auction problems.
An important aspect of our approach is that it can be applied to multi-dimensional
agent preferences. Multi-dimensional preferences can arise as distinct values for differ-
ent goods or services or different configurations of a good or service being auctioned, in
specifying a private budget and a private value, or in specifying preferences over risk.
We briefly review related work for agent preferences with multiple values, budgets,
or risk parameters.
Multi-dimensional valuations are well known to be difficult. For example, Ro-
chet and Chone (1998), showed that, because bunching1 can not be ruled out easily,
the optimal auctions for multi-dimensional valuations are dramatically different from
those for single dimensional valuations. Because of this, most results are for cases
with special structure (e.g., Armstrong, 1996; Wilson, 1994; McAfee and McMillan,
1988) and often, by using such structures, reduce the problems to single-dimensional
ones (e.g., Spence, 1980; Roberts, 1979; Mirman and Sibley, 1980). Our framework
does not need any such structure.
A number of papers consider optimal auctions for agents with budgets (see, e.g.,
1Bunching refers to the situation in which a group of distinct types are treated the same way in
by the mechanism.
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Pai and Vohra, 2008; Che and Gale, 1995; Maskin, 2000). These papers rely on
budgets being public or the agents being symmetric; our technique allows for a non-
identical prior distribution and private budgets. Mechanism design with risk averse
agents was studied by Maskin and Riley (1984) and Matthews (1983). Both works
assume i.i.d. prior distributions and have additional assumptions on risk attitudes;
our reduction does not require these assumptions.
Characterization of interim feasibility plays a vital role in this work. For single-
item single-unit auctions, necessary and sufficient conditions for interim feasibility
were developed through a series of works (Maskin and Riley, 1984; Matthews, 1984;
Border, 1991, 2007; Mierendorff, 2011); this characterization has proved useful for de-
riving properties of mechanisms, Manelli and Vincent (2010) being a recent example.
Border (1991) characterized symmetric interim feasible auctions for single-item auc-
tions with identically distributed agent preferences. His characterization is based on
the definition of “hierarchical auctions.” He observes that the space of interim feasi-
ble mechanisms is given by a polytope, where vertices of this polytope corresponding
to hierarchical auctions, and interior points corresponding to convex combinations
of vertices. Mierendorff (2011) generalize Border’s approach and characterization
to asymmetric single-item auctions. Our work generalizes the characterization from
asymmetric single-unit auctions to asymmetric multi-unit and matroid auctions.
Our main result provides computational foundations to the interim feasibility
characterizations discussed above. We show that interim feasibility can be checked,
that interim feasible allocation rules can be optimized over, and that corresponding ex
post implementations can be found. Independently and contemporaneously Cai et al.
(2012) provided similar computational foundations for the single-unit auction problem
and multi-item auctions with agents with additive preferences. Their approach to the
single-unit auction problem is most comparable to our approach for the multi-unit
and matroid auction problems where the optimization problem is written as a convex
program which can be solved by the ellipsoid method; while these methods result in
strongly polynomial time algorithms they are not considered practical. In contrast,
our single-unit approach, when the single-agent problems can be solved by a linear
program, gives a single linear program which can be practically solved.
14
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2.2 Preliminaries
We begin by defining the model and some notation.
Model. There are n agents; each agent i ∈ [n] has a discrete type space Ti and a
private type ti ∈ Ti. The agents’ type profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T1 × . . .× Tn = T is
distributed according to a publicly known distribution with probability mass function
f : T → [0, 1]; WLOG, assume that all types have non-zero probability mass. A
multi agent mechanism maps each type profile to a distribution over outcomes; an
outcome specifies the allocation as well as extra attributes (e.g., payment, etc) for
each agent. For each agent i, let Xi ⊂ Rm+ and Wi denote the space of feasible
allocations and the space of feasible attributes respectively. The space of jointly
feasible allocations is denoted by X ⊆ X1× . . .×Xn. Also let W = W1× . . .×Wn. A
multi agent mechanism M : T→ ∆(X)×∆(W) maps type profiles to distributions
over allocations and attributes.Each agent i has a utility function ui : Ti×Xi×Wi → R
that maps the agent’s type and outcome to a real valued utility. Given a space of
feasible mechanisms2 M ⊂ [T → ∆(X) ×∆(W)], we are interested in computing a
mechanism in M that maximizes3 the expected value of a given objective function
Obj : T × X ×W → R; formally we want to compute M ∈ M that maximizes
Et∼f , (x,w)∼M (t)[Obj(t, x,w)].
Notation. A function æx : T→ ∆(X) that maps type profiles to distributions over
allocations is called an allocation rule; the space of feasible allocation rules is denoted
by èX = [T → ∆(X)] and çXi = [Ti → ∆(Xi)] for each agent i. Similarly, a functionçw : T → ∆(W) is called an attribute rule; the space of feasible attribute rules is
denoted by éW = [T → ∆(W)], and éWi = [Ti → ∆(Wi)] for each agent i. Any
pair of æx ∈ èX and çw ∈ éW define a multi agent mechanism which is specified as
M = (æx, çw); similarly any æxi ∈ çXi and çwi ∈ éWi define a single agent mechanism
2Note that additional constraints (e.g., incentive compatibility, budget, etc) can be incorporated
in M.
3All of our results can be applied to minimization problems by simply maximizing the negation
of the objective function.
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Mi = (æxi, çwi) for agent i. Note that every mechanism can be uniquely specified by its
allocation rule and attribute rule.
For notational convenience, we use xM (t) and wM (t) to denote the random vari-
ables corresponding to the allocations and attributes of a mechanism M for type
profile t (i.e., assuming M = (æx, çw), random variable xM (t) and wM (t) are drawn
from distributions æx(t) and çw(t) respectively.
The single agent mechanism induced on agent i by a multi agent mechanism
M ∈ èX×éW is denoted by [[M ]]i. Such a single agent mechanism can be obtained by
simulating the other agents according to their respective distributions4; furthermore
Mi ⊆ çXi ×éWi denotes the space of all feasible single agent mechanisms for agent i,
i.e., Mi = {[[M ]]i|M ∈M}.
Assumptions. We make the following assumptions.
(A1) Independence. The agents’ types must be distributed independently, i.e.,
f = f1 × . . . × fn where fi : Ti → [0, 1] is the probability mass function for ti.
Note that if agent i has multidimensional types, fi itself does not need to be a
product distribution.
(A2) Linear Separability of Objective. The objective function must be linearly
separable over the agents, i.e., Obj(t, x,w) =
P
iObji(ti, xi,wi) where ti, xi, and
wi respectively represent the type, the allocation, and the payment of agent i.
(A3) Linearity in Allocation. The utility functions of the agents, the objective
function, and the space of feasible mechanisms M must be linear in allocation,
as formally defined next. For any arbitrary mechanism M = (æx, çw) ∈ M and
any allocation rule æx′ ∈ èX whose expected allocation is the same as æx for each
type of each agent, the mechanism M ′ = (æx′, çw) must also be feasible (i.e.,
must be in M) and must yield the same expected objective value and the same
expected utilities as M ′ for each type of each agent.
4The single agent mechanism induced on agent i can be obtained by simulating all agents other
than i by drawing a random t−i from f−i and running M on agent i and the n− 1 simulated agents
with types t−i; note that this is a single agent mechanism because the simulated agents are just
part of the mechanism.
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We linearly extend ui and Obji to any allocation in the convex hall of Xi.
Throughout the rest of this note, we treat ui and Obji as the linear extensions
of the corresponding functions.
(A4) Convexity. The space of feasible mechanisms, M, must be convex. In other
words, for any two mechanisms M ,M ′ ∈M and any β ∈ [0, 1], the mechanism
M ′′ = βM +(1−β)M ′ must also be in M. M ′′ can be interpreted as a mechanism
which runes M with probability β and runs M ′ with probability 1− β.
(A5) Decomposability. The constraints imposed by the space of feasible mecha-
nisms, M, must be decomposable to allocation constraints which are dictated
by X and single agent constraints (e.g., incentive compatibility, budget, etc).
In other words, M must impose no inter agent constrains except for those im-
plied by X. Formally, the decomposability assumption requires that for any
mechanism M ∈ èX × éW, if [[M ]]i ∈ Mi (for all agents i), then it must be
M ∈M.
Multi agent problem. A multi agent mechanism for n agents induces n single
agent mechanisms, one per each agent. Furthermore, the expected objective value of
the mechanism and the expected utilities of the agents only depend on the induced
single agent mechanisms (this follows from assumption A2 and given that the utility
of each agent depends only on her own outcome). Consequently, one would hope to
obtain an optimal multi agent mechanism by combining optimal single agent mecha-
nisms; however, the resulting multi agent mechanism could yield infeasible allocations
due to the joint feasibility constraints imposed by X. To ensure joint feasibility of
allocations, one can simultaneously optimize the single agent mechanisms over the
space of feasible allocation rules. The multi agent optimization problem is captured
by the following program.
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Exi∼æxi(ti),wi∼æwi(ti) [Obji(ti, xi,wi)] (OPT )
subject to æxi(ti) = X
t−i∈T−i
f−i(t−i)æxi(ti, t−i), ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀ti ∈ Ti
(æxi, çwi) ∈ Mi, ∀i ∈ [n]
æx ∈ çX
Theorem 1. Given an optimal assignment of æx and æxi and çwi (for all i) in pro-
gram (OPT ), an optimal multi agent mechanism is given by M = (æx, çw), in whichçw = çw1× · · ·× çwn (i.e., çw is a product distribution). Furthermore, the optimal value
of that program is equal to the expected objective value of M .
Proof. Consider a hypothetical optimal multi agent mechanism and let æx be its alloca-
tion rule and let (æxi, çwi) be the single agent mechanism induced on agent i for each i.
By A1 and A3, the contribution of agent i to the expected objective value of the opti-
mal mechanism is exactly the same as its contribution to the expected objective value
of the single agent mechanism (æxi, çwi) which isPti∈Ti Exi∼æxi(ti),wi∼æwi(ti)[Obji(ti, xi,wi)].
Since æx, æxi and çwi form a feasible assignment for convex program (OPT ), the optimal
value of the convex program must be at least as much as the expected objective value
of the optimal mechanism. On the other hand, by A5, any feasible assignment ofæx and æxi and çwi for the convex program can be turned into a feasible multi agent
mechanism M = (æx, çw), in which çw = çw1×· · ·× çwn, therefore the optimal assignment
for the convex program must yield an optimal multi agent mechanism.
Unfortunately, the dimension of the space of feasible allocation rules, èX, is pro-
portional to the dimension of T (i.e., |T1| × · · · × |Tn|) which grows exponentially
in the number of agents. So the size of program (OPT ) is exponential in the size of
the input. However, because of assumption A3 on linearity in allocations, only the
expected allocation of each type is relevant from the perspective of the multi agent
optimization problem; in other words, two mechanisms that are identical except for
18
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their allocation rules, but have the same expected allocation for each type, are equiv-
alent in terms of feasibility, optimality (i.e., expected objective value), and expected
utility for each type. This observation is the key idea to the multi to singe agent
decomposition of the next section.
Interim allocation rule. For a mechanism M ∈ èX × éW, the interim allocation
rule specifies the expected allocation for every type of every agent normalized by the
probability of that type which can be formally defined as follows. WLOG, assume
that T1, . . . ,Tn are disjoint
5 and let TN =
S
i Ti be the set of all types. The interim
allocation rule ex ∈ RTN×m+ for a mechanism M = (æx, çw) is defined as follows.
ex(ti) = fi(ti) Et−i∼f−i xMi (ti, t−i) , ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀ti ∈ Ti (IA)
An interim allocation rule is subscripted by an agent (e.g., exi) to denote its restriction
to the types of that agent.
To avoid confusion we often refer to an allocation rule æx ∈ èX as an ex post
allocation rule. An ex post allocation rule æx implements an interim allocation rule ex
iff the following equation holds.
ex(ti) = X
t−i∈T−i
f(ti, t−i)æxi(ti, t−i), ∀i ∈ [n] , ∀ti ∈ Ti (IA-XPA)
An interim allocation rule is feasible iff it can be implemented by a feasible ex post
allocation rule. Note that there could be many ex post allocation rules that implement
the same interim allocation rule. The space of feasible interim allocation rules is
denoted by fX.
2.3 Decomposition via Interim Allocation Rule
We show that an optimal multi agent mechanism can be computed by simultaneously
optimizing the single agent mechanisms over the space of feasible interim allocation
5If not, label all types of each agent with the name of that agent, i.e., for each i ∈ [n] replace Ti
with T′i = {(i, t)|t ∈ Ti} so that T′1, · · · ,T′n are disjoint.
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rules. Note that the dimension of the space of interim allocation rules is proportional
to the size of TN (i.e., |T1|+ · · ·+ |Tn|) which grows linearly in the number of agents.
Note that by assumption A3, the objective function, the utilities, and the space of
feasible mechanisms are linear in allocations and hence depend only on the expected
allocation of each type, i.e., the interim allocation rule. In other words, two ex post
allocation rules, which yield the same interim allocation rule, are equivalent in all
relevant aspects. Next, we define the single agent problem formally and then discuss
the multi to single agent decomposition.
Single agent problem. The single agent problem for agent i is to compute an
optimal single agent mechanism subject to a given interim allocation rule 6 exi, and
to compute its expected objective value which is denoted by Ri(exi). The single agent
problem is captured by the following program whose optimal value is equal to Ri(exi)





Exi∼æxi(ti),wi∼æwi(ti) [Obji(ti, xi,wi)] (OPTi)
subject to Exi∼æxi(ti) [xi] = exi(ti), ∀ti ∈ Ti
(æxi, çwi) ∈ Mi
We will refer to Ri as the optimal benchmark for agent i. If there are no feasible
single agent mechanisms for a given exi, Ri(exi) is defined as −∞.
Theorem 2. Ri(exi), the expected objective value of the optimal single agent mecha-
nism for agent i subject to an interim allocation rule exi, is concave in exi and has a
convex domain.
Proof. Consider any exi and ex′i in the domain of Ri and any β ∈ [0, 1]. We shall show
that ex′′i = βexi+(1−β)ex′i is in the domain of Ri and Ri(ex′′i ) ≥ βRi(exi)+(1−β)Ri(ex′i).
Let Mi and M
′
i denote optimal single agent mechanisms for agent i subject to exi and
6I.e., the expected allocation of the mechanism to type ti must be exi(ti).
20
CHAPTER 2. MULTI TO SINGLE AGENT REDUCTION (INTERIM)
ex′i respectively. Define M ′′i = βMi + (1 − β)M ′i (i.e., M ′′i runs Mi with probability
β and runs M ′i with probability 1 − β). M ′′i is feasible by assumption A4 and has
interim allocation rule ex′′i , so ex′′i is in the domain of Ri. Furthermore, the expected
objective value of the optimal single agent mechanism subject to ex′′i is at least as
much as the expected objective value of M ′′i which is exactly Ri(exi) + (1− β)Ri(ex′i);
so Ri is concave.
Multi to single agent decomposition. The multi agent optimization problem






subject to ex ∈ fX
Note that the above program is a convex program because Ri are concave (Theo-
rem 2) and fX is a convex space. Therefore an optimal assignment can be computed
efficiently (e.g., in polynomial time) assuming that Ri can be computed efficiently for
each i.
Theorem 3. Given an optimal assignment of ex in convex program (OPTinterim) and
an optimal single agent mechanism Mi = (æxi, çwi) subject to exi for each agent i, an
optimal multi agent mechanism is given by M = (æx, çw) in which æx is any ex post
allocation rule implementing ex and çw = çw1 × · · · × çwn (i.e., a product distribution).
Proof. Let æx be an ex post allocation rule corresponding to ex. Let æx′i denote the ex
post allocation rule induced by æx on agent i. Note that æxi and æx′i may not necessarily
be the same for each agent i, but they both produce the same interim allocation ruleex. By A3, (æx′i, çwi) is feasible mechanism for each agent i which is equivalent to (æx′i, çwi)
and is also an optimal assignment for the convex program. Observe that æx and æx′i andçwi (for all i) form an optimal assignment for convex program (OPT ); consequently
M = (æx, çw1 × · · · × çwn) in an optimal multi agent mechanism by Theorem 1.
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Convex program (OPTinterim) together with Theorem 3 provide a generic approach
for computing an optimal multi agent mechanism; however, in order for this approach
to be computationally efficient, each of the following steps must be computationally
efficient.
1. Computing Ri(exi).
2. Optimizing over fX; typically, this can be done using the Ellipsoid method to-
gether with a separation oracle or an explicit representation of fX (in the form
of a collection of linear constraints).
3. Computing an optimal single agent mechanism Mi = (æxi, çwi) ∈ Mi subject toexi, for each agent i.
4. Computing an ex post allocation rule æx that implements ex.
The second and fourth steps are discussed in §2.4. The first and the third steps
together form the single agent problem which can be computed for each agent i
typically in time polynomial in the size of Ti, as shown in the next example.
Example. There is one indivisible item which can be allocated to at most one of n
agents with the objective of maximizing revenue. The item can be painted with one of
c available colors. vi : Ti → Rc+ denotes the valuations of each type of agent i for each
color. An outcome for agent i specifies an allocation (either 0 or 1) and an attribute
which specifies the color and payment; therefore Xi = {0, 1} and Wi = [c]× R. The
space of jointly feasible allocations is given by
X =
(





Let ex ∈ [0, 1]TN×1 be an interim allocation rule. Pick an arbitrary agent i. Recall
that exi ∈ [0, 1]Ti×1 denotes the restriction of ex to the types of agent i. An optimal
single agent mechanism for agent i, subject to exi, is computed by the following linear
program and Ri(exi) is given by the optimal value of this program as a function of exi.
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subject to vi(ti) · yi(ti)− pi(ti) ≥ vi(ti) · yi(t′i)− pi(t′i), ∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti (IC)
vi(ti) · yi(ti)− pi(ti) ≥ 0, ∀ti ∈ Ti (IR)
cX
`=1
yi(ti, `) = exi(ti)/fi(ti), ∀ti ∈ Ti
yi ∈ [0, 1] Ti×c
pi ∈ RTi+
For agent i, conditioned on having type ti, yi(ti, `) denotes the probability of
receiving the item painted with color `, and p(ti) denotes the corresponding payment.
Recall that a single agent mechanism maps each type of the agent to distributions
over allocations and attributes. In the above example, each type ti ∈ Ti is mapped
to the following distributions over allocations and attributes.
• xi is 1 with probability exi(ti)fi(ti) , and is 0 otherwise.
• wi is (`, pi(ti)) with probability yi(ti,`)exi(ti) fi(ti), for each ` ∈ [c].
2.4 Optimization and Implementation of Interim Allocation
Rules
We address the computational issues pertaining to (i) optimization over the space of
interim allocation rules, and (ii) ex post implementation of interim allocation rules.
We study fundamental characteristic of the space of interim allocation rules which
allow computationally tractable methods for both optimization and implementation
over this space; such characteristics are important even from a non-computational
stand point as they relate to qualitative characteristics of optimal multi agent mech-
anisms.
Optimization over fX requires either a separation oracle or an explicit represen-
tation of ÜX as a collection of linear constraints; however the latter approach is often
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not computationally efficient since it requires exponentially many linear constraints.
In the rest of this section, we develop solutions based on either of those approaches.
An ex post implementation of a feasible interim allocation rule can be obtained
without an explicit construction of a corresponding ex post allocation rule. Recall
that an ex post allocation rule æx maps every type profile t to a distribution æx(t) over
feasible allocations. Furthermore, to run a mechanism it is enough to sample fromæx(t). We show that the interim allocation rules corresponding to the vertices offX have
simple deterministic implementations, i.e., the corresponding æx(t) is deterministic
and efficiently computable for all t. Consequently, any ex ∈ fX can be implemented
by sampling a vertex ex′ of fX at random such that E[ex′] = ex and then choosing the
determinist allocation corresponding to an ex post implementation of ex′.
2.4.1 Single Unit Allocation Constraints
We consider the space of feasible allocations defined by single unit allocation con-
straints (i.e., at most one agent can be allocated to). For such space of feasible
allocations, we characterize feasibility of interim allocation rules as implementability
via a particular, simple stochastic sequential allocation rule whose dynamics can be
captured by O(|TN |2) linear equations. Consequently, we obtain a compact formula-
tion of the space of feasible interim allocation rules.
The space of feasible allocations defined by single unit allocation constrains can
be formulated as follows.
X =
(





Observe that the space of feasible allocations for each agent i is exactly Xi = {0, 1}.
A stochastic sequential allocation algorithm is parameterized by a stochastic tran-
sition table. Such a table specifies the probability by which an agent with a given
type can steal a token from a preceding agent with a given type. For simplicity
in describing the process we will assume the token starts under the possession of a
“dummy agent” indexed by 0; the agents are then considered in the arbitrary order
from 1 to n; and the agent with the token at the end of the process is the one that is
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allocated (or none are allocated if the dummy agent retains the token).
Definition 1 (stochastic sequential allocation algorithm). Parameterized by a stochas-
tic transition table π, the stochastic sequential allocation algorithm (SSA) computes
the allocations for a type profile t ∈ T as follows:
1. Give the token to the dummy agent 0 with dummy type t0.
2. For each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (in order):
If agent i′ has the token, transfer the token to agent i with probability π(ti′ , ti).
3. Allocate to the agent who has the token (or none if the dummy agent has it).
First, we present a dynamic program, in the form of a collection of linear equations,
for calculating the interim allocation rule implemented by SSA for a given π. Let
y(ti′ , i) denote the ex-ante probability of the event that agent i
′ has type ti′ and is
holding the token at the end of iteration i. Let z(ti′ , ti) denote the ex-ante probability
in iteration i of SSA that agent i has type ti and takes the token from agent i
′ who
has type ti′ .
The following additional notation will be useful in this section. For any subset
of agents A ⊆ N = {1, . . . , n}, we define TA =
S
i∈A Ti (Recall that without loss of
generality agent type spaces are assumed to be disjoint.). The shorthand notation
ti ∈ S for S ⊆ TN will be used to quantify over all types in S and their corresponding
agents (i.e., ∀ti ∈ S is equivalent to ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ S ∩ Ti).
The interim allocation rule ex resulting from the SSA is exactly given by the
dynamic program specified by the following linear equations.
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z(ti′ , ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n} (S.2)
y(ti′ , i) = y(ti′ , i− 1)−
X
ti∈Ti
z(ti′ , ti), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1} (S.3)
z(ti′ , ti) = y(ti′ , i− 1)π(ti′ , ti)fi(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n},∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1} (π)
y(ti, n) = ex(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n}
Note that π is the only adjustable parameter in the SSA algorithm, so by relaxing the
equation (π) and replacing it with the following inequality we can specify all possible
dynamics of the SSA algorithm.
0 ≤ z(ti′ , ti) ≤ y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n},∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1} (S.4)
Let S denote the convex polytope captured by the 4 sets of linear constraints (S.1)
through (S.4) above, i.e., (y, z) ∈ S iff y and z satisfy the aforementioned constraints.
Note that every (y, z) ∈ S corresponds to some stochastic transition table π by solving
equation (π) for π(ti, ti′). We show that S captures all feasible interim allocation rules;
in other words, the space of feasible interim allocation rules, fX, is the projection of
S through equation ex(·) = y(·, n).
Theorem 4. An interim allocation rule ex is feasible if and only if it can be imple-
mented by the SSA algorithm for some choice of stochastic transition table π. In other
words, ex ∈ fX iff there exists (y, z) ∈ S such that ex(ti) = y(ti, n) for all ti ∈ TN .
Corollary 1. fX can be compactly formulated by O(|TN |2) variables and linear con-
straints.
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Corollary 2. The convex program (OPTinterim) can be rephrased as follows for com-





subject to y(ti, n) = ex(ti), ∀ti ∈ TN
(y, z) ∈ S.
Furthermore, the resulting interim allocation rule can be implemented ex post by SSA
using the the stochastic transition table defined by:7
π(ti′ , ti) =
z(ti′ , ti)
y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti)
, ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n},∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1}.
Next, we present a few definitions and lemmas that are used in the proof of
Theorem 4. Two transition tables π and π′ are considered equivalent if their induced
interim allocation rules for SSA are equal. Type ti is called degenerate for π if in the
execution of SSA the token is sometimes passed to type ti but it is always taken away
from ti later, i.e., if y(ti, i) > 0 but y(ti, n) = 0. The stochastic transition table π is
degenerate if there is a degenerate type. For π, type ti is augmentable if there exists
a π′ (with a corresponding y′) which is equivalent to π for all types expect ti and has
y(ti, n) > y
′(ti, n).
8
Lemma 1. For any stochastic transition table π there exists an equivalent π′ that is
non-degenerate.
Lemma 2. For any non-degenerate stochastic transition table π, any non-augmentable
type ti always wins against any augmentable type ti′. I.e.,
• if i′ < i and ti′ has non-zero probability of holding the token then π(ti′ , ti) = 1,
i.e., ti always takes the token away from ti′, and
7If the denominator is zero, i.e., y(ti, i
′ − 1) = 0, we can set π(ti, ti′) to an arbitrary value in
[0, 1].
8We define t0 to be augmentable unless the dummy agent never retains the token in which
case all agents are non-augmentable (and for technical reasons we declare the dummy agent to be
non-augmentable as well).
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• if i < i′ and ti has non-zero probability of holding the token then π(ti, ti′) = 0,
i.e., ti′ never takes the token away from ti.
It is possible to view the token passing in stochastic sequential allocation as a
network flow. From this perspective, the augmentable and non-augmentable types
form a minimum-cut and Lemma 2 states that the token must eventually flow from
the augmentable to non-augmentable types. We defer the proof of this lemma to §2.5
where the main difficulty in its proof is that the edges in the relevant flow problem
have dynamic(non-constant) capacities.
Proof of Theorem 4. Any interim allocation rule that can be implemented by the SSA
algorithm is obviously feasible, so we only need to prove the opposite direction. The
proof is by contradiction, i.e., given an interim allocation rule ex we show that if there
is no (y, z) ∈ S such that ex(·) = y(·, n), then ex must be infeasible. Consider the





subject to y(ti, n) ≤ ex(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n}
(y, z) ∈ S.
Let (y, z) be an optimal assignment of this LP. If the first set of inequalities are all
tight (i.e., ex(·) = y(·, n)) then ex can be implemented by the SSA, so by contradiction
there must exists a type τ ∗ ∈ TN for which the inequality is not tight. Note that τ ∗
cannot be augmentable; otherwise, by the definition of augmentability, the objective
of the LP could be improved. Partition TN to augmentable types T
+
N and non-
augmentable types T−N . Note that T
−
N is non-empty because τ
∗ ∈ T−N . Without loss
of generality, by Lemma 1 we may assume that (y, z) is non-degenerate.9
An agent wins if she holds the token at the end of the SSA algorithm. The ex ante




the other hand, Lemma 2 implies that the first (in the order agents are considered by
9By Lemma 1, there exits an non-degenerate assignment with the same objective value.
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SSA) agent with non-augmentable type will take the token from her predecessors and,
while she may lose the token to another non-augmentable type, the token will not be
relinquished to any augmentable type. Therefore, the probability that an agent with
a non-augmentable type is the winner is exactly equal to the probability that at least
one such agent exists, therefore
Prt∼f










The second inequality follows from the assumption above that τ ∗ satisfies y(τ ∗, n) <ex(τ ∗). We conclude that ex requires an agent with non-augmentable type to win more
frequently than such an agent exists, which is a contradiction to interim feasibility ofex.
The contradiction that we derived in the proof of Theorem 4 yields a necessary
and sufficient condition, as formally stated in the following theorem for feasibility of
any given interim allocation rule.
Theorem 5. If the space of feasible allocations, æx, is defined by single unit allocation
constraints, an interim allocation rule ex is feasible iff
X
τ∈S
ex(τ) ≤ Prt∼f [∃i : ti ∈ S] , ∀S ⊆ TN (MRMB)
The necessity of condition (MRMB) was first discovered both by Maskin and Riley
(1984) and independently by Matthews (1984) and its sufficiency was first proved by
Border (1991, 2007). This condition implies that the space of feasible interim alloca-
tion rules, fX, can be specified by O(2|TN |) linear constraints on a |TN |-dimensional
space. An important consequence of Theorem 4 is that fX can equivalently be formu-
lated by only O(|TN |2) variables and O(|TN |2) linear constraints as a projection of S,
therefore any optimization problem over fX can equivalently be solved over S.
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2.4.2 General Allocation Constraints
In this section we consider environments where the set of feasible allocations X is
arbitrary, however we assume blackbox access to an algorithm for optimizing linear
objectives over X. We present computationally tractable algorithms both for opti-
mization over the space of interim allocation rules, and for ex post implementation of
interim allocation rules; however most of the details (including the actual algorithms
and the proofs) are deferred to chapter 3.
Flat allocation vector. A “flat allocation vector” x ∈ RTN×[m] specifies the al-
location for each type of each agent, i.e., x(τ) is the allocation of type τ ∈ TN .
Conditioned on type profile t ∈ T being reported, the space of feasible flat allocation




(x(t1), . . . ,x(tn)) ∈ X and x(τ) = 0,∀τ ∈ TN \ t©
where TN \ t denotes the set of all types minus t1, . . . , tn. Observe that x(τ) is forced
to be 0 for any type τ that is not among {t1, . . . , tn}.
For the rest of this section we assume all allocation vectors are flat in order to
simplify the exposition of our algorithms and proofs. For instance, x ∼ æx(t) will
denote an allocation vector drawn from æx(t) but represented as a flat allocation vector.
Observe that Xt has the same dimension as fX; furthermore, for any mechanism
M = (æx, çw) the interim allocation rule is now given by
ex = Et∼f Ex∼æx(t) [x] .
Observe that the implementation problem for an interim allocation rule ex ∈ fX is to
select an allocation vector from each Xt for each t ∈ T such that in expectation ex is
obtained.
chapter 3 studies the optimization and the implementation problem for fX in detail.
All of the theorems presented throughout the rest of this section are directly implied
by similar theorems in chapter 3 so the proofs are omitted here.
30
CHAPTER 2. MULTI TO SINGLE AGENT REDUCTION (INTERIM)
Theorem 6. For any ε, δ > 0, the problems of computing and implementing an opti-
mal interim allocation rule can be solved with an error of less than δ with probability
at least 1−ε in time polynomial in δ, log 1
ε
and the size of the problem, assuming black
box access to an algorithm for optimizing linear objective over X.
We show that the interim allocation rules corresponding to the vertices of fX are
easy to implement.
Theorem 7. Consider any vertex ex ∈ fX and let w be the normal vector to a strictly
supporting hyperplane for ex (i.e., w · ex′ − w · ex < 0, for all ex′ ∈ fX \ {ex}). ex has
a deterministic implementation as follows: under each type profile t ∈ T, select the
allocation x = arg maxx∈Xt w · x.
In the above theorem, if we interpret w as a vector of virtual valuations, then ex
can be implemented by choosing for each t ∈ T the allocation x ∈ Xt that maxi-
mizes the virtual surplus. Note that that by linearity of expectation every interim
allocation rule which is not a vertex of fX can be implemented by randomizing over
the implementations of the vertices of fX.
2.4.3 Polymatroidal Allocation Constraints
For environments where for every t ∈ T the convex hall of Xt is a polymatroid, we
present a polymatroidal characterization of fX. Since our implementation algorithms
only choose allocations that are vertices of Xt, we can replace each Xt with its convex
hall without loss of generality. We assume that a non-decreasing submodular function
F t is given for each t ∈ T such that Xt is the polymatroid associated with F t.
Definition 2. Given a non-decreasing submodular function F : [d] → R+, the poly-
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Example. Suppose there is one indivisible item to be allocated to at most one of
n agents; Let t ∈ T be the type profile reported by the agents. Then it is easy to see
that an allocation vector x ∈ RTN×[m] is feasible if and only if it satisfies the following
set of inequalities.
x(S) ≤ min(|S ∩ t|, 1), ∀S ⊆ TN
The above set of inequalities ensures that the item can be allocated to at most one of
the reported types and the allocations for all other types should be zero. Therefore Xt
is the polymatroid associated with the submodular function F t(S) = min(|S ∩ t|, 1).
Polymatroidal characterization of ex. Recall that an interim allocation rule ex
is feasible (i.e., ex ∈ ÜX) iff there exists an ex post allocation rule æx that implements it
(i.e., ex = Et∼f [Ex∼æx(t)[x]]). Note that every allocation vector in the support of æx(t)
must be in Xt therefore
x(S) ≤ F t(S), ∀t ∈ T,∀x ∈ æx(t),∀S ⊆ TN × [m] .
Taking the expectation over x ∼ æx(t) and then over t ∼ f we get
Et∼f

Ex∼æx(t) [x(S)] ≤ Et∼f F t(S) , ∀S ⊆ TN × [m] .
Observe that the left hand side of the above inequality is exactly ex and the right
hand side is itself a non-decreasing submodular function of S.10. Consequently, the
above inequality implies that ex ∈ PeF where ÜF is defined as follows.
Definition 3. ÜF : TN × [m]→ R+ is a non-decreasing submodular function given by
ÜF (S) = Et∼f F t(S) , S ⊆ TN × [m] .
The above discussion shows that if ex ∈ fX then ex ∈ PeF which implies fX ⊆ PeF ; we
will show that the two are in fact equal which implies that fX is itself a polymatroid.
10Because it is the expectation of (i.e., weighted sum of) non-decreasing submodular functions
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Theorem 8. fX is the polymatroid associated with ÜF (i.e., fX = PeF ).
The polymatroidal characterization of ex is important both because it relates to
qualitative characteristics of optimal mechanisms and because it leads to more efficient
algorithms for optimization and implementation of interim allocation rules.
Theorem 9. The problems of computing and implementing an optimal interim allo-
cation rule can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of computing ÜF .
We also show that the interim allocation rules corresponding to the vertices of fX
have particularly easy implementations.
Proposition 1 (Polymatroid Vertices). Consider an arbitrary non-decreasing sub-
modular function F : [d]→ R+ and the associated polymatroid PF . Every ordered
subset π = (π1, π2, . . .) ⊆ [d] identifies a vertex x ∈ PF whose value at each coordi-
nate j ∈ [d] is given by
x(j) =
8><>:
F ({π1, . . . , πr})−F({π1, . . . , πr−1}) if j = πr for some r ∈ [|π|]
0 if j 6∈ π
.
Furthermore, every vertex of PF is identified by one or more such ordered subsets.
Theorem 10. Consider an arbitrary vertex ex ∈ fX and a corresponding ordered subset
π ⊆ TN × [m]. Then ex can be implemented by choosing, for each t ∈ T, the allocation
corresponding to the vertex of Xt associated with π.
Suppose there are m indivisible items so that each coordinate of the allocation
vector corresponds to a pair of type and item. Then the previous theorem implies that
for every interim allocation rule ex which is a vertex of fX there exists an ordering π
over a subset of pairs of types and items, such that ex can be implemented by greedily
allocating items to agents (types) according to the ordering specified by π subject to
the constraint imposed by Xt.
k-unit allocation constraint. Suppose there are k units of an indivisible item and
agents are unit demand. Therefore an allocation vector is feasible iff the the total
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number of allocated items is no more than k, each one of the reported types get at
most one unit, and types that are not reported have a zero allocation. It is easy to see
that an allocation vector x is feasible, conditioned on type profile t being reported,
iff
x(S) ≤ min(|S ∩ t|, k), ∀S ⊆ TN .
Therefore Xt = PFt where F t(S) = min(|S ∩ t|, k). Then by Theorem 8 we can
argue that ex is a feasible interim allocation rule iff
ex(S) ≤ Et∼f [min(|S ∩ t|, k)] , ∀S ⊆ TN .
Observe that the result of Border (1991, 2007) can be obtained from the above in-
equalities by setting k = 1.
Lemma 3. ÜF (S) = Et∼f [min(|S ∩ t|, k)] can be exactly computed in time O((n+ |S|) · k)
for any S ∈ TN using dynamic programming.
Proof. It can be computed using the following dynamic program in which Gij denotes
the probability of the event that min(|t ∩ S ∩ T{1,...,i}|, k) = j.










k−1 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j = k
Gi−1j + (
P
ti∈S∩Ti fi(ti)) · (G
i−1
j−1 −Gi−1j ) 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j < k
1 i = 0, j = 0
0 otherwise
The above lemma can be combined with Theorem 9 to yields the following theo-
rem.
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Theorem 11. For an environment with k-unit allocation constraint, the problems of
computing and implementing an optimal interim allocation rule can be solved exactly,
in polynomial time.
Matroid allocation constraint. Suppose a subset of agents are to be selected to
receive some service. Suppose the set of all feasible subsets of agents is given by a
matroid M = (N, I), i.e., a subset A ⊆ N can be simultaneously allocated to (e.g.,
served) iff A ∈ I. Let rM denote the rank function of M. It is easy to see that an
allocation vector x is feasible, conditioned on type profile t being reported, iff
x(S) ≤ rM({i ∈ N |ti ∈ S}), ∀S ⊆ TN .
Therefore Xt = PFt where F t(S) = rM({i ∈ N |ti ∈ S}). Then by Theorem 8 we
can argue that ex is a feasible interim allocation rule iff
ex(S) ≤ Et∼f [rM({i ∈ N |ti ∈ S})] , ∀S ⊆ TN .
Observe that k-unit allocation constraint is a special case of matroid allocation con-
straint in which the matroid is k-uniform. In particular the characterization of interim
feasibility for k-unit allocation constraint can be obtained from the above inequalities
by setting rM(A) = min(|A|, k).
2.5 Omitted Proofs
We first describe a network flow formulation of S, which is used to prove Lemma 1
and Lemma 2.
A network flow formulation of S. We construct a network in which every feasible
flow corresponds to some (y, z) ∈ S. The network (see Figure 2.1) has a source
node 〈Src〉, a sink node 〈Snk〉, and n − i + 1 nodes for every ti ∈ TN labeled as
〈ti, i〉, . . . , 〈ti, n〉 where each node 〈ti′ , i〉 corresponds to the type ti′ at the time SSA
algorithm is visiting agent i. For each ti′ ∈ TN and for each i ∈ {i′, . . . , n− 1} there
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𝑧(𝑏, 𝑑) ≤ 𝑦 𝑏, 1 𝑓2(𝑑) 
𝑦 𝑏, 1  𝑦 𝑏, 2  
𝑦 𝑐, 2  
𝑦 𝑑, 2  
𝑧 𝑏, 𝑑  
Figure 2.1: The flow network corresponding to the SSA algorithm 1.
. In this instance, there are three agents with type spaces T1 = {a, b}, T2 = {c, d},
and T3 = {e, g}. All nodes in the same row correspond to the same type. The
diagonal edges have dynamic capacity constraints while all other edges have no
capacity constraints. The flow going from 〈ti′ , i〉 to 〈ti, i〉 corresponds to the ex-ante
probability of ti taking the token away from ti′ . The flow going from 〈ti′ , i〉 to
〈ti′ , i+ 1〉 corresponds to the ex-ante probability of ti′ still holding the token after
agent i is visited.
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is an edge (〈ti′ , i〉, 〈ti′ , i+ 1〉) with infinite capacity whose flow is equal to y(ti′ , i); we
refer to these edges as “horizontal edges”. For every ti′ and every ti where i
′ < i
there is an edge (〈ti′ , i〉, 〈ti, i〉) whose flow is equal to z(ti′ , ti) and whose capacity is
equal to the total amount of flow that enters 〈ti′ , i〉 multiplied by fi(ti), i.e., it has
a dynamic capacity which is equal to y(ti′ , i − 1)fi(ti); we refer to these edges as
“diagonal edges”. There is an edge (〈Src〉, t0) through which the source node pushes
exactly one unit of flow. Finally, for every ti ∈ TN , there is an edge (〈ti, n〉, 〈Snk〉)
with unlimited capacity whose flow is equal to y(ti, n). To simplify the proofs we
sometimes use 〈t0, 0〉 as an alias for the source node 〈Src〉 and 〈ti, n+ 1〉 for i ∈ [n]
as aliases for the sink node 〈Snk〉. The network always has a feasible flow because
all the flow can be routed along the path 〈Src〉, 〈t0, 1〉, . . . , 〈t0, n〉, 〈Snk〉.
We define the residual capacity between two types ti′ , ti ∈ TN with respect to a
given (y, z) ∈ S as follows.
ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) =
8>>><>>>:
y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti)− z(ti′ , ti) i > i′




Due to dynamic capacity constraints, it is not possible to augment a flow along a
path with positive residual capacity by simply changing the amount of the flow along
the edges of the path, because reducing the total flow entering a node also decreases
the capacity of the diagonal edges leaving that node, which could potentially violate
their capacity constraints. Therefore, we introduce an operator Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ)
(algorithm 1 and Figure 2.2) which modifies an existing (y, z) ∈ S, while maintaining
its feasibility, to transfer a ρ-fraction of y(ti, n) to y(ti′ , n) by changing the flow along
the cycle
〈Snk〉, 〈ti′ , n〉, 〈ti′ , n− 1〉, . . . , 〈ti′ ,max(i′, i)〉, 〈ti,max(i′, i)〉, . . . , 〈ti, n− 1〉, 〈ti, n〉, 〈Snk〉
and adjusting the flow of the the diagonal edges which leave this cycle. More pre-
cisely, Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ) takes out a ρ-fraction of the flow going through the subtree
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rooted at 〈ti′ ,max(i′, i)〉 11 and reassigns it to the subtree rooted at 〈ti,max(i′, i)〉
(see Figure 2.2).
Algorithm 1 Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ).
Input: An existing (y, z) ∈ S given implicitly, a source type ti′ ∈ TN , a destination
type ti ∈ TN where i′ 6= i, and a fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: Modify (y, z) to transfer a ρ-fraction of y(ti′ , n) to
y(ti, n) while ensuring that the modified assignment is still in
S.
1: if i′ < i then
2: Increase z(ti′ , ti) by ρ · y(ti′ , i).
3: else
4: Decrease z(ti, ti′) by ρ · y(ti′ , i′).
5: end if
6: for i′′ = max(i′, i) to n do
7: Increase y(ti, i
′′) by ρ · y(ti′ , i′′).
8: Decrease y(ti′ , i
′′) by ρ · y(ti′ , i′′).
9: end for
10: for ti′′ ∈ T{max(i′,i)+1,...,n} do
11: Increase z(ti, ti′′) by ρ · z(ti′ , ti′′).
12: Decrease z(ti′ , ti′′) by ρ · z(ti′ , ti′′).
13: end for
Proof of Lemma 1. For any given (y, z) ∈ S we show that it is always possible to
modify y and z to obtain a non-degenerate feasible assignment with the same induced
interim allocation probabilities (i.e., the same y(·, n)). Let d denote the number of




y(ti, n) = 0, y(ti, i) > 0©
The proof is by induction on d. The base case is d = 0 which is trivial. We prove the
claim for d > 0 by modifying y and z, reducing the number of degenerate types to
d− 1, and then applying the induction hypothesis. Let ti be a degenerate type. For
each ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1}, we apply the operator Reroute(ti, ti′ , z(ti′ ,ti)y(ti,i) ) unless y(ti, i) has
11This subtree consists of the path 〈ti′ ,max(i′, i)〉, . . . , 〈ti′ , n〉, 〈Snk〉 and all the diagonal edges
leaving this path.
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〈𝑆𝑟𝑐〉 −𝜌. y(𝑡0, 1) 
+𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑑) 
+𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑐) 
−𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑐) 
−𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑑) 
+𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑔) 
+𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑒) 
−𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑒) 
−𝜌. z(𝑡0, 𝑔) 
+𝜌. y(𝑡0, 1) 
−𝜌. y(𝑡0, 2) −𝜌. y(𝑡0, 3) 
+𝜌. y(𝑡0, 1) +𝜌. y(𝑡0, 2) +𝜌. y(𝑡0, 3) 
Figure 2.2: Changes made by applying Reroute(t0, b, ρ).
. A ρ-fraction of the red subtree rooted at t0 is take out and reassigned to the green
subtree rooted at b. The exact amount of change is indicated for each green and
each red edge. The flow along all other edges stay intact. The operator has the effect
of reassigning ρ-fraction of ex-ante probability of allocation for type t0 to type b.
already reached 0. Applying this operator to each type ti′ eliminates the flow from
〈ti′ , i〉 to 〈ti, i〉, so eventually y(ti, i) reaches 0 and ti is no longer degenerate and also
no new degenerate type is introduced, so the number of degenerate types is reduced
to d− 1. It is also easy to see that y(ti′ , n) is not modified because y(ti, n) = 0. That
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove the lemma it is enough to show that for any augmentable
type ti′ and any non-augmentable type ti, ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) = 0 which is equivalent
to the statement of the lemma (the equivalence follows from the definition of ResCap
and equation (π)). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose ti′ is augmentable and
ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) = δ for some positive δ; we show that ti is also augmentable.
Since ti′ is augmentable, there exists a (y
′, z′) ∈ S such that y′(τ, n) = y(τ, n) for all
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τ ∈ TN \ {t0, ti′} and y′(ti′ , n)− y(ti′ , n) = ε > 0. Define
(y′′, z′′) = (1− β) · (y, z) + β · (y′, z′)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that we specify later. Note that in (y′′, z′′), ti′ is
augmented by βε, and ResCapy′′,z′′(ti′ , ti) ≥ (1 − β)δ, and (y′′, z′′) ∈ S because it
is a convex combination of (y, z) and (y′, z′). Consider applying Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ)
to (y′′, z′′) for some parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The idea is to choose β and ρ such that
the exact amount, by which ti′ was augmented, gets reassigned to ti, by applying
Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ); so that eventually ti is augmented while every other type (except
t0) has the same allocation probabilities as they originally had in (y, z). It is easy to







we get a feasible assignment in which the allocation probability of ti is augmented by
βε while every other type (except t0) has the same allocation probabilities as in (y, z).
We still need to show that β > 0. The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose β = 0,
so it must be y(ti′ , n) = 0, which would imply that ti′ is a degenerate type because
y(ti′ , i
′) > 0 (because ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) > 0), however (y, z) is a non-degenerate




Optimizing Over A Stochastic Polytope
We consider the following abstract stochastic optimization problem: we would like
to select (possibly at random) a point x ∈ Rd so as to maximize the the value of
a concave objective function Obj(E[x]), i.e., the objective function depends only on
the expected value of x; the set of feasible choices for x depends on a random variable
t with known distribution D; for each realization of t, the set of feasible choices for
x, denoted by Xt, is a bounded subset of Rd. Formally, the problem is to identify a
“selection policy”, say æx, which maps each realization of t to a distribution over Xt,
with the objective of maximizing Obj(Et∼D[Ex∼æx(t)[x]]). Note that it is not required
to explicitly compute the optimal æx; it is enough that a point x can be efficiently
sampled from æx(t), for any given t. We present computationally efficient algorithms
(i.e., polynomial running time) for this problem, assuming we can efficiently sample
t from D and efficiently optimize any linear objective over Xt. In particular, the
running times of our proposed algorithms do not depend on the size of the support
of D.
Definition 4 (fX). A point ex ∈ Rd is “implementable” iff there exists a feasible se-
lection policy æx such that ex = Et∼D[Ex∼æx(t)[x]]; subsequently, we say æx “implements”ex. The set of all implementable points is denoted by . Conceptually, one can definefX = Et∼D[Xt].
Proposition 2. fX is convex.
Proof. Consider any ex, ex′ ∈ fX and β ∈ [0, 1]. We show that ex′′ = βex + (1−β)ex′ ∈ fX
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which proves that fX is convex. Let æx and æx′ be selection policies implementing ex andex′ respectively. Let æx′′ be the selection policy which with probability β selects accord-
ing to æx and otherwise selects according to æx′. It is easy to see that æx′′ implementsex′′.
Consider the following convex program.
maximize Obj(ex) (àOPT )
subject to ex ∈ fX
The problem can be broken down to two parts:
• Optimization problem. Compute an optimal assignment for program (àOPT ).
• Implementation problem. Given a point ex ∈ fX and given Xt (specified
by t), identify a selection polity æx that implements ex, and draw at random
x ∼ æx(t).
Main result. The main result of this chapter can be summarized in the following
informal theorem.
Theorem 12. For any ε, δ > 0, both the optimization problem and the implementation
problem can be solved within an absolute error less than δ (in terms of Euclidian
distance) with probability at least 1 − ε in time polynomial in δ, log 1
ε
and the size of
the problem, assuming black box access to polynomial time algorithms for sampling
t ∼ D and optimizing linear objectives over Xt.
Road map. Section §3.1 presents a characterization of the vertices of fX which
leads to a simple algorithm (based on sampling) for optimizing a linear objective
over fX; this characterization also yields a simple deterministic implementation for
the vertices of fX. Furthermore, any point in fX can be decomposed as a convex
combination of vertices of fX and therefore can be implemented by randomizing over
the implementations of those vertices. Section §3.2 presents a separation oracle for fX,
which can be used with the Ellipsoid method to optimize a concave objective over fX.
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The separation oracle itself makes use of the Ellipsoid method to reduce the separation
problem to the problem of optimizing a linear objective over fX. Section §3.3 presents
a polymatroidal characterization of fX assuming each Xt is itself a polymatroid. This
polymatroidal characterization yields more efficient algorithms for optimization and
implementation over fX.
3.1 Preliminaries
This section presents basic separating/supporting hyperplane theorems from convex
optimization and provides a simple characterization of the vertices of fX which yields
a simple algorithm for optimizing linear functions over fX and also yields a simple
determinist implementation for the vertices of fX.
Sampling and optimization over Xt. We assume blackbox access to algorithms
with polynomial running time for:
• Sampling t ∼ D.
• Computing arg†maxx∈Xt w · x for any given w ∈ Rd and Xt ⊂ Rd (specified by
t), where arg†max breaks ties in lexicographical order 1.
Separating/Supporting hyperplanes. fX is a closed convex polytope, therefore
for any point outside of fX there exists a separating hyperplane (i.e., a hyperplane
that separates that point from the polytope); also for any vertex of fX there exists
a strict supporting hyperplane (i.e., a hyperplane through that vertex such that the
rest of fX lies strictly on one side of the hyperplane).
Proposition 3 (Separating Hyperplane). Consider any ex ∈ Rd; ex is not in fX iff
there exists w ∈ Rd such that
w · ex′ −w · ex < 0, for all ex′ ∈ fX.
1The lexicographical tie breaking is not strictly necessary, but simplifies the exposition.
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Proposition 4 (Strict Supporting Hyperplane). Consider any ex ∈ fX; ex is a vertex
of fX iff there exists w ∈ Rd such that
w · ex′ −w · ex < 0, for all ex′ ∈ fX \ {ex}
Optimization of a linear objective over fX. Suppose the objective function
Obj(ex) is a linear function of ex, i.e., Obj(ex) = w · ex for some w ∈ Rd; then an
optimal assignment for program (àOPT ) is given by arg†maxex∈eX w · ex.
Lemma 4. For any w ∈ Rd,
arg†maxex∈eX w · ex = Et∼D arg†maxx∈Xt w · x .
Proof. Let ex = arg†maxex∈eX w · ex and let æx be a selection policy that implements ex.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the equation does not hold, so there must
be some t∗ ∈ D for which æx(t∗) 6= x∗ = arg†maxx∈Xt∗ x · x which implies that either
w · æx(t∗) < w · x∗ or w · æx(t∗) = w · x∗ and x∗ comes before æx(t∗) in lexicographical
order; in either case, we can obtain a new selection policy æx′ which is the same asæx everywhere except that æx′(t∗) = x∗; let ex′ ∈ fX be the point implemented by æx′;
it is easy to see that either w · ex < w · ex′ or w · ex = w · ex′ and ex′ comes before ex
in lexicographical order; in either case we have a contradiction which completes the
proof 2.
The previous lemma implies that the optimal along the direction of w can be
achieved in expectation by optimizing along the direction of w over every realization
of Xt; consequently, arg†maxex∈eX w · ex can be approximated to any degree of accuracy
2The proof implicitly assumes that every t ∈ D has a probability mass of non-zero measure; this
assumption is without loss of generality if t is a discrete random variable. Also, it is easy to extend
the proof to the case of t being a continuous random variable.
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with high probability by sampling and taking the average.
Definition 5. ApxSolve(w). Given w ∈ Rd and an implicit parameter σ ∈ N0,
compute and return an approximate solution for arg†maxex∈eX w · ex:
1. For each ` ∈ [σ]: sample t` ∼ D and compute x` = arg†maxx∈Xt` w · x.
2. Compute exAPX ← Pσ`=1 x` /σ and return exAPX.
Definition 6. η is the length of the smallest hypercube which contains Xt for all
t ∈ D.





that for any w ∈ Rd, if exOPT = arg†maxex∈eX w · ex and exAPX = ApxSolve(w), then
‖exAPX − exOPT‖ < δ with probability at least 1− ε.
Proof. Recall that exOPT = Et∼D[arg†maxx∈Xt w · x] by Lemma 4, therefore






|exAPX(j)− exOPT(j)| ≥ δ/√di






where the last inequality follows from Hoeffding’s inequality (recall that ex1(j), . . . , exσ(j)









we get Pr[‖exAPX − exOPT‖ < δ] ≥ 1− ε which completes the proof.
Corollary 3. Consider any algorithm that makes up to c ∈ N calls to ApxSolve.
For any ε, δ > 0, there exists σ ∈ N0 such that σ is polynomial in c, log 1ε , δ and such
that with probability 1− ε all calls to ApxSolve have errors less than δ.






) such that a single call to
ApxSolve returns a point with an error of at most δ with probability at least 1−ε/σ
and consequently with probability 1− ε all calls have errors of at most δ.
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Implementation of vertices of fX. Another consequence of Lemma 4 is that every
vertex of fX has a simple implementation.
Proposition 5. Consider any vertex ex of fX and let w be the normal vector to a
strictly supporting hyperplane for ex (i.e., w · ex′ −w · ex < 0, for all ex′ ∈ fX \ {ex}). ex
has a deterministic implementation as follows: under each realization of t, select the
point x = arg†maxx∈Xt w · x.
Furthermore, every point in fX can be implemented by decomposing it as a convex
combination of vertices of fX and randomizing over the implementations of those
vertices. This observation is the basis of our algorithms for implementing arbitrary
points in fX.
Proposition 6. Every ex of fX has a randomized implementation as follows: roundex to a vertex ex∗ at random such that E[ex∗] = ex; then implement ex∗ (as in Proposi-
tion 5).
Proof. Since fX is a convex polytope, every ex ∈ fX can be written as ex = P` λ`ex∗`
where each ex∗` is a vertex of fX and P` λ` = 1. Consequently, ex can be implemented
by rounding it to ex∗` with probability λ` for each `, and then using the corresponding
deterministic implementation.
3.2 General Polytopes
For both the optimization problem and the implementation problem over fX, we
present polynomial time reductions to the linear optimization problem over fX; recall
that the linear optimization problem over fX can be approximated to any degree
of accuracy and with high probability via sampling in polynomial time. To avoid
complicating the exposition we omit the details related to preserving the sampling
error through the reduction.
Optimization over fX. Any concave optimization problem over fX can be solved by
the Ellipsoid method as long as a separation oracle for fX is available. Grötschel et al.
(1981) showed that, for any convex polytope, the separation problem and the linear
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optimization problem are equivalent, i.e., there exists a polynomial time reduction
between the two problems. Our approach is to reduce the separation problem for fX
to the linear optimization problem over fX which can then be solved via sampling as
explained in the previous section.
The separation problem for fX can be reduced to the linear optimization problem
over fX by using the Ellipsoid method itself. Recall that for any point ex 6∈ fX there
can be several hyperplanes separating ex from fX; each such separating hyperplane is
determined by its normal vector.
Definition 7 (Separating Witness). Consider any ex,w ∈ Rd. w is a separating
witness for ex iff
w · ex′ −w · ex < 0, for all ex′ ∈ fX.
The set of all separating witnesses for ex is
W(ex) = ¦w ∈ Rdw · ex′ −w · ex < 0,∀ex′ ∈ fX© .
W(ex) is a convex cone consisting of all vectors that are normal to a separating
hyperplane for ex; in particular, W(ex) is empty for every ex ∈ fX.
The separation problem for fX can be reduced to linear optimization problem overfX as follows: given a query ex ∈ Rd, use the Ellipsoid method to verify whether W(ex)
is empty (hence ex ∈ fX), and if not, to find a w ∈W(ex); for every w ∈ Rd queried
by the Ellipsoid method, optimizing over fX along the direction of w either yields
a separating hyperplane for ex, or yields a separating hyperplane for w itself. The
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reduction is formally described in Definition 8 and Definition 9.
Definition 8. DualSep(ex,w). Given a query w ∈ Rd and ex ∈ Rd, either confirm
that w ∈W(ex), or find a hyperplane that separates w from W(ex):
1. Compute ex∗ = arg†maxex′∈eX w · ex′.
2. If w · (ex− ex∗) > 0, assert w ∈W(ex).
3. Otherwise, w can be separated from W(ex) by
w′ · (ex− ex∗) > 0, for all w′ ∈W(ex).
Definition 9. Sep(ex). Given a query ex ∈ Rd, either confirm that ex ∈ fX, or find a
hyperplane that separates ex from fX:
1. Find a w ∈W(ex) using the Ellipsoid method with separation oracle DualSep(ex, ·).
2. If the Ellipsoid method concludes that W(ex) is empty, assert ex ∈ fX.
3. Otherwise, ex can be separated from fX by
w · (ex′ − ex) < 0, for all ex′ ∈ fX.
Theorem 14. The separation problem over fX can be reduced to the linear optimiza-
tion problem over fX in polynomial time.
Proof. The claim follows from the algorithms of Definition 8 and Definition 9.
The linear optimization problems over fX can be approximated to any degree
of accuracy with high probability by sampling (Definition 5). By modifying the
above reduction to take the sampling error into account and then combining it with
Corollary 3 the following theorem can be proved.
Theorem 15. For any ε, δ > 0, there exists an algorithm for the separation problem
over fX, and consequently an algorithm for the concave optimization problem over fX,
with an error of less than δ with probability at least 1 − ε, and with running time
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Implementation of points in fX. Recall that any ex ∈ fX can be implemented by
randomizing over the implementations of the vertices of fX. This can be done by (a)
finding a subset of vertices (of polynomial size) such that ex falls in their convex hall,
(b) decomposing ex as a convex combination of those vertices (i.e., by solving a linear
program), and (c) picking a vertex at random according to that convex combination
and then implementing that vertex. The only non-trivial step is (a). However, it turns
out the separation oracle Sep in fact does the step (a) implicitly! The algorithm is
sketched in Definition 11.
Definition 10. ImplementVertex(w,Xt). Given w ∈ Rd and Xt ⊂ Rd (specified
by t), select a vertex x ∈ Xt so as to implement the vertex ex = Et∼D[arg†maxx∈Xt w ·
x] ∈ fX in expectation:
1. Return arg†maxx∈Xt w · x.
Definition 11. Implement(ex,Xt). Given ex ∈ fX and Xt ⊂ Rd (specified by t),
select a vertex x ∈ Xt at random so as to implement ex in expectation:
1. Run the Ellipsoid method with separation oracle DualSep(ex, ·).
2. Let w1, . . . ,wc ∈ Rd denote the queries by the Ellipsoid method to DualSep;
also let ex∗1, . . . , ex∗c ∈ fX denote the corresponding points computed by DualSep
where, for each ` ∈ [c], w` is separated from W(ex) by
w′ · (ex− ex∗`) > 0, for all w′ ∈W(ex).
3. Compute λ1, . . . , λc ∈ [0, 1] such that
Pc
`=1 λ`ex∗` = ex and Pc`=1 λ` = 1 (i.e.,
using linear programming).
4. Pick ` ∈ [c] at random with probability λ`.
5. Return ImplementVertex(w`,X
t).
Observe that the first step of the algorithm Implement (Definition 11) is practi-
cally the same as invoking the separation oracle Sep on point ex. Given that ex ∈ fX,
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the Ellipsoid method will confirm W(ex) is empty after making polynomially many
calls to DualSep(ex, ·), so c is polynomially bounded. For each w` queried by the El-
lipsoid method, DualSep computes a vertex ex∗` which is optimal along the direction
of w`. It is easy to see that the Ellipsoid method concludes the emptiness of W(ex)
if and only if ex falls in the convex hall of ex∗1, . . . , ex∗c . Therefore, the first step of the
algorithm indeed finds polynomially many vertices of fX whose convex hall contain ex.
The algorithm picks ` ∈ [c] at random such that E`[ex∗` ] = ex and then implements ex∗` .
Theorem 16. For any point in fX, the implementation problem can be reduced to the
linear optimization problem over fX in polynomial time.
Proof. The claim follows from the algorithms of Definition 11.
Recall that the linear optimization problems over fX can be approximated to any
degree of accuracy with high probability by sampling (Definition 5). Consequently,
from Definition 11 and Corollary 3 the following theorem can be proved.
Theorem 17. For any ε, δ > 0, there exists an algorithm for the implementation
problem for any point in fX which has an error of less than δ with probability at least
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3.3 Polymatroids
In this section we consider problem instances where the convex hall of each Xt is
a polymatroid. We present a polymatroidal characterization of fX which also leads
to specialized algorithms for both optimization and implementation over fX. Since
our implementation algorithms only select points that are vertices of Xt, we can
replace each Xt with its convex hall without loss of generality. We assume that a
non-decreasing submodular function F t is given for each t ∈ D such that Xt is the
polymatroid associated with F t.
Definition 12. Given a non-decreasing submodular function F : [d] → R+, the




x(S) ≤ F (S),∀S ⊆ [d]©
where x(S) is a shorthand notation for
P
j∈S x(j).
Consider an arbitrary ex ∈ fX and a corresponding selection policy æx that imple-
ments ex, i.e., Et∼D[Ex∼æx(t)[x]] = ex. Recall that ex ∈ fX iff such a selection policy
exists. Observe that x must be selected form Xt therefore
x(S) ≤ F t(S), ∀t ∈ D,∀x ∈ æx(t),∀S ⊆ [d] .
Taking the expectation over x ∼ æx(t) and over t ∼ D we get
Et∼D

Ex∼æx(t) [x(S)] ≤ Et∼D F t(S) , ∀S ⊆ [d] .
Observe that the left hand side of the above inequality is exactly ex and the right
hand side is a non-decreasing submodular function of S.3. Consequently, the above
3Because it is the expectation of (i.e., weighted sum of) non-decreasing submodular functions
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inequality implies that ex ∈ PeF where ÜF is defined as follows.
Definition 13. ÜF : [d]→ R+ is a non-decreasing submodular function defined as
ÜF (S) = Et∼D F t(S) , S ⊆ [d]
So far we have shown that if ex ∈ fX then ex ∈ PeF which implies that fX is a subset
of PeF ; we will show that the two are in fact equal which implies that fX is itself a
polymatroid.
Theorem 18. fX is the polymatroid associated with ÜF (i.e., fX = PeF ).
The proof of the above theorem heavily relies on the following characterization of
the vertices of a polymatroid.
Proposition 7 (Polymatroid Vertices). Consider an arbitrary non-decreasing sub-
modular function F : [d]→ R+ and the associated polymatroid PF . Every ordered
subset π = (π1, π2, . . .) ⊆ [d] identifies a vertex x ∈ PF whose value at each coordi-
nate j ∈ [d] is given by
x(j) =
8><>:
F ({π1, . . . , πr})−F({π1, . . . , πr−1}) if j = πr for some r ∈ [|π|]
0 if j 6∈ π
.
Furthermore, every vertex of PF is identified by one or more such ordered subsets.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 18. Note that we have already shown fX ⊆ PeF ,
so we only need to show PeF ⊆ fX. Since both PeF and fX are convex polytopes it
is enough to show that every vertex of PeF is in fX. Consider an arbitrary vertexex ∈ PF and a corresponding ordered subset π = (π1, π2, . . .) ⊆ [d]; such a π exists
by Proposition 7. We explicitly present a selection policy that implements ex which
implies that ex ∈ fX. For each t ∈ D, we select the vertex xt ∈ Xt = PFt associated
with π. We show that Et∼D[xt] = ex. Observe that for each j ∈ [d]:
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• If j = πr for some r ∈ [|π|], then
ex(j) = ÜF ({π1, . . . , πr})− ÜF ({π1, . . . , πr−1})
= Et∼D








• Otherwise j 6∈ π which implies that
ex(j) = 0 = Et∼D xt(j) .
Therefore Et∼D[xt] = ex which completes the proof. The above proof also implies the
following theorem.
Theorem 19. Consider an arbitrary vertex ex ∈ fX and a corresponding ordered subset
π ⊆ [d]. Then ex can be implemented by selecting, for each t ∈ D, the vertex of Xt
associated with π.
Optimization over fX. Recall that any concave optimization problem over fX can
be solved in polynomial time by the Ellipsoid method assuming a polynomial time
separation oracle is available. fX is a polymatroid which is defined by an exponential
number of linear inequalities, however the separation problem for any given ex ∈ Rd
can be solved in polynomial time as follows: find S∗ = arg minS⊆[d]
ÜF (S) − ex(S); ifex 6∈ fX, the inequality ex(S∗) ≤ ÜF (S∗) must be violated, and that yields a separating
hyperplane for ex. Note that ÜF (S) − ex(S) is itself submodular in S, so it can be
minimized in strong polynomial time. Consequently, optimization problems can be
solved over polymatroids in polynomial time. In some cases ÜF can be computed
exactly in strong polynomial time (e.g., using dynamic programming); otherwise it
can be approximated to any degree of accuracy with high probability via sampling in
polynomial time. In either case, the separation problem for fX can be solved without
relying on the the Ellipsoid method; that makes concave optimization over fX more
efficient than the general case.
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Implementation of points in fX. Recall that any ex ∈ fX can be implemented by
randomizing over the implementations of the vertices of fX. This can be done by (a)
iteratively making small changes to ex to arrive at a vertex while ensuring that the
expected change at each iteration is 0, and (b) implementing the vertex obtained in
the previous step. Recall that by Theorem 19 any vertex of fX can be implemented
as in Definition 15. Next we describe our approach for (a).
Definition 14 (Tight Sets). Consider an arbitrary non-decreasing submodular func-
tion F : [d]→ R+ where F (∅) = 0 and consider the associated polymatroid PF . A
subset S ⊆ [d] is tight with respect to a given x ∈ PF iff x(S) = F (S). A set Ψ =
{S0, S1, . . .} ⊂ 2[d] is called a nested family of tight sets with respect to x ∈ PF , if and
only the elements of Ψ can be ordered/relabeled such that ∅ = S0 ⊂ · · · ⊂ S|S|−1 ⊆ [d],
and such that Sr is tight with respect to x (for every r ∈ {0, . . . , |S|}).
Definition 16 sketches the algorithm ImplementVertexP for implementing anyex ∈ fX = PeF . The algorithm makes small changes to ex iteratively until a vertex is
reached. At each iteration `, it computes ex` ∈ PeF , and a nested family of tight sets
Ψ` (with respect to ex`) such that
• E[ex`|ex`−1] = ex`−1, and
• ex` is closer to a vertex in the sense that either the number of non-zero coordinate
values increases by one or the number of tight sets decreases by one.
Observe that the above process must stop after at most 2d iterations4. At the `-th
iteration of the rounding process, a vector ∆ ∈ Rd and δ, δ′ ∈ R+ are computed
such that both ex`−1 + δ∆ and ex`−1 − δ′∆ are still in PeF , but closer to a vertex.
The algorithm then chooses at random δ′′ ∈ {δ,−δ′} such that E[δ′′] = 0, and setsex` ← ex`−1 + δ′′∆.
Definition 15. ImplementVertexP(π,Xt). Given an ordered subset π ⊆ [d] and
Xt ⊂ Rd (specified by t), select a vertex x ∈ Xt so as to implement the vertex of fX
associated with π in expectation:
1. Return the vertex of x ∈ Xt associated with π (see Proposition 7).
4In fact we will show that it stops after at most d iterations.
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Definition 16 (ImplementP(ex,Xt)). Given ex ∈ fX and Xt ⊂ Rd (specified by t),
select at random a vertex x ∈ Xt so as to implement ex in expectation.
In the following, let 1j ∈ [0, 1]d be the vector whose value is 1 at coordinate j and 0
everywhere else.
1. Initialize Ψ ← {∅}. Ψ will maintain a nested family of tight sets with respect
to ex. Whenever Ψ is updated, order/relabel its element as Ψ = {S0, S1, . . .} so
that S0 ⊂ S1 ⊆ · · · .
2. Repeat each of the following steps until no longer applicable:
• If there exist distinct j, j′ ∈ Sr \ Sr−1 for some r ∈ [|Ψ| − 1]:
(a) Let ∆ ← 1j − 1j′ Compute δ, δ′ ∈ R+ such that ex + δ∆ has a new
tight set S and ex− δ′∆ has a new tight set S ′, i.e:
– Let S ← arg minSr−1+j⊆S⊆Sr−j′ ÜF (S)− ex(S),
and δ ← ÜF (S)− ex(S).
– Let S ′ ← arg minSr−1+j′⊆S′⊆Sr−j ÜF (S ′)− ex(S ′),









: set ex← ex− δ′∆, and add S ′ to Ψ.
• If there exists j ∈ [d] \ S|S|−1 for which ex(j) > 0:
(a) Let ∆← 1j, and compute δ, δ′ ∈ R+ such that ex+ δ∆ has a new tight
set S and ex− δ′∆ has a zero at coordinate j, i.e:
– Let S ← arg minS⊇S|S|−1+j
ÜF (S)− ex(S), and δ ← ÜF (S)− ex(S).









: set ex← ex− δ′∆
3. Let π = (π1, . . . , π|Ψ|−1) ⊆ [d] be the ordered subset associated with Ψ where πr ∈
Sr \ Sr−1 for each r ∈ [|π|].
4. Return ImplementVertexP(π,Xt).
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Theorem 20. The implementation problem for any point ex ∈ fX = PeF can be reduced
to computing ÜF in polynomial time.
Proof. It follows from the algorithm of Definition 16.
56
Chapter 4
Multi to Single Agent Reduction (Ex ante)
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present an alternative multi to single agent decomposition ap-
proach that leads to approximately optimal mechanisms, but is far more practical
compared to the approach presented in §2 in terms of both computation and appli-
cability. In §2, we presented a general decomposition technique to reduce a multi
agent mechanism design problem to single agent subproblems. The decomposition
technique allowed us avoid the exponential blow up (as a function of the number of
agents) in the size of the optimization problem. On the other hand, the proposed
techniques are more theoretical than practical as they heavily rely on the use of El-
lipsoid method where each query to the separation oracle involves solving a second
optimization problem.
The decomposition technique of the current chapter can be roughly described as
the following: (i) Construct a mechanism that satisfies the supply constraints only in
expectation (ex-ante); the optimization problem for constructing such a mechanism
can be fully decomposed over the set of agents. (ii) Convert the mechanism from
the previous step to another mechanism that satisfies the supply constraint at every
instance.
We restrict our discussion to Bayesian combinatorial auctions. We are interested
in mechanisms that allocate a set of heterogenous items with limited supply to a set of
agents in order to maximize the expected value of a certain objective function which
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is linearly separable over the agents (e.g., welfare, revenue, etc). The agents’ types
are assumed to be distributed independently according to publicly known priors. We
defer the formal statement of our assumptions to §4.2.
Our framework can be summarized as follows. We start by relaxing the supply
constraints, i.e., we consider the mechanisms for which only the ex-ante expected num-
ber of allocated units of each item is no more than the supply of that item. Note that
“ex-ante” means that the expectation taken over all possible inputs (i.e., all possible
types of the agents). We show that the optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem
can be constructed by independently running n single agent mechanisms, where each
single agent mechanism is subject to an ex-ante probabilistic supply constraint. In
particular, we show that if one can construct an α-approximate mechanism for each
single agent problem, then running these mechanisms simultaneously and indepen-
dently yields an α-approximate mechanism for the relaxed multiple agent problem.
We then present two methods for converting the mechanism for the relaxed problem
to a mechanism for the original problem while losing a small constant factor in the
approximation. We present two generic multi agent mechanisms that use the single
agent mechanisms from the previous step as blackboxes 1. In the first mechanism, we
serve agents sequentially by running, for each agent, the corresponding single agent
mechanism from the previous step. However, we sometimes randomly preclude some
of the items from the early agents in order to ensure that late agents get the same
chance of being offered with those items; we ensure that the ex-ante expected proba-
bility of preclusion is equalized over all agents, regardless of the order in which they
are served (i.e., we simultaneously minimize the preclusion probability for all agents).
In the second mechanism, we run all of the single agent mechanisms simultaneously
and then modify the outcomes by deallocating some units of the over-allocated items
at random while adjusting the payments respectively; we ensure that the ex-ante
probability of deallocation is equalized among all units of each item and therefore
simultaneously minimized for all agents.
We also introduce a toy problem, the magician’s problem, in §4.4, along with a
1Note that the single agent mechanisms can be different for different agents, e.g., to accommodate
different classes of agents.
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near optimal solution for it, which is used as the main ingredient of our multi agent
mechanisms. A more general variant of this toy problem is presented in §5 along with
other applications.
As applications of our framework, in §4.6, we present mechanisms with improved
approximation factor for several settings from the literature. For each setting we
present a single agent mechanism that satisfies the requirements of our framework,
and can be plugged in one of our generic multi agent mechanisms.
4.1.1 Related Work
In single dimensional settings, the related works form the CS literature are mostly
focused on approximating the VCG mechanism for welfare maximization and/or
approximating the Myerson’s mechanism Myerson (1981) for revenue maximization
(e.g., Bulow and Roberts (1989); Babaioff et al. (2006); Blumrosen and Holenstein
(2008); Hartline and Roughgarden (2009); Dhangwatnotai et al. (2010); Chakraborty
et al. (2010); Yan (2011)). Most of them consider mechanisms that have simple im-
plementation and are computationally efficient. For welfare maximization in single
dimensional settings, Hartline and Lucier (2010) gives a blackbox reduction from
mechanism design to algorithmic design.
In multidimensional setting, for welfare maximization, Hartline et al. (2011) presents
a blackbox reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design which subsumes the
earlier work of Hartline and Lucier (2010).
Our work is also related to a line of work on approximating the Bayesian optimal
mechanism. These works tend to look for simple mechanisms that give constant (e.g.,
two) approximations to the optimal mechanism. Chawla et al. (2007), Briest et al.
(2010), and Cai and Daskalakis (2011) consider item pricing and lottery pricing for
a single agent; the first two give constant approximations the last gives a (1 + ε)-
approximation for any ε. These problems are related to the single-agent problems
we consider. Chawla et al. (2010) and Bhattacharya et al. (2010) extend these ap-
proaches to multi-agent auction problems. For revenue maximization, Chawla et al.
(2010) presents several sequential posted pricing mechanisms for various settings and
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various types of matroid feasibility constraints. These mechanisms have simple imple-
mentation and approximate the revenue of the optimal mechanism. For unit demand
agents whose valuations’ for the items are distributed according to product distribu-
tions, Chawla et al. (2010) present a sequential posted pricing mechanism that ob-
tains in expectation at least 1
6.75
-fraction of the revenue of the optimal posted pricing
mechanism. In §4.6.2, we present an improved sequential posted pricing mechanism
for this setting with an approximation factor of 1
2
γk in which k is the number of
units available of each item, and γk is a constant which is at least 1 − 1√k+3 . For
combinatorial auctions with additive/correlated valuations with budget and demand
constraints, Bhattacharya et al. (2010) presents all-pay 1
4
-approximate BIC mecha-
nisms for revenue maximization and a similar mechanism for welfare maximization.
In subsection 4.6.4, we present an improved mechanism for this setting with an ap-
proximation factor of γk. Note that γk is at least
1
2
and approaches 1 as k → ∞.
Bhattacharya et al. (2010) also presents sequential posted pricing mechanisms for the
same setting, obtaining O(1) approximation factors. For a similar setting, in §4.6.3,
we present an improved sequential posted pricing mechanism with an approximation
factor of (1− 1
e
)γk. Finally, Chawla et al. (2011) also considers various settings with
hard budget constraints.
4.2 Preliminaries
We present our framework for combinatorial auctions, but it can be readily applied
to Bayesian mechanism design in other contexts. We begin by defining the model and
some notation.
Model. We consider the problem of allocating m indivisible heterogenous items to
n agents where there are kj units of each item j ∈ [m]. All the relevant private
information of each agent i ∈ [n] is represented by her type ti ∈ Ti where Ti is the
type space of agent i. Let T = T1 × · · · × Tn be the space of all type profiles. The
agents’ type profile t ∈ T is distributed according to a publicly known prior D. We
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use xij(t) and pi(t) to denote the random variables
2 respectively for the allocation of
item j to agent i and the payment of agent i, for type profile t. For a mechanism
M , the random variables for allocations and payments are denoted respectively by
xMij (t) and p
M
i (t). We are interested in computing a mechanism that (approximately)
maximizes3 the expected value of a given objective function Obj(t, x,p) where t, x,
and p respectively represent the types, the allocations, and the payments of all agents.
We are only interested in mechanisms which are within a given space M of feasible
mechanisms. Formally, we aim to compute a mechanism M ∈ M that (approximately)
maximizes Et∼D[Obj(t, xM (t),pM (t))].
Assumptions. We make the following assumptions.
(A1) Independence. The agents’ types must be distributed independently, i.e.,
D = D1 × . . .×Dn where Di is the distribution of types for agent i. Note that
if agent i has multidimensional types, Di itself does not need to be a product
distribution.
(A2) Linear Separability of Objective. The objective function must be linearly
separable over the agents, i.e., Obj(t, x,p) =
P
iObji(ti, xi, pi) where ti, xi, and
pi respectively represent the type, the allocations, and the payment of agent i.
(A3) Single–Unit Demands. No agent should ever need more than one unit of
each item, i.e., xij(t) ∈ {0, 1} for all t ∈ T. This assumption is not necessary
and is only to simplify the exposition; it can be removed as explained in §4.7.
(A4) Incentive Compatibility. M must be restricted to (Bayesian) incentive com-
patible mechanisms. By direct revelation principle this assumption is without
loss of generality4,
2Note that these random variables are often correlated. Furthermore, for a deterministic mecha-
nism, these variables take deterministic values as a function of t.
3All of the results can be applied to minimization problems by simply maximizing the negation
of the objective function.
4It is WLOG, given that we are only interested in mechanisms that have Bayes-Nash equilibria.
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(A5) Convexity. M must be a convex space. In other words, every convex combi-
nation of every two mechanisms from M must itself be a mechanism in M. A
convex combination of two mechanisms M ,M ′ ∈ M is another mechanism M ′′
which simply runs M with probability β and runs M ′ with probability 1−β, for
some β ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, if M is restricted to deterministic mechanisms,
it is not convex; however if M also includes mechanisms that randomize over
deterministic mechanisms, then it is convex 5.
(A6) Decomposability. The set of constraints specifying M must be decomposable
to supply constraints (i.e.,
P
i xij(t) ≤ kj, for all t and all items j) and single
agent constraints(e.g., incentive compatibility, budget, etc). We define this
assumption formally as follows. For any mechanism M , let [[M ]]i be the single
agent mechanism perceived by agent i, by simulating6 the other agents according
to their respective distributions D−i. Define Mi = {[[M ]]i|M ∈ M} to be the
space of all feasible single agent mechanisms for agent i. The decomposability
assumption requires that for any arbitrary mechanism M the following holds:
if M satisfies the supply constraints and also [[M ]]i ∈ Mi (for all agents i), then
it must be that M ∈ M.
We shall clarify the last assumption by giving an example. Suppose M is the space
of all agent specific item pricing mechanisms, then M satisfies the last assumption.
On the other hand, if M is the space of mechanisms that offer the same set of prices
to every agent, it does not satisfy the decomposability assumption, because there is
an implicit inter agent constraint that the same prices should be offered to different
agents.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, we often omit the range of the sums whenever









5For an example of a randomized non-convex space of mechanisms, consider the space of mech-
anisms where the expected payment of every type must be either less than $2 or more than $4.
6The single agent mechanism induced on agent i can be obtained by simulating all agents other
than i by drawing a random t−i from D−i and running M on agent i and the n−1 simulated agents
with types t−i; note that this is a single agent mechanism because the simulated agents are just
part of the mechanism.
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Multi agent problem. Formally, the multi agent problem is to find a mechanism
















xMij (t) ≤ kj, ∀t ∈ T,∀j ∈ [m]
[[M ]]i ∈ Mi, ∀i ∈ [n]
Observe that, in the absence of the first set of constraints, we could optimize the
mechanism for each agent independently. This observation is the key to our multi to
single agent decomposition, which allows us to approximately decompose/reduce the
multi agent problem to single agent problems. A mechanism M is an α-approximation
of the optimal mechanism if it is a feasible mechanism for the above program and
obtains at least α-fraction of the optimal objective value of the program.
Ex ante allocation rule. For a multi agent mechanism M , the ex ante allocation
rule is a vector x ∈ [0, 1]n×m in which xij = Et∼D[xMij (t)] is the expected probability of
allocating a unit of item j to agent i, where the expectation is taken over all possible
type profiles. Note that for any feasible mechanism M , by linearity of expectation,
the ex ante allocation rule satisfies
P
i xij ≤ kj, for every item j.
Single agent problem. The single agent problem, for agent i, is to compute an
optimal single agent mechanism and its expected objective value, subject to a given
upper bound xi ∈ [0, 1]m on the ex ante allocation rule; in other words, the single
agent mechanism may not allocate a unit of item j to agent i with an expected
probability of more than xi, where the expectation is taken over ti ∼ Di. Formally,
the single agent problem is to compute the optimal value of the following program
along with a corresponding solution (i.e., the optimal Mi), for a given xi.
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≤ xij, ∀j ∈ [m]
Mi ∈ Mi,
We typically denote an optimal single agent mechanism for agent i, subject to a given
xi, by Mi〈xi〉, and denote its expected objective value (i.e., the optimal value of the
above program as a function of xi) by Ri(xi). Later, we prove that Ri(xi), which
we refer to as the optimal benchmark for agent i, is a concave function of xi. In
the case of approximation, we say that a single agent mechanism Mi together with
a concave benchmark Ri provide an α-approximation of the optimal single agent
mechanism/optimal benchmark, if the expected objective value of Mi〈xi〉 is at least
αRi(xi) and if Ri(xi) is an upper bound on the optimal benchmark, for every xi.
To make the exposition more concrete, consider the following single agent problem
as an example. Suppose there is only one type of item (i.e., m = 1) and the objective
is to maximize the expected revenue7. Suppose agent i’s valuation is drawn from
a regular distribution with CDF, Fi. The optimal single agent mechanism for i,
subject to xi ∈ [0, 1], is a deterministic mechanism which offers the item at some
fixed price, while ensuring that the probability of sale (i.e., the probability of agent
i’s valuation being above the offered price) is no more than xi. In particular, the





subject to xi ≤ xi
xi ∈ [0, 1]
Furthermore, the optimal single agent mechanism offers the item at the price F−1i (1−
7The optimal multi agent mechanism for this setting is given by Myerson (1981); yet we consider
this setting to keep the example simple and intuitive.
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xi) where xi is the optimal assignment for the above convex program. Note that, for a
regular distribution, xiF
−1
i (1− xi) is concave in xi, so the above program is a convex
program.
4.3 Decomposition via Ex ante Allocation Rule
In this section we present general methods for approximately decomposing/reducing
the multi agent problem to single agent problems. Recall that a single agent problem
is to compute the optimal single agent mechanism Mi〈xi〉 and its expected objective
value Ri(xi) (i.e., the optimal benchmark), subject to an upper bound xi on the
ex ante allocation rule. We present two methods for constructing an approximately
optimal multi agent mechanism, using Mi and Ri as black box. Furthermore, we
show that if we can only compute an α-approximation of the optimal single agent
mechanism/optimal benchmark for each agent i, then the factor α simply carries over
to the approximation factor of the final multi agent mechanism.
Multi agent benchmark. We start by showing that the optimal value of the
following convex program gives an upper bound on the expected objective value of








xij ≤ kj, ∀j ∈ [m]
xij ∈ [0, 1] ,
We first show that the above program is indeed a convex program.
Theorem 21. The optimal benchmarks Ri are always concave.
Proof. We prove this for an arbitrary agent i. Let Mi and Ri denote the optimal
single agent mechanism and the optimal benchmark for agent i. To show that Ri
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is concave, it is enough to show that for any xi, x
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m and any β ∈ [0, 1], the
following inequality holds.
Ri(βxi + (1− β)x′i) ≥ βRi(xi) + (1− β)Ri(x′i)
Consider the single agent mechanism M ′′ that works as follows: M ′′ runs Mi(xi) with
probability β and runs Mi(x
′
i) with probability 1 − β. Note that Mi is a convex
space (this follows from A5 and A6), therefore M ′′ ∈ Mi. Observe that by linearly of
expectation, the ex ante allocation rule of M ′′ is no more than βxi+(1−β)x′i and the
expected objective value of M ′′ is exactly βRi(xi) + (1 − β)Ri(x′i). So the expected
objective value of the optimal single agent mechanism, subject to βxi + (1 − β)x′i,
may only be higher. That implies Ri(βxi+(1−β)x′i) ≥ βRi(xi)+(1−β)Ri(x′i) which
proves the claim.
Theorem 22. The optimal value of the convex program (OPT ) is an upper bound
on the expected objective value of the optimal multi agent mechanism.
Proof. Let M ∗ be an optimal multi agent mechanism. Let x∗ denote the ex ante
allocation rule corresponding to M ∗, i.e., x∗ij = Et∼D[x
M ∗
ij ]. Observe that x
∗ is a





which is upper bounded by the optimal value of the convex program. So to prove the
theorem it is enough to show that the contribution of each agent i to the expected
objective value of M ∗ is upper bounded by Ri(x
∗




single agent mechanism induced by M ∗ on agent i. M ∗i can be obtained by simply
running M ∗ on agent i and simulating the other n − 1 agents with random types
t−i ∼ D−i; Observe that M ∗i is a feasible single agent mechanism subject to x∗i
and obtains the same expected objective value as M ∗ from agent i, so the expected
objective value of the optimal single agent mechanism subject to x∗i could only be
higher.
Constructing multi agent mechanisms. Theorem 22 suggests that by comput-
ing an optimal assignment of x for the convex program (OPT ) and running the single
agent mechanism Mi〈xi〉 for each agent i, one might obtain a reasonable multi agent
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mechanism; however such a multi agent mechanism would only satisfy the supply
constraints in expectation; in other words, there is a good chance that some items are
over allocated with a non-zero probability. We present two generic multi agent mech-
anisms for combining the single agent mechanisms and resolving the conflicts in the
allocations in such a way that would ensure the supply constraints are met at every
instance and not just in expectation. In both approaches we first solve the convex
program (OPT ) to compute the optimal x. The high level idea of each mechanism is
explained below.
1. Pre-Rounding. This mechanism serves the agents sequentially (arbitrary or-
der); for each agent i, it selects a subset Si of available items and runs the single
agent mechanism Mi〈xi[Si]〉, where xi[Si] denotes the vector resulting from xi
by zeroing the entries corresponding to items not in Si. In particular, this
mechanism sometimes precludes some of the available items from early agents
to make them available to late agents. We show that if there are at least k units
of each item, then Si includes item j with probability at least 1− 1√k+3 , for each
agent i and each item j.
2. Post-Rounding. This mechanism runs Mi〈xi〉 for all agents i simultaneously
and independently. It then modifies the outcomes by deallocating the over
allocated items at random in such a way that the probability of deallocation
observed by all agents are equal, and therefore minimized over all agents. The
payments are adjusted respectively. We show that if there are at least k units
of each item, every allocation is preserved with probability 1 − 1√
k+3
from the
perspective of the corresponding agent.
We will explain the above mechanisms in more detail in §4.5 and present some
technical assumptions that are sufficient to ensure that they retain at least 1− 1√
k+3
fraction of the expected objective value of each Mi〈xi〉.
Approximately optimal single agent mechanisms. Throughout the above dis-
cussion, we assumed that we can compute the optimal single agent mechanisms and
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the corresponding optimal benchmarks. However, it is likely that we can only com-
pute an approximation of them. Suppose for each agent i, Mi and Ri, instead of
being optimal, only provide an α-approximation of the optimal single agent mecha-
nism/optimal benchmark, and suppose Ri is concave; then we can still use Mi and Ri
in the above construction, but the final approximation factor will be multiplied by α.
Main result. The following informal theorem summarizes the main result of this
chapter. The formal statement of this result can be found in Theorem 26 and Theo-
rem 27.
Theorem 23 (Market Expansion). If for each agent i ∈ [n], an α-approximate single
agent mechanism Mi and a corresponding concave benchmark Ri can be constructed in
polynomial time, then, with some further assumptions (explained later), a multi agent
mechanism M ∈ M can be constructed in polynomial time by using Mi as building
blocks, such that M is γkα-approximation of the the optimal multi agent mechanism
in M, where k = minj kj and γk is a constant which is at least 1− 1√k+3 .
In order to explain the construction of the multi agent mechanism, we shall first
describe the magician’s problem and its solution, which is used in both pre-rounding
and post-rounding for equalizing the expected probabilities of preclusion/deallocation
over all agents.
4.4 The Magician’s Problem
In this section, we present an abstract online stochastic toy problem and a near-
optimal solution for it which provides the main ingredient for combining single agent
mechanisms to form multi agent mechanisms. A generalization of this problem and
its solution is presented in §5.2.
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Definition 17 (The Magician’s Problem). A magician is presented with a series of
boxes one by one, in an online fashion. There is a prize hidden in one of the boxes.
The magician has k magic wands that can be used to open the boxes. If a wand is
used on box i, it opens, but with a probability of at most xi, which written on the box,
the wand breaks. The magician wishes to maximize the probability of obtaining the
prize, but unfortunately the sequence of boxes, the written probabilities, and the box
in which the prize is hidden are arranged by a villain, and the magician has no prior
information about them (not even the number of the boxes). However, it is guaranteed
that
P
i xi ≤ k, and that the villain has to prepare the sequence of boxes in advance
(i.e., cannot make any changes once the process has started).
The magician could fail to open a box either because (a) he might choose to skip
the box, or (b) he might run out of wands before getting to the box. Note that once
the magician fixes his strategy, the best strategy for the villain is to put the prize
in the box that has the lowest ex ante probability of being opened, based on the
magician’s strategy. Therefore, in order for the magician to obtain the prize with
a probability of at least γ, he has to devise a strategy that guarantees an ex ante
probability of at least γ for opening each box. Notice that allowing the prize to
be split among multiple boxes does not affect the problem. It is easy to show the
following strategy ensures an ex ante probability of at least 1
4
for opening each box:
for each box randomize and use a wand with probability 1
2
. But can we do better?
We present an algorithm parameterized by a probability γ ∈ [0, 1] which guarantees
a minimum ex-ante probability of γ for opening each box while trying to minimize
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algorithm never requires more than k wands.
Definition 18 (γ-Conservative Magician). The magician adaptively computes a se-
quence of thresholds θ1, θ2, . . . ∈ N0 and makes a decision about each box as follows:
let Wi denote the number of wands broken prior to seeing the i
th box; the magician
makes a decision about box i by comparing Wi against θi; if Wi < θi, it opens the box;
if Wi > θi, it does not open the box; and if Wi = θi, it randomizes and opens the box
with some probability (to be defined). The magician chooses the smallest threshold
θi for which Pr[Wi ≤ θi] ≥ γ where the probability is computed ex ante (i.e., not
conditioned on past broken wands). Note that γ is a parameter that is given. Let
FWi(`) = Pr[Wi ≤ `] denote the ex ante CDF of random variable Wi, and let Yi be
the indicator random variable which is 1 iff the magician opens the box i. Formally,
the probability with which the magician should open box i condition on Wi is computed
as follows.
Pr [Yi = 1|Wi] =
8>>><>>>:
1 Wi < θi
(γ − FWi(θi − 1))/(FWi(θi)− FWi(θi − 1)) Wi = θi
0 Wi > θi
(y)
θi = min{`|FWi(`) ≥ γ} (θ)
Observe that θi is in fact computed before seeing box i itself.
Define y`i = Pr[Yi = 1|Wi = `]; the CDF of Wi+1 can be computed from the CDF




y`ixiFWi(`− 1) + (1− y`ixi)FWi(`) i ≥ 1, ` ≥ 0
1 i = 0, ` ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(FW)
Furthermore, if each xi is just an upper bound on the probability of breaking a wand
on box i, then the above definition of FWi(·) stochastically dominates the actual CDF
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of Wi, and the magician opens each box with a probability of at least γ.
In order to prove that a γ-conservative magician does not fail for a given choice
of γ, we must show that the thresholds θi are no more than k − 1. The following
theorem states a condition on γ that is sufficient to guarantee that θi ≤ k − 1 for all
i.
Theorem 24 (γ-Conservative Magician). For any γ ≤ 1 − 1√
k+3
, a γ-conservative
magician with k wands opens each box with an ex ante probability of at least γ. Fur-
thermore, if xi is the exact probability (not just an upper bound) of breaking a wand
on box i for each i, then each box is opened with an ex ante probability exactly γ8
Proof. We defer the proof of this theorem to §5.2 where we present a more general
variant of the magician’s problem.
Definition 19 (γk). We define γk to be the largest probability such that for any k
′ ≥ k
and any instance of the magician’s problem with k′ wands, the thresholds computed by
a γk-conservative magician are less than k
′. In other words, γk is the optimal choice
of γ which works for all instances with k′ ≥ k wands. By Theorem 24, γk must be9
at least 1− 1√
k+3
.
Observe that γk is a non-decreasing function in k which is at least
1
2
(when k = 1)
and approaches 1 as k → ∞. The next theorem shows that the lower bound of
1− 1√
k+3
on γk cannot be far from the optimal.
Theorem 25 (Hardness of Magician’s Problem). For any ε > 0, it is not possible to
guarantee an ex ante probability of 1− kk
ekk!
+ ε for opening each box (i.e., no magician






8In particular the fact that the probability of the event of breaking a wand for the ith box is
exactly xi, conditioned on any sequence of prior events, implies that these events are independent
for different boxes.
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4.5 Generic Multi Agent Mechanisms
In this section, we present a formal description of the two generic multi agent mecha-
nisms outlined toward the end of §4.3. Throughout the rest of this section we assume
that for each agent i ∈ [n] we can compute a single agent mechanism Mi and a cor-
responding concave benchmark Ri, which together provide α-approximation of the
optimal single agent mechanism/optimal benchmark for agent i. We show that the
resulting multi agent mechanism will be γkα-approximation of the the optimal multi
agent mechanism in M, where k = minj kj and γk is the optimal magician parameter




This mechanism serves the agents sequentially (arbitrary order); for each agent i, it
selects a subset Si of available items and runs the single agent mechanism Mi〈xi[Si]〉,
where xi is an optimal assignment for the benchmark convex program (OPT ), and
xi[Si] denotes the vector resulting from xi by zeroing the entries corresponding to
items not in Si. In particular, this mechanism sometimes precludes some items from
early agents to make them available to late agents. For each item, the mechanism tries
to minimize the probability of preclusion for each agent by equalizing it for all agents.
Note that, for any given pair of agent and item, we only care about the probability
of preclusion in expectation, where the expectation is taken over the types of other
agents and the random choices of the mechanism. The mechanism is explained in
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detail in Definition 20.
Definition 20 (γ-Pre-Rounding).
(I) Solve the convex program (OPT ) and let x be an optimal assignment.
(II) For each item j ∈ [m], create an instance of γ-conservative magician (Def-
inition 18) with kj wands (this will be referred to as the j
th magician). We
will use these magicians through the rest of the mechanism. Note that γ is a
parameter that is given.
(III) For each agent i ∈ [n]:
(a) For each item j ∈ [m], write xij on a box and present it to the jth magician.
Let Si be the set of items where the corresponding magicians opened the
box.
(b) Run Mi〈xi[Si]〉 on agent i and use its outcome as the final outcome for
agent i.
(c) For each item j ∈ [m], if a unit of item j was allocated to agent i in the
previous step, break the wand of the jth magician.
Note that since x is a feasible assignment for convex program (OPT ), it must
satisfy
P
i xij ≤ kj, so by setting γ ← γk and by Theorem 24 and Definition 19 we
can argue that each Si includes each item j with probability at least γk where γk is
at least 1− 1√
k+3
.
In order for the above mechanism to retain at least a γ-fraction of the the expected
objective value of each Mi〈xi〉, further technical assumptions are needed in addition
to γ ≤ γk. We show that it is enough to assume each Ri has a budget-balanced and
cross monotonic cost sharing scheme.
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Definition 21 (Budget Balanced Cross Monotonic Cost Sharing Scheme). A function
R : [0, 1]m → R+ has a budget balanced cross monotonic cost sharing scheme iff there
exists a cost share function ξ : [m]× [0, 1]m → R+ with the following two properties:
(i) ξ must be budget balanced which means for all x ∈ [0, 1]m and S ⊆ [m],P
j∈S ξ(j, x[S]) = R(x[S]).
(ii) ξ must be cross monotonic which means for all x ∈ [0, 1]m, j ∈ [m] and S, S ′ ⊆
[m], ξ(j, x[S]) ≥ ξ(j, x[S ∪ S ′]).
Intuitively, a cost share function associates a fraction of the expected objective
value returned by the benchmark function R to each item; and ensures that the
fraction associated with each item does not decrease when other items are excluded.
In particular, the above assumption holds if R(x[S]) is a submodular function of S
(e.g., for welfare maximization, assuming that agents’ valuations are submodular10).
Note that it is enough to show that such a cost sharing function exists; however it is
never used in the mechanism and its computation is not required.
Theorem 26 (γ-Pre-Rounding). Suppose for each agent i, Mi is an α-approximate
incentive compatible single agent mechanism, and Ri is the corresponding concave
benchmark. Also suppose Ri has a budget balanced cross monotonic cost sharing
scheme. Then, for any γ ∈ [0, γk], the γ-pre-rounding mechanism (Definition 20) is
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism which is in M and is a
γα-approximation of the optimal mechanism in M.
Proof. See §4.8.
Remark 1. The γ-pre-rounding mechanism assumes no control and no prior informa-
tion about the order in which agents are visited. The order specified in the mechanism
is arbitrary and could be replaced by any other ordering which may be unknown in
advance. In particular, this mechanism can be adopted to online settings in which
agents are served in an unknown order.
10We conjecture that it holds in general for revenue maximization, when agents’ valuations are
submodular and M is restricted to mechanisms which use agent specific item pricing.
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Corollary 4. In any setting where Theorem 26 is applicable and when M includes
all feasible BIC mechanisms, the gap between the optimal DSIC mechanism and the
optimal BIC mechanism is at most 1/γk. This gap is at most 2 (for k = 1) and
vanishes as k →∞. That is because Definition 20 is always DSIC, yet it approximates
the optimal mechanism in M.
4.5.2 Post-Rounding
This mechanism runs Mi〈xi〉 simultaneously and independently for all agents i to
compute a tentative allocation/payment for each agent; it then deallocates some of
the items at random to ensure that the supply constraints are met at every instance;
it ensures that the probability of deallocation perceived by each agent (i.e., in ex-
pectation over the types of other agents and random choices of the mechanism) is
equalized and therefore simultaneously minimized for all agents. The payments are
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also adjusted respectively. The mechanism is explained in detail in Definition 22.
Definition 22 (γ-Post-Rounding).
(I) Solve the convex program (OPT ) and let x denote an optimal assignment.
(II) Run Mi〈xi〉 simultaneously and independently for all agents i ∈ [n], and let
x′i ⊆ [m] and p′i ∈ R+ denote respectively the allocation (subset of items) and
payment computed by Mi〈xi〉 for agent i.
(III) For each item j ∈ [m], create an instance of γ-conservative magician (Def-
inition 18) with kj wands (this will be referred to as the j
th magician). We
will use these magicians through the rest of the mechanism. Note that γ is a
parameter that is given.
(IV) For each agent i ∈ [n]:
(a) For each item j ∈ [m], write x̂ij on a box and present it to the jth magician,
where x̂ij is the exact probability
11 of Mi〈xi〉 allocating a unit of item j
to agent i; let Si be the set of items where the corresponding magicians
opened the box.
(b) Let xi ← Si ∩ x′i and pi ← γp′i. The final allocation and payment of agent
i is given by xi and pi respectively.





i xij ≤ kj; so by setting γ ← γk and by Theorem 24 and
Definition 19 we can argue that each Si includes each item j with probability at least
γk where γk is at least 1− 1√k+3 . Consequently, any item that is in x
′
i will also be in
xi with probability exactly γ.
In order for γ-post-rounding to retain at least a γ-fraction of the the expected
objective value of each Mi〈xi〉 and preserve incentive compatibility, further technical
assumptions are needed in addition to γ ≤ γk; next, we present a set of assumptions
which is sufficient for this purpose12.
11Note that xij is only an upper bound on the probability of allocation, so x̂ij ≤ xij
12I.e., one might come up with other sets of assumptions that are also sufficient.
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(A′1) The exact ex ante allocation rule for each Mi〈xi〉 (i.e., x̂) must be available
(i.e., efficiently computable). Note that x is only an upper bound on the ex
ante allocation rule.
(A′2) The objective functions must be of the form Obji(ti, xi, pi) = Obji(ti, xi, 0) +
cipi in which ci ∈ R+ is an arbitrary fixed constant. Also, each Obji(ti, xi, 0)
must have cost sharing scheme in xi which is cross monotonic and budget
balanced.
(A′3) The resulting mechanism must be in M. In particular, that implies M may
not be restricted to any from of incentive compatibility stronger than Bayesian
incentive compatibility (BIC), because the γ-post-rounding is only BIC.
(A′4) The valuations of each agent must be in the form of a weighted rank function
of some matroid.
Observe thatA′2 obviously holds for revenue maximization (because Obji(ti, xi, pi) =
pi), and also for welfare maximization with quasilinear utilities and submodular val-
uations (because Obji(ti, xi, pi) = vi(ti, xi) where vi(ti, xi) is the valuation of agent i
for allocation xi
13). Next, we formally define A′4.
Definition 23 (Matroid Weighted Rank Valuation). A valuation function v : 2m →
R+ is a matroid weighted rank valuation iff there exists a matroid M = ([m], I), and
a weight function w : [m]→ R+ such that v(S) is equal to the weight of a maximum





w(j), ∀S ⊆ [m]
Matroid weighted rank valuations include additive valuations with demand con-
straints, unit demand valuations, etc.
13Note that the payment terms cancel out because the utility of the auctioneer is counted toward
the social welfare of the mechanism
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Theorem 27 (γ-Post-Rounding). Suppose for each agent i, Mi is an α-approximate
incentive compatible single agent mechanism, and Ri is a corresponding concave
benchmark. Also suppose the assumptions A′1 through A′4 hold. Then, for any
γ ∈ [0, γk], the γ-post-rounding mechanism (Definition 22) is a Bayesian incentive
compatible (BIC) mechanism which is in M and is a γα-approximation of the optimal
mechanism in M.
Proof. See §4.8.
4.6 Single Agent Mechanisms
In this section, we present approximately optimal single agent mechanisms for several
common settings. Each one of the single agent mechanisms presented in this section
satisfies the requirements of one of the generic multi agent mechanisms of §4.5, so they
can be readily converted to a multi agent mechanisms. Except for §4.6.4, we restrict
the space of mechanisms to item pricing mechanisms with budget randomization as
defined next.
Definition 24 (Item Pricing with Budget Randomization (IPBR)). An item pricing
mechanism is a possibly randomized mechanism that offers a menu of prices to each
agent and allows each agent to choose their favorite bundle. The payment of an
agent is equal to the total price of the items in her purchased bundle. Note that
the prices offered to different agents do not need to be identical and agents can be
served sequentially. In the presence of budget constraints, an agent is allowed to pay
a fraction of the price of an item and receive the item with a probability equal to the
paid fraction14. A mechanism is considered an item pricing mechanism if its outcome
can be interpreted as such15.
Item pricing mechanisms are simple and practical as opposed to optimal BIC
14A utility maximizing agent, with submodular valuations and budget constraint, always pays the
full price for any item she purchases, except potentially for the last item purchased, for which she
must have run out of budget.
15I.e., an item pricing mechanism may collect all the reports and compute the final outcome along
with agent specific prices, such that the outcome of each agent would be the same as if each agent
purchased their favorite bundle according to her observed prices, and the prices observed by each
agent should be independent of her report.
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mechanisms which often involve lotteries. Also budget randomization allows us to
get around the hardness of the knapsack problem faced by the budgeted agents; in
particular, assuming that budgets are large compared to prices, budget randomization
can be safely ignored since the optimal integral solution of the knapsack problem
approaches its optimal fractional solution.
Table 4.1 lists several settings for which we obtain a multi agent mechanism with
an improved approximation factor compared to previous best known approximations.
For each setting, we present a single agent mechanism that satisfies the requirements
of one of the generic multi agent mechanisms of §4.5. The corresponding single
agent mechanisms are presented in detail throughout the rest of this section. Note
that the final approximation factor for each multi agent mechanism is equal to the
approximation factor of the corresponding single agent mechanism multiplied by γk;
recall that γk ≥ 1− 1√k+3 which approaches 1 as k →∞.
Setting Approx Space of Mechanisms Ref
single item(multi unit), unit demand,
budget constraint, revenue maximiza-
tion
γk item pricing with budget randomization §4.6.1
multi item(heterogenous), unit demand,




multi item(heterogenous), additive val-
uations, product distribution, budget
constraint, revenue maximization
(1− 1e )γk item pricing with budget randomization §4.6.3
multi item(heterogenous), additive val-
uations, correlated distribution with
polynomial number of types, budget
constraint, matroid constrains, revenue
or welfare maximization
γk randomized (BIC) §4.6.4
Table 4.1: Summary of mechanisms obtained using the current framework.
For each single agent mechanism presented in this chapter, the single agent bench-
mark function R(x) is defined as the optimal value of some convex program of the
following general form, in which u is some concave function, gj(·) are some convex
functions, and Y is some convex polytope (in the rest of this section we only consider
a single agent, so we will omit the subscript i).
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maximize u(y) (OPT 1)
subject to gj(y) ≤ xj, ∀j ∈ [m]
y ∈ Y
Lemma 5. R(x) is concave, i.e., the optimal value of a convex program of the form
(OPT 1) is always concave in x.
Proof. See section 4.8.
Note that we can substitute each Ri(·) in the multi agent benchmark convex
program (OPT ) with the corresponding single agent benchmark convex program to
obtain a combined convex program which can be solved efficiently. If each Ri is
captured by a linear program, the combined multi agent program will also be a linear
program.
4.6.1 Single Item, Unit Demand, Budget Constraint
In this section, we consider a unit-demand agent with a publicly known budget B
and one type of item (i.e., m = 1). The only private information of the agent is
her valuation for the item, which is drawn from a publicly known distribution with
CDF F (·). To avoid complicating the proofs, we assume that F (·) is continuous
and strictly increasing in its domain16. We present a single agent mechanism which
is optimal among item pricing mechanisms with budget randomization (IPBR). We
start by defining the modified CDF function FB(·) as follows.
FB(v) =
8><>:
F (v) v ≤ B




Intuitively, 1 − FB(p) is the probability of allocating the item to the agent if we
offer the item at price p. Note that the agent only buys if her valuation is more than p
16The proofs can be modified to work without this assumption.
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which happens with probability 1−F (p) ; if p > B, she will pay her whole budget and
only get the item with probability B
p
, otherwise she pays the full price and receives the
item with probability 1. Observe that if we want to allocate the item with probability
x we can offer a price of FB
(−1)
(1 − x) which yields a revenue of xFB(−1)(1 − x) in
expectation. Define R(x) = xFB
(−1)
(1 − x) and let ÒR(x) denote its concave closure
(i.e., the smallest concave function that is an upper bound on R(x) for every x). We
will address the problem of efficiently computing ÒR(x) later in Lemma 6. Next, we
show that the optimal value of the following convex program is equal to the expected
revenue of the optimal single agent IPBR mechanism subject to x; therefore we will
define the single agent benchmark function R(x) to be equal to the optimal value of
this program as a function of x.
maximize ÒR(x) (Revsingle)
subject to x ≤ x
x ≥ 0
Theorem 28. The revenue of the optimal single agent IPBR mechanism, subject
to an upper bound of x on the ex ante allocation rule, is equal to the optimal value
of the convex program (Revsingle). Furthermore, assuming that x
∗ is the optimal
assignment for the convex program, if ÒR(x∗) = R(x∗), then the optimal mechanism
uses a single price p = FB
(−1)
(1 − x∗) otherwise, it randomized between two prices
p−, p+ with probabilities θ and 1− θ for some θ ∈ [0, 1] and p−, p+.
Proof. First, we prove that the expected revenue of the optimal single agent IPBR
mechanism, subject to x, is upper bounded by ÒR(x∗). We then construct a price
distribution that obtains this revenue. Note that any single agent IPBR mechanism
can be specified as a distribution over prices. Let P be the optimal price distribution.
So the optimal revenue is Ep∼P [p(1 − FB(p))]. Note that every price p corresponds
to an allocation probability x = 1 − FB(p). So any probability distribution over p
can be specified as a probability distribution over x. Let Q denote the probability
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distribution over x that corresponds to price distribution P , so we can write








hÒR(x)i ≤ ÒR(Ex∼Q [x]) By Jensen’s inequality
which means the optimal revenue is upper bounded by the value of the convex program
for x = Ex∼Q[x]
17; so the optimal revenue is upper bounded by the optimal value of
the convex program. That completes the first part of the proof.
Next, we construct an optimal price distribution. If ÒR(x∗) = R(x∗), the optimal
price distribution is just a single price p = FB
(−1)
(1 − x∗); otherwise, by definition
of concave closure, there are two points x− and x+ and θ ∈ [0, 1] such that x∗ =
θx−+ (1− θ)x+ and ÒR(x∗) = θR(x−) + (1− θ)R(x+). In the latter case, the optimal
price distribution offers price p− = FB
(−1)
(1−x−) with probability θ and offers price
p+ = FB
(−1)
(1− x+) with probability 1− θ.
Formally, an optimal single agent IPBR mechanism can be constructed as follows.
Definition 25 (Mechanism).
• Define the single agent benchmark R(x) to be the optimal value of the convex
program (Revsingle) as a function of x.
• Given x, solve (Revsingle) and let x be an optimal assignment.
• If ÒR(x) = R(x), offer the single price p = FB(−1)(1− x), otherwise randomize
between two prices p− and p+ as explained in the proof of Theorem 28.
Theorem 29. The mechanism of Definition 25 is the optimal revenue maximizing
single agent IPBR mechanism. Furthermore, this mechanism satisfies the require-
ments of γ-pre-rounding.
Proof. The proof of the optimality follows from Theorem 28. Furthermore, the bench-
mark function, R(x), is concave (this follows from Lemma 5) and it has a trivial budget
17Note that Ex∼Q[x] is exactly the probability of allocating the item by the price distribution P,
so it must be no more than x
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balanced cost sharing scheme (because there is only one item), therefore it meets the
requirements of γ-pre-rounding.
Next, we address the problem of efficiently computing ÒR(·).
Lemma 6. A (1 + ε)-approximation of ÒR(·), which we denote by ÒR1+ε(·), can be
constructed using a piece-wise linear function with ` = logL
log(1+ε)
pieces and in time
O(` log `) in which L is the ratio of the maximum valuation to minimum non-zero
valuation. Note that we need at least log2 L bits just to represent such valuations so
this construction is polynomial in the input size for any constant ε.
Proof. WLOG, assume that all possible non-zero valuations of the agent are in the
range of [1, L]. Let ` = b logL
log(1+ε)
c. For r = 0 · · · `, consider the prices pr = (1 + ε)`−r
and compute the corresponding xr = 1− FB(pr). Construct ÒR1+ε(·) by constructing
the convex hall of the points:
(0, 0), (x1, p1x1), (x2, p2x2), . . . , (x`, p`x`), (1, 0). This can be done in time O(` log `).
Note that FB
(−1)
(1 − x) is a decreasing function of x so at every x ∈ [xr, xr+1], the
corresponding price is FB
(−1)
(x) ∈ [pr+1, pr] but pr = (1 + ε)pr+1 therefore at every
x, R1+ε(x) ≤ ÒR(x) ≤ (1 + ε)R1+ε(x) which completes the proof.
Remark 2. In order to use R1+ε(·) in the single agent mechanism of Definition 25,
we need to substitute (1 + ε)ÒR1+ε(·) in the objective function of the convex program
(Revsingle) instead of ÒR(·) for computing the benchmark. Furthermore, the mecha-
nism will be a (1 − ε)-approximation of the optimal single agent IPBR mechanism.
Also notice that finding p− and p+ from R1+ε(·) is trivial.
4.6.2 Multi Item (Independent), Unit Demand
In this section, we consider a unit demand agent with private independent valuations
for m items. We assume that for each item j, the agent’s valuation is distributed inde-
pendently according to a publicly known distribution with CDF Fj(·). We present a
single agent mechanism which is a 1
2
-approximation of the optimal deterministic rev-
enue maximizing mechanism. To avoid complicating the proofs, we assume that each
Fj(·) is continuous and strictly increasing in its domain. Furthermore, we require the
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distributions to be regular. This mechanism can be used with γ-pre-rounding (Defini-
tion 20) to yield a 1
2
γk-approximate sequential posted pricing multi agent mechanism.
The previous best approximation mechanism for this setting was a 1
6.75
-approximate
sequential posted pricing mechanism by Chawla et al. (2010)18.
We start by defining Rj(x) = xF
−1
j (1 − x) for each item j. Because Fj(·) is
corresponds to a regular distribution, Rj(·) is concave as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 7. If F (·) is the CDF of a regular distribution, the function R(x) = xF−1(1−
x) is concave.
Proof. It is enough to show that ∂
∂x
R(x) is non-increasing in x. Observe that ∂
∂x
R(x) =
F−1(1 − x) − x
f(F−1(1−x)) in which f(·) is the derivative of F (·). By substituting
x = 1 − F (p), it is enough to show that the resulting function is non-decreasing
in p because x is itself non-increasing in p. However, by this substitution we get
∂
∂x
R(x) = p− 1−F (p)
f(p)
which is non-decreasing in p by definition of regularity.
Note that any deterministic mechanism for a unit demand agent can be interpreted
as item pricing. Consequently, Rj(xj) is the maximum revenue that such a mechanism
can obtain if item j is allocated with probability xj. Next, we show that the following





subject to xj ≤ xj, ∀j ∈ [m] (λj)X
j
xj ≤ 1 (τ)
xj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [m] (µj)
Theorem 30. The revenue of the optimal deterministic single agent mechanism,
subject to an upper bound of x on the ex ante allocation rule, is no more than the
18Note that the mechanism of Chawla et al. (2010) does not work for non-regular distributions
despite the authors’ claim.
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optimal value of the convex program (Revunit).
Proof. Let x∗ be the ex ante allocation rule of the optimal single agent deterministic
mechanism. So the expected revenue obtained from each item j is upper bounded by
Rj(x
∗
j) (proof of this claim is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 28). Conse-









j ≤ 1, and also
x∗j ≤ xj; therefore x∗ is a feasible solution for the convex program; so the expected
optimal revenue is upper bounded by the optimal value of the convex program.
Next, we present the single agent mechanism.
Definition 26 (Mechanism).
• Define the benchmark R(x) to be the optimal value of (Revunit) as a function
of x.
• Given x, solve (Revunit) and let x denote an optimal assignment.
• For each item j, assign the price pj = F−1j (1− xj). WLOG, assume that items
are indexed in non-decreasing order of prices, i.e., p1 ≤ . . . ≤ pm.
• For each item j, define rj = max(xjpj + (1 − xj)rj+1, rj+1) and let rm+1 = 0.
Let S∗ be the subset of items defined as S∗ = {j|pj ≥ rj+1}.
• Only offer the items in S∗ at prices computed in the previous step (i.e., set the
price of other items to infinity).
Theorem 31. The mechanism of Definition 26 obtains at least 1
2
of the revenue of
the optimal deterministic single agent mechanism in expectation. Furthermore, it
satisfies the requirements of γ-pre-rounding.
Proof. First, we show that this mechanism obtains in expectation at least 1
2
of its
benchmark R(x), which by Theorem 30 is an upper bound on the optimal revenue.
Observe that R(x) =
P
j xjpj where xj is exactly the probability that the valuation of
the agent for item j is at least pj. Now consider an “adversary replica” who has the
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exact same valuations as the original agent, but always buys the item that has the
lowest price among all the items priced below her valuation. For any assignment of
prices, the revenue obtained from the adversary replica is a lower bound on the revenue
obtained from the original agent. So it is enough to show that the mechanism obtains
a revenue of at least 1
2
P
j xjpj from the adversary replica. Observe that rj is exactly
the expected revenue obtained from the adversary replica when offered the items in
S∗ ∩ {j, . . . ,m}. In particular, item j is included in S∗ if pj ≥ Rj+1, which implies
that the revenue obtained from the purchase of item j, conditioned on purchase, is
more than the lower bound on the expected revenue obtained from items {j, . . . ,m}.
Finally, observe that the expected revenue obtained from the adversary replica is
exactly r1. By Lemma 8 we can conclude that r1 ≥ 12
P
j xjpj which completes the
proof of the first claim.
Next, we show that this mechanism satisfies the requirements of γ-pre-rounding.
Observe that by Lemma 5, the optimal value of (Revunit) is a concave function of x;
so R(x) is concave. It only remains to show that R(·) has a budget balanced cross
monotonic cost sharing scheme. Let xj(x) denote the optimal assignment of variable
xj, in the convex program (Revunit), as a function of x. Define the cost share function
ξ(j, x) = Rj(xj(x)).
We shall show that ξ is budget balanced and cross monotonic (see Definition 21).
• Budget balance. We shall show that for any x ∈ [0, 1]m and any S ⊆ [m],
R(x[S]) =
P





which proved that ξ is budget balanced. Note that Rj(xj(x[S])) = 0, for any
j 6∈ S, because xj(x[S]) is forced to be 0.
• Cross monotonicity. We shall show that ξ(j, x[S]) ≥ ξ(j, x[S ∪ S ′]), for any
x ∈ [0, 1]m and any S, S ′ ⊆ [m]. Let the Lagrangian of (Revunit) be defined as
follows.
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The high level idea of the proof is as follows. We show that there is more
pressure on the constraint associated with τ when the set of available items is
S ∪ S ′ instead of S (i.e., τ is larger for S ∪ S ′); we then show that the optimal
xj can be determined from τ ; in particular, we show that, as the optimal τ
increases, the optimal xj decreases, and consequently ξ(j, x) (which is equal to
Rj(xj)) decreases as well, which proves ξ is cross monotonic. Next we present
the proof in detail.
By KKT stationarity conditions, at the optimal assignment the following holds.
∂
∂xj
L(x, λ, τ, µ) = − ∂
∂xj
Rj(xj) + λj + τ − µj = 0
First we show that the optimal xj, and consequently ξ(j, x), can be determined
from the optimal τ ; and they are both non-increasing in τ . Observe that (a)
all dual variables must be non-negative, (b) by complementary slackness λj
may be non-zero only if xj = xj, and (c) complementary slackness implies that
µj may be non-zero only if xj = 0; therefore, if the optimal τ is given, the
optimal assignment for xj is uniquely
19 determined by the above equation and
the aforementioned complementarity slackness conditions. Let xj(τ) denote the
optimal assignment of xj as a function of τ . Due to the concavity of Rj(·), and
the above KKT condition, we can argue that xj(τ) is non-increasing in τ , which
also implies that ξ(j, x) is non-increasing in τ .
Next, we prove by contradiction that ξ is cross monotonic. Let τ(x) denote the
optimal assignment of τ as a function of x. By contradiction, suppose ξ is not
cross monotonic, i.e. ξ(j∗, x[S ∪ S ′]) > ξ(j∗, x[S]) for some item j∗; therefore
τ(x[S]) > τ(x[S ∪ S ′]) ≥ 0. Since τ(x[S]) > 0, the inequality associated with
τ must be tight (by complementary slackness), so
P
j xj(τ(x[S])) = 1. On the
other hand, for all j, xj(τ(x[S ∪ S ′])) ≥ xj(τ(x[S])), with the inequality being
strict for j = j∗, which means
P
j xj(τ(x[S ∪ S ′])) > 1, which is a contradiction.
19To avoid complicating the proof, we assume that the functions Rj(·) are strictly concave, however
this assumption is not necessary.
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Lemma 8. Let p1, . . . , pm and x1, . . . , xm be two sequences of non-negative real num-
bers and suppose
P
j xj ≤ 1. For each j ∈ [m], define rj = max(xjpj + (1 −
xj)rj+1, rj+1) and let rm+1 = 0. Then r1 ≥ 12
P
j xjpj.
Proof. See section 4.8.
4.6.3 Multi Item (Independent), Additive, Budget Constraint
In this section, we consider an agent with publicly known budget B who has private
independent and additive valuations for m items (i.e., her valuation for a bundle of
items is the sum of her valuations for individual items in the bundle). We assume the
agent’s valuation for each item j is distributed independently according to a publicly
known distribution with CDF Fj(·). To avoid complicating the proofs, we assume that
each Fj(·) is continuous and strictly increasing in its domain20. We present a single
agent mechanism which is a (1− 1
e
)-approximation of the optimal revenue maximizing
item pricing mechanism with budget randomization (IPBR). This mechanism can be
used with γ-pre-rounding (Definition 20) to yield a (1− 1
e
)γk-approximate sequential
posted pricing multi agent mechanism. The previous best approximation mechanism
for this setting was an O(1)-approximate21 sequential posted pricing mechanism by
Bhattacharya et al. (2010). We should note that the mechanism in Bhattacharya
et al. (2010) is more general as it allows the agents to have demand constraints as
well, and it does not allow for budget randomization.




Fj(v) v ≤ B
1− (1− Fj(v))Bv v ≥ B
(FBj )




(1 − x) and let ÒRj(·) be its
concave closure as define in §4.6.1. Also, for each j, define Rj(xj) to be the optimal
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value of the following convex program as a function of xj.
maximize Rj(xj) (Revadd)
subject to xj ≤ xj
xj ≥ 0
The next theorem provides an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal single
agent IPBR mechanism.
Theorem 32. The revenue of the optimal single agent item pricing mechanism with
budget randomization (IPBR), subject to an upper bound of x on the ex ante allocation
rule, is no more than min(
P
j Rj(xj), B), .
Proof. For any j, if we were only to sell the item j, by Theorem 28, the maximum
revenue we could obtain using an IPBR mechanism would be no more than Rj(xj).
Observe that if we compute the optimal price distribution for each item separately,
we might only get less revenue because the budget is shared among all items and the
agent might not be able to buy some of the items that she would otherwise buy if there
were no other items. That means the actually probability of allocating each item j
could be less than the optimal assignment of xj for the convex program (Revadd); so
the optimal joint price distribution might sell at lower prices; but the extra revenue
may only come from lower types which were originally excluded by the optimal single
item mechanism. Consequently, the overall revenue from each item j cannot be more
than Rj(xj). Finally, observe that the expected revenue of the mechanism cannot be
more that B, so it can be no more than min(
P
j Rj(xj), B).
Next, we present (1 − 1
e
)-approximate revenue maximizing single agent IPBR
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mechanism.
Definition 27 (Mechanism).
• Define the benchmark R(x) = min(Pj Rj(xj), B).
• Given x, solve the convex program of (Revadd) for each item j, and let xj
denote an optimal assignment.
• For each item j, if ÒRj(xj) = Rj(xj), offer the single price pj = FBj (−1)(1− xj),
otherwise randomize between two prices p−j and p
+
j with probabilities θj and
1− θj, as explained in Theorem 28. Note that the randomization must be done
for each item independently.
Theorem 33. The mechanism of Definition 27 obtains at least 1− 1
e
of the revenue
of the optimal single agent IPBR mechanism. Furthermore, this mechanism satisfies
the requirements of γ-pre-rounding.
Proof. First, we show that the mechanism obtains at least 1 − 1
e
of its benchmark
R(x), which by Theorem 32 is an upper bound on the optimal revenue. Consider an
imaginary replica of the agent who has exactly the same valuations as the original
agent, but has a separate budget B for each item. We call this imaginary agent the
“super replica”. Furthermore, suppose that any payment received from the super
replica beyond B is lost (i.e., if the super replica pays Z , the mechanism receives only
min(Z , B)). Observe that for any assignment of prices, the payment received from
the original agent and the payment received from the super replica are exactly the
same because if the original agent has’t hit his budget limit then both the original
agent and the super replica will buy the same items and pay the exact same amount.
Otherwise, if the original agent hits his budget limit, the mechanism receives exactlyB
from both the original agent and the super replica; therefore we only need to show that
the revenue obtained by the mechanism from the super replica is at least (1− 1
e
)R(x).
Observe that from the view point of the super replica there is no connection between
different items, so he makes a decision for each item independently. Let Zj be the
random variable corresponding to the amount paid by the super replica for item
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j. By Theorem 28, we know that E[Zj] = Rj(xj) and the total revenue received
by the mechanism is Z = min(
P
j Zj, B). Notice that Z1, . . . ,Zm are independent
random variables in the range of [0, B]. By applying Lemma 9, we can argue that
E[min(
P
j Zj, B)] ≥ (1− 1e) min(
P
j E[Zj], B) = (1− 1e)R(x) which proves our claim.
Next, we show that the mechanism satisfies the requirements of γ-pre-rounding.
Observe that allRj(·) are concave, and so isR(x). Furthermore, R(x[S]) = min(
P
j∈S Rj(xj), B)
is submodular in S for any S ⊆ [m], and therefore it has a cross monotonic budget
balanced cost share scheme (see Definition 21), which completes the proof.
Lemma 9. Let B be an arbitrary positive number and let Z1, . . . ,Zm be independent
















E [Zj] , B)
Proof. See section 4.8.
4.6.4 Multi Item (Correlated), Additive, Budget and Ma-
troid Constraints
In this section, we consider an agent with publicly known budget B who has private
correlated additive valuations for m items; furthermore, a bundle of items can be
allocated to the agent only if it is an independent set of a matroid M = ([m], I),
where M is publicly known; equivalently, instead of treating M as a constraint on
the allocation, we may assume that the agent has matroid valuations, as defined in
Definition 23. We assume that the agent has a discrete type space T. Let vt ∈ Rm+
denote the agent’s valuation vector corresponding to type t ∈ T, and let f(t) denote
its probability. We assume that f(·) is represented explicitly as a part of the input, i.e.,
by enumerating all types along with their respective probabilities. The only private
information of the agent is her type. We present an optimal single agent randomized
mechanism. This mechanism can be used with γ-post-rounding (Definition 22) to




approaches 1 as k →∞, which means the resulting multi agent mechanism approaches
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the optimal multi agent mechanism as k →∞. Prior to the preliminary version of this
work, the best approximation for this setting was a 1
4
-approximate BIC mechanism
by Bhattacharya et al. (2010)22. At the time of writing the current version, Henzinger
and Vidali (2011) has also presented a 1
2
-approximate BIC mechanism for the same
setting. Note that all of the aforementioned mechanisms (including the one presented
here) have running times polynomial only in |T|, which means their running time
may not be polynomial in the input size if |T| is of exponential size and f(·) has a
compact representation.
Consider the following linear program in which xt ∈ [0, 1]m represents the marginal
allocation probabilities for type t ∈ T, and pt represents the corresponding payment.
Also let rM : 2
m → {0, . . . ,m} denote the rank function ofM. The optimal value of








f(t)xtj ≤ xj, ∀j ∈ [m]
X
j∈S
xtj ≤ rM(S), ∀t ∈ T,∀S ⊆ [m]
vt · xt − pt ≥ vt · xt′ − pt′ , ∀t, t′ ∈ T
xt ∈ [0, 1]m, ∀t ∈ T
pt ∈ [0, B] , ∀t ∈ T
Even though the above LP has exponentially many constraints, it can be solved in
polynomial time using the ellipsoid method23. Next, we present a mechanism whose
expected revenue is equal to the optimal value of the above LP, which also implies
22The mechanism in Bhattacharya et al. (2010) considers demand constraint, which is a special
case of matroid constraints.
23See Schrijver (2003) for optimization over matroid polytope.
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that it is optimal.
Definition 28 (Mechanism).
• Define the optimal benchmark R(x) to be the optimal value of (Revcorr) as a
function of x.
• Given x, solve the LP of (Revcorr) and let x an p be an optimal assignment.
• Let t be the agent’s reported type. Allocate a random subset x ⊆ [m] of items
such that x is an independent set of M and each item j ∈ [m] is included in x
with a marginal probability of exactly xtj. This can be archived by rounding xt
to a vertex of the matroid polytope using dependent randomized rounding (see
Chekuri et al. (2010) and the references therein). Also charge a payment of pt.
Theorem 34. The mechanism of Definition 28 is an optimal truthful in expectation
revenue maximizing single agent mechanism, subject to an upper bound of x on the
ex ante allocation rule. Furthermore, it satisfies all the requirements of the γ-post-
rounding.
Proof. The proof of truthfulness and optimality trivially follows from the linear pro-
gram of (Revcorr). So, we only focus on proving that this mechanism satisfies the
requirements of Theorem 27. First, observe that the benchmark function, R(x), is
concave (this follows from Lemma 5). Second, observe that the matroid constrains
can be interpreted as matroid valuations for the agent. Third, notice that the exact ex
ante allocation rule can be readily computed from the LP solution, i.e., x̂j =
P
t f(t)xtj
is the exact probability of allocating item j. Therefore, the mechanism satisfies the
requirements of γ-post-rounding.
Remark 3. Observe that by replacing the objective function of (Revcorr) with
P
t∈T f(t)vt·
xt, we get a truthful in expectation welfare maximizing single agent mechanism, which
can also be used with γ-post-rounding to obtain a γk-approximate welfare maximizing
BIC multiple agent mechanism.
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4.7 Multi Unit Demands
In this section, we show that the more general model, in which each agent may need
more than one unit but no more than 1
k
of all units of each item, can be reduced
to the simpler model in which there are at least k units of every item and no agent
demands more than 1 unit of each item.
Definition 29 (Multi Unit Demand Market Transformation). Let kj denote the num-
ber of units of item j. Define cj = bkjk c and divide the units of item j almost equally
into cj bins (i.e., each bin will contain either cj or cj + 1 units). Create a new item
type for each bin (i.e., units from the same bin has the same type, but units from
different bins are treated as different types of item).
Theorem 35. Let M be the space of feasible mechanisms, in the original (multi
unit demand) market, which do not allocate more than 1
k
of all units of each item
to any single agent. Similarly, let M(1) be the space of feasible mechanisms, in the
transformed market, which do not allocate more than one unit of each item to any
single agent. Any mechanism in M can be interpreted as a mechanism in M(1) and
vice-versa with the same allocations/payments. Therefore, in order to find the optimal
mechanism in the original market, it is enough to find the optimal mechanism in the
transformed market.
Proof. First, we show that any mechanism in M ∈ M(1) can be interpreted as a
mechanism in M. That is trivially true because M allocates to each agent at most
one unit from each bin, which is at most cj units of each item j of the original market,
which is no more than 1
k
of all units of item j.
Next, we show that any mechanism M ∈ M can be interpreted as a mechanism in
M(1). For every j, we create a list Lj of all the bins of item j. Lj is initially sorted
in decreasing order of the size of the bins. Let xMij be the number of units of item j
allocated to agent i by M . We specify the allocations in the transformed market as
follows. For each agent i we repeat the following, xMij times: Allocate one unit from
the bin that is first in the list Lj and then move the bin back to the end of the list.
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It is easy to see that no two units from the same bin are allocated to the same agent,
which completes the proof.
Note that by Theorem 35, any mechanism in the original market is equivalent to
a mechanism in the transformed market with the exact same allocations/payments
from the perspective of agents. Therefore, WLOG, we can work with the transformed
market and only consider mechanisms in this market. However, to use our generic
multi agent mechanisms in the transformed market, the underlying single agent mech-
anisms should be capable of handling correlated valuations, because units of the same
item, even when labeled with different types, are perfect substitutes from the view
point of an agent. Among the single agent mechanisms presented in this chapter,
only the mechanism explained in §4.6.4 can handle correlated valuations.
4.8 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 25. Suppose we create n boxes and in each box, independently, we
put $1 with probability k
n
. If the magician opens a box containing a $1, then he gets
the $1 but we break his wand (i.e., xi =
k
n
). Observe that the expected total prize
is k dollars, but because we put a dollar in each box independently, there are some
instances in which there are more than k non-empty boxes but the magician cannot
win more than k dollars at any instance. Let Xi be the indicator random variable
which is 1 iff there is a dollar in box i. The expected total prize is E[
P
i Xi] = k, but
the expected prize that the magician can win is at most E[min(
P
i Xi, k)]. It can be
verified that E[min(
P
i Xi, k)] ≈ (1− k
k
ekk!
)k asymptotically as n→∞. In fact, for any
positive ε, there is a large enough n such that E[min(
P




the other hand, if a magician can guarantee that every box is opened with probability
at least γ = 1− kk
ekk!





+ ε)k in expectation which is a contradiction; therefore it is not possible to
make such a guarantee.
Proof of Theorem 26. First, we show that each Si includes each item j with proba-
bility at least γ. Observe that for each item j, a sequence of n boxes are presented
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to the jth magician with probabilities x1j, . . . , xnj written on them. Since
P
i xij ≤ kj
and γ ∈ [0, γk], we can argue that each box is opened with probability at least γ (see
Theorem 24 and Definition 19); therefore Si includes each item j with probability at
least γ.
Next, we show that the expected objective value of γ-pre-rounding is at least
γα-fraction of the expected objective value of the optimal mechanism in M. Note
that by Theorem 22, the expected objective value of the optimal mechanism in M
is upper bounded by the optimal value of (OPT ) which is
P
iRi(xi); therefore, it
is enough to show that ESi [Ri(xi[Si])] ≥ γαRi(xi), i.e., the expected objective value
that Mi〈xi[Si]〉 obtains from agent i is at least γαRi(xi). Let ξi be a budget balanced
cross monotonic cost share function for Ri(·); then








ξi(j, xi[{1, . . . ,m}])









= γRi(xi) because ξi is budget balanced
Next, we show that the multi agent mechanism based on γ-pre-rounding is in M
and it is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). The fact that this mech-
anism is in M follows from assumption A6 and the fact that for each item j, the
corresponding magician breaks no more than kj wands, which means no more than
kj units are allocated at any instance. To show that it is DSIC, observe that the only
way the reports of other agents could affect the outcome of agent i is by affecting Si,
yet Mi〈xi[Si]〉 is a mechanism in Mi, so it is incentive compatible mechanism for any
choice of Si; therefore the resulting mechanism is DSIC. Observe that this mechanism
also preserves all of the ex post properties of each Mi (e.g., individual rationality).
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Proof of Theorem 27. First, we show that each Si includes each item j with proba-
bility exactly γ. Observe that for each item j, a sequence of n boxes are presented to
the jth magician with probabilities x̂1j, . . . , x̂nj written on them. Since γ ∈ [0, γk] andP
i x̂ij ≤ kj and because each Mi〈xi〉 allocates each item j with probability exactly
x̂ij, we can argue that each box is opened with probability exactly γ (see Theorem 24
and Definition 19); therefore Si includes each item j with probability exactly γ.
Next, we show that γ-post-rounding obtains in expectation at least γα-fraction
of the expected objective value of the optimal mechanism in M. Note that by Theo-
rem 22 the expected objective value of the optimal mechanism in M is upper bounded
by the optimal value of (OPT ) which is
P
iRi(xi); therefore, it is enough to show
that Eti,xi,pi [Obji(ti, xi, pi)] ≥ γαRi(xi), i.e., the expected objective value that γ-post-
rounding obtains from agent i is at least γαRi(xi). Let ξi be a budget balanced cross
monotonic cost share function for Obji as required by A
′2; then





ξi(j, ti, xi) + cipi
































i)] is exactly the expected
objective value of Mi〈xi〉 which is at least αRi(xi).
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Next, we show that γ-post-rounding is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) and
does not over allocate any item. Consider any arbitrary agent i. Observe that each
item j ∈ x′i is included in xi with a probability of exactly γ; furthermore, by A′4,
valuations of agent i can be interpreted as a weighted rank function of some ma-
troid; WLOG, we may assume that x′i is always an independent set of this matroid
24;
therefore, the valuation of the agent for the items in x′i is additive; consequently, her
expected valuation for xi is exactly γ times her valuation for x
′
i. Observe that both
the expected valuation and the expected payment of agent i are scaled by γ for any
outcome of Mi〈xi〉 and Mi〈xi〉 itself was incentive compatible; therefore, the result-
ing mechanism is incentive also incentive compatible. However, the final mechanism
is only Bayesian incentive compatible because Si depends on the typers/reports of
agents other that i 25. Also note that the mechanism does not over allocate any item,
because for each unit of item j being allocated one of the kj wands of the j
th magician
breaks.
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 21. To show
that R(x) is concave, it is enough to show that for any x and x′ and any β ∈ [0, 1],
R(βx+ (1− β)x′) ≥ βR(x) + (1− β)R(x′). Let y and y′ be the optimal assignments
for the convex program subject to x and x′ respectively; then y′′ = βy + (1− β)y′ is
also a feasible assignment for the convex program subject to βx+(1−β)x′; therefore,
R(βx+(1−β)x′) must be at least u(βy+(1−β)y′); on the other hand u(·) is concave,
so u(βy+ (1−β)y′) ≥ βu(y) + (1−β)u(y′) = βR(x) + (1−β)R(x′). That proves the
claim.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let µ =
P
j E[Zj]. Define the random variables Yj = max(Yj−1−
Zj, 0) and Y0 = B. Observe that for each j, Yj = max(B−
Pj
r=1 Zr, 0), so min(
Pj
r=1 Zr, B)+
Yj = B. Therefore E[min(
Pj
r=1 Zr, B)] + E[Yj] = B and to prove the theorem it is





24Otherwise, we could replace x′i by a maximum weight independent subset of x
′
i.
25I.e., Pr[j ∈ Si] is equal to γ only in expectation over other agents’ reports
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(for all j) and m→∞.
To prove the second inequality in the statement of the lemma we can use the









B = (1− 1
e
) min(µ,B).
To complete the proof, we prove inequality (Yj) as follows.







































we may assume that
P




and this will also scale r1, . . . , rm by the same constant c, so their ratio is not
be affected. Consider the following LP and observe that xj, pj, and rj, as defined in
the statement of the lemma, form a feasible assignment for this LP. If we show that
the optimal objective value of the LP is bounded below by 1
2
, any feasible assignment
yields an objective value of at least 1
2






lemma. In the following LP, pj and rj are variables and everything else is constant.
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minimize r1
subject to rj ≥ xjpj + (1− xj)rj+1, ∀j ∈ [m] (αj)
rj ≥ rj+1, ∀j ∈ [m] (βj)
mX
j=1
xjpj ≥ 1 (γ)
pj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [m]
rj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [m+ 1]
To prove that the optimal value of the above LP is bounded below by 1
2
, we
construct a feasible assignment for its dual LP, obtaining a value of 1
2
. The dual LP
is as follows.
maximize γ
subject to γ ≤ αj, ∀j ∈ [m] (pj)
α1 + β1 ≤ 1 (r1)
αj + βj ≤ (1− xj−1)αj−1 + βj−1, ∀j ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (rj)
0 ≤ (1− xm)αm + βm (rm+1)
αj ≥ 0, βj ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [m]
We construct an assignment for the dual LP as follows. Set αj = γ and set
βj = βj−1 − xj−1γ for all j, except that for j = 1 we set β1 = 1 − γ. From this
assignment we get βj = 1− γ − γ
Pj−1
`=1 x`. Observe that we get a feasible assignment
as long as all βj resulting from this assignment are non-negative. Furthermore, it is
easy to see that βj ≥ 1 − γ − γ
Pm
`=1 x` ≥ 1 − 2γ because
P
j xj ≤ 1. Therefore, by
setting γ = 1
2
, all βj are non-negative and we always get a feasible assignment for the
dual LP with an objective value of 1
2
, which completes the proof.
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Chapter 5
The Generalized Magician’s Problem and Applica-
tions
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a generalization of the magician’s problem from §4.4 along
with several applications. As the first application, we present an improved algo-
rithm/lower bound for a generalization of prophet inequalities. As the second ap-
plication, we present an online algorithm for the stochastic generalized assignment
problem.
5.2 The Generalized Magician’s Problem
We present a generalization of the magician’s problem along with a near-optimal
solution.
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Definition 30 (The Generalized Magician’s Problem). A magician is presented with
a series of boxes one by one, in an online fashion. There is a prize hidden in one of
the boxes. The magician has a magic wand that can be used to open the boxes. The
wand has k units of mana1. If the wand is used on box i and has at least 1 unit of
mana, the box opens, but the wand looses a random amount of mana Xi ∈ [0, 1] drawn
from a distribution specified on the box by its cumulative distribution function FXi
(i.e., the magician learns FXi upon seeing box i). The magician wishes to maximize
the probability of obtaining the prize, but unfortunately the sequence of boxes, the
distributions written on the boxes, and the box containing the prize have been arranged
by a villain; the magician has no prior information (not even the number of the boxes);
however, it is guaranteed that
P
i E[Xi] ≤ k, and that the villain has to prepare the
sequence of boxes in advance (i.e., cannot make any changes once the process has
started).
The magician could fail to open a box either because (a) he might choose to
skip the box, or (b) his wand might run out of mana before getting to the box.
Note that once the magician fixes his strategy, the best strategy for the villain is to
put the prize in the box which, based on the magician’s strategy, has the lowest ex
ante probability of being opened. Therefore, in order for the magician to obtain the
prize with a probability of at least γ, he has to devise a strategy that guarantees
an ex ante probability of at least γ for opening each box. Notice that allowing the
prize to be split among multiple boxes does not affect the problem. We present an
algorithm parameterized by a probability γ ∈ [0, 1] which guarantees a minimum ex-
ante probability of γ for opening each box while trying to minimize the mana used.
1“Mana is an indigenous Pacific islander concept of an impersonal force or quality that resides
in people, animals, and inanimate objects. . . . . Modern fantasy fiction, computer and role-playing
games have adopted mana as a term for magic points, an expendable (and most often rechargeable)
resource out of which magic users form their magical spells.”Wikipedia (2012)
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We show that for γ ≤ 1− 1√
k
this algorithm never requires more than k units of mana.
Definition 31 (γ-Conservative Magician). The magician adaptively computes a se-
quence of thresholds θ1, θ2, . . . ∈ R+ and makes a decision about each box as follows:
let Wi denote the amount of mana lost prior to seeing the i
th box; the magician makes
a decision about box i by comparing Wi against θi; if Wi < θi, it opens the box; if
Wi > θi, it does not open the box; and if Wi = θi, it randomizes and opens the box with
some probability (to be defined). The magician chooses the smallest threshold θi for
which Pr[Wi ≤ θi] ≥ γ where the probability is computed ex ante (i.e., not conditioned
on X1, . . . ,Xi−1). Note that γ is a parameter that is given. Let FWi(w) = Pr[Wi ≤ w]
denote the ex ante CDF of random variable Wi, and let Yi be the indicator random
variable which is 1 iff the magician opens the box i. Formally, the probability with
which the magician should open box i condition on Wi is computed as follows
2.
Pr [Yi = 1|Wi] =
8>>><>>>:
1 Wi < θi
(γ − F−Wi(θi))/(FWi(θi)− F
−
Wi
(θi)) Wi = θi
0 Wi > θi
(Y )
θi = inf{w|FWi(w) ≥ γ} (θ)
In the above definition, F−Wi is the left limit of FWi, i.e., F
−
Wi
(w) = Pr[Wi < w].
Note that FWi+1 and F
−
Wi+1
are fully determined by FWi and FXi and the choice of
γ (see Theorem 38). Observe that θi is in fact computed before seeing box i itself.
A γ-conservative magician may fail for a choice of γ unless all thresholds θi are
less than or equal to k − 1. The following theorem states a condition on γ that is
sufficient to guarantee that θi ≤ k − 1 for all i.
Theorem 36 (γ-Conservative Magician). For any γ ≤ 1 − 1√
k
, a γ-conservative
magician with k units of mana opens each box with an ex ante probability of γ exactly.
Proof. See §5.5.
2Assume W0 = 0
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Theorem 37 (γ-Conservative Magician (0–1)). If Xi ∈ {0, 1} (i.e., Bernoulli random
variable) for all i, then for any γ ≤ 1− 1√
k+3
, a γ-conservative magician with k units
of mana opens each box with an ex ante probability of γ exactly; furthermore, if each
FXi is not the exact CDF of Xi but stochastically dominates it, then the magician
opens each box with an ex ante probability of at least γ.
Proof. See §5.5.
Definition 32 (γ∗k and γk). We define γ
∗
k to be the largest probability such that for
any k′ ≥ k and any instance of the magician’s problem with k′ units of mana, the
thresholds computed by a γ∗k-conservative magician are no more than k
′− 1. In other
words, γ∗k is the optimal choice of γ which works for all instances with k
′ ≥ k units
of mana. By Theorem 36, γ∗k must be
3 at least 1 − 1√
k
. We define γk similar to γ
∗
k




Observe that γ∗k and γk are non-decreasing functions in k and they both approach
1 as k →∞. However, for k = 1, γ∗1 = 0 whereas γ1 = 12 . We can show that both of
these bounds are tight for k = 1.
Proposition 8. For the generalized magician’s problem for k = 1, no algorithm for
the magician (online or offline) can guarantee a constant non-zero probability for
opening each box.
Proof. Suppose there is an algorithm for the magician that is guaranteed to open
each box with a probability of at least γ ∈ (0, 1]. We construct an instance in which
the algorithm fails. Let n = d 1
γ
e+ 1. Suppose all Xi are (independently) drawn from





with prob. 1− 1
2n
1 with prob. 1
2n
, ∀i ∈ [n]
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As soon as the magician opens a box, the remaining mana will be less than 1, so he will
not be able to open any other box, i.e., the magician can open only one box at every
instance. Let Yi denote the indicator random variable which is 1 iff the magician
opens box i. Since
P
i Yi ≤ 1, it must be
P
i E[Yi] ≤ 1. On the other hand, E[Yi] ≥ γ
because the magician has guaranteed to open each box with a probability of at least
γ. However
P
i E[Yi] ≥ nγ > 1 which is a contradiction. Note that
P
i E[Xi] < 1 so
it satisfies the requirement of Definition 30.
Proposition 9. For the magician’s problem for k = 1, assuming Xi ∈ {0, 1} for all i,
no algorithm for the magician (online or offline) can guarantee a probability of more
than 1
2
for opening each box.
Proof. Suppose there is an algorithm for the magician that is guaranteed to open each
box with a probability of at least γ ∈ (0.5, 1]. We construct an instance in which the
algorithm fails. Pick any δ ∈ ( 1
2γ








1 with prob. 1− δ
0 otherwise
Observe that the algorithm must open the first box with probability at least γ; so the
probability that there is enough mana left for the second box is at most 1− γδ < 1
2
;
therefore the algorithm will not be able to open the second box with a probability of
1
2
or more. Note that
P
i E[Xi] = 1 so it satisfies the requirement of Definition 30.
Computation of FWi(·). For every i ∈ [n], the equation Wi+1 = Wi + YiXi relates
the distribution of Wi+1 to those of Wi and Xi
4. The following lemma shows that the
distribution of Wi+1 is fully determined by the information available to the magician
before seeing box i+ 1.
4Note that the distribution of Yi is dependent on/determined by Wi.
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Theorem 38. In the algorithm of γ-conservative magician (Definition 31), the choice
of γ and the distributions of X1, . . . ,Xi fully determine the distribution of Wi+1, for
every i ∈ [n]. In particular, FWi+1 can be recursively defined as follows.
FWi+1(w) = FWi(w)−Gi(w) + EXi∼FXi [Gi(w − Xi)] ∀i ∈ [n] , ∀w ∈ R+ (FW)
Gi(w) = min(FWi(w), γ) ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀w ∈ R+ (G)
Proof. See §5.5.
As a corollary of Theorem 38, we show how FWi can be computed using dynamic
programming, assuming Xi can only take discrete values that are proper multiples of
some minimum value.
Corollary 5. If all Xi are proper multiple of
1
D
for some D ∈ N, then FWi(·) can be








]Gi(w − `D ) i ≥ 1, w ≥ 0
1 i = 0, w ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
, ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀w ∈ R+
In particular, the γ-conservative magician makes a decision for each box in time
O(D).







) for any w ∈ R+.
5.3 Prophet Inequalities
We prove a generalization of prophet inequalities by a direct reduction to the magi-
cian’s problem. Prophet inequalities have been extensively studied in the past (e.g.
Hill and Kertz (1992)). Prior to this work, the best known bound for the generaliza-




) by Hajiaghayi et al. (2007). We improve
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this to 1 − 1√
k+3
. Note that the current bound is tight for k = 1, and is useful even
for small values of k. We start by defining the problem formally.
Definition 33 (k-Choice Sum). A sequence of n non-negative random numbers V1, . . . ,Vn
are drawn from arbitrary distributions F1, . . . , Fn one by one in an arbitrary order. A
gambler observes the process and may select k of the random numbers, with the goal
of maximizing the sum of the selected ones; a random number may only be selected
at the time it is drawn, and it cannot be unselected later. The gambler knows all the
distributions in advance, and observes from which distribution the current number is
drawn, but not the order in which the future numbers are drawn. On the other hand,
a prophet knows all the actual draws in advance, so he chooses the k highest draws.
We assume that the order in which the random numbers are drawn is fixed in advance
(i.e., may not change based on the decisions of the gambler).
Hajiaghayi et al. (2007) proved that there is a strategy for the gambler that




) fraction of the payoff of the prophet,
using a non-decreasing sequence of k stopping rules (thresholds) 5. Next, we construct
a gambler that obtains in expectation at least γk fraction of the prophet’s payoff, using
a γk-conservative magician as a black box. Note that γk ≥ 1 − 1√k+3 . This gambler
uses only a single threshold. However, he may skip some of the random draws at
random.
Theorem 39 (Prophet Inequalities – k-Choice Sum). The following strategy ensures
that the gambler obtains at least γk fraction of payoff of the prophet in expectation.
6
• Find a threshold τ such that Pi Pr[Vi > τ ] = k (e.g., by doing a binary search
on τ).
• Use a γk-conservative magician with k units of mana. Upon seeing each Vi,
create a box and write xi = Pr[Vi > τ ] on it and present it to the magician.
If the magician chooses to open the box and also Vi > τ , then select Vi and
decrease the magician’s mana by 1, otherwise skip Vi.
5A gambler with stopping rules τ1, . . . , τk works as follows. Upon seeing Vi, he selects it iff
Vi ≥ τj+1 where j is the number of random draws selected so far.
6To simplify the exposition we assume that the distributions do not have point masses. The
result holds with slight modifications if we allow point masses.
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Proof. First, we compute an upper bound on the expected payoff of the prophet.
Let xi be the ex ante probability (i.e., before any random number is drawn) that
the prophet chooses Vi (i.e. the probability that Vi is among the k highest draws).
Let ui(xi) denote the maximum possible contribution of the random variable Vi to
the expected payoff of the prophet if Vi is selected with an ex ante probability xi.
Note that ui(xi) is equal to the expected value of Vi conditioned on being above
the 1 − xi quantile, multiplied by the probability of Vi being above that quantile.
Assuming Fi(·) and fi(·) denote the CDF and PDF of Vi, we can write ui(xi) =R∞
F−1i (1−xi)
vfi(v)dv. By changing the integration variable and applying the chain rule




i (1 − x)dx. Observe that ddxiui(xi) = F
−1
i (1 − xi) is a non-
increasing function, so ui(xi) is a concave function. Furthermore,
P
i xi ≤ k because
the prophet cannot choose more than k random draws. So the optimal value of the








xi ≤ k (τ)
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n] (µi)
Define the Lagrangian for the above convex program as












By KKT stationarity condition, at the optimal assignment, it must be ∂
∂xi
L(q, τ, µ) =
0. On the other hand, ∂
∂xi
L(q, τ, µ) = −F−1i (1− xi) + τ − µi. Assuming that xi > 0,
by complementary slackness µi = 0, which then implies that xi = 1 − Fi(τ), so
xi = Pr[Vi > τ ]. Furthermore, it is easy to show that the first constraint must be
tight, which implies that
P
i Pr[Vi > τ ] = k. Observe that the contribution of each
Vi to the objective value of the convex program is exactly E[Vi|Vi > τ ] Pr[Vi > τ ].
By using a γk-conservative magician we can ensure that each box is opened with
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probability at least γk which implies the contribution of each Vi to the expected
payoff of the gambler is E[Vi|Vi > τ ] Pr[Vi > τ ]γk which proves that the expected
payoff of the gambler is at least γk fraction of optimal objective value of the convex
program, which was itself and upper bound on the expected payoff of the prophet.
5.4 Online Stochastic Generalized Assignment Problem
5.4.1 Introduction
The generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its special cases, multi knapsack
problem and bin packing capture a class of optimization problems with various appli-
cations in computer science, operations research, and related disciplines. The (offline)
GAP is defined as follows:
Definition 34 (Generalized Assignment Problem). There is a set of items that can
be assigned to a set of bins. Each item has a known size and a known value for each
bin. the objective is to maximize the total value of the assignment subject to the total
size of the items assigned to each bin not exceeding the capacity of that bin. The size
and value of each item may depend on the bin it is assigned to (if assigned).
For example GAP can be viewed as a scheduling problem on parallel machines,
where each machine has a capacity (or a maximum load) and each job has a size (or
a processing time) and a profit each possibly dependent on the machine to which it
is assigned, and the objective is to find a feasible scheduling which maximizes the
total profit. Though multiple knapsack and bin packing have a fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme (asymptotic for bin packing) ? in the offline setting, GAP is
APX-hard and the best known approximation ratio is 1 − 1/e + ε where ε ≈ 10−180
?, which improves on a previous (1− 1/e)-approximation ?.
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In this section we consider the following online stochastic variant of the problem.
Definition 35 (Online Stochastic Generalized Assignment Problem). A sequence of
items arrive online and each item can be either assigned to a bin from a fixed set of
bins, or discarded. Items arrive in an arbitrary unknown order; each item has a size
and a value; stochastic information is known about the size/value of each item; the
objective is to maximize the total value of the assignment subject to the total size of
the items assigned to each bin not exceeding the capacity of that bin. The size and
value of each item may depend on the bin it is assigned to (if assigned). The actual
size of an item becomes known only after it is placed in a bin. Furthermore, it is given
that an item does not take up more than 1
k
fraction of the capacity of any relevant
bin.
We present a 1 − 1√
k
-approximate online algorithm for the online stochastic as-
signment problem under the assumption that no item takes up more than 1
k
fraction
of the capacity of any bin. Items arrive online; each item has a value and a size; upon
arrival, an item can be placed in a bin or discarded; the objective is to maximize
the total value of the placement. Both value and size of an item may depend on
the bin in which the item is placed; the size of an item is revealed only after it has
been placed in a bin; distribution information is available about the value and size of
each item in advance (not necessarily i.i.d), however items arrive in adversarial order
(non-adaptive adversary).
5.4.2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge Feldman et al. ? were the first to consider the generalized
assignment problem in an online setting. In the adversarial model where the items
and the order of arrivals are chosen by an adversary, there is no competitive algorithm.
Consider the simple case of one bin with capacity one and two arriving items each
with size one. The value of the first item is 1. The value of the second item would be
either 1
ε
or 0 based on whether we assign the first item to the bin. Thus the online
profit cannot be more than ε factor of the offline profit. Indeed one can show a much
stronger hardness result for the adversarial model: two special cases of GAP, namely
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the Adword problem7 and the Display Ad problem8 are shown to be not competitive
even under the large-capacity assumption ??.
Since no algorithm is competitive for online GAP in the adversarial model, Feld-
man et al. consider this model with free disposal. In free disposal model, the total
size of items assigned to a bin may exceed its capacity, however, the profit of the
bin is the maximum-valued subset of the assigned items which does not violate the
capacity. Feldman et al. give a (1− 1
e
−ε)-competitive primal-dual algorithm for GAP
under the free disposal assumption and the additional large-capacity assumption by
which the capacity of each bin is at least O(1
ε
) times larger than the maximum size
of a single item. Although the free disposal assumption might be counter-intuitive
in time-sensitive applications such as job scheduling, where the machine may start
doing a job right after the job assignment, it is a very natural assumption in many
applications including applications in economics like Ad allocation – a buyer does not
mind receiving more items.
Dean, Goemans, and Vondrak ? consider the closely related problem of (offline)
stochastic knapsack problem. In their model, there is only one bin and the value of
each item is known. However, the size of each item is drawn from a known distribution
only after it is placed in the knapsack. We note that this is an offline setting in the
sense that we may choose any order of items for allocation. This model is motivated
by job scheduling on a single machine where the actual processing time required for a
job is learned only after the completion of the job. Dean et al. give various adaptive
and non-adaptive algorithms for their model where the best one has a competitive
ratio 1
3
− ε. This ratio was improved to 3
8
− ε by Bhalgat et al. ?. Recently Bhalgat
improved the competitive ratio to 1
2
− ε ?. Other variations, such as soft capacity
constraints, have also been considered for which we refer the reader to ???. Dean et
al. ? also introduce an ordered model where items must be considered in a specific
order, which can be seen as a version of the the online model where the order is
known. ? present a 1
9.5
-competitive algorithm. In general, the online model can be
considered as a more challenging variation of the models proposed by Dean et al,
7The Adword problem is a special case of GAP where the size and the value of assigning an item
to a bin is the same, i.e., sij = vij .
8The Display Ad problem is a special case of GAP where all sizes are uniform, i.e., sij = 1.
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however we show that the assumption of bound on the maximum size to capacity
ratio is enough to overcome this challenge.
Even with stochastic information about the arriving queries, no online algorithm
can achieve a competitive ratio better than 1
2
Hajiaghayi et al. (2007); ?); ?); Alaei
(2011). Consider the simple example where the value of the first item is 1 with
probability one and the value of the second item is 1
ε
with probability ε, and 0 with
probability 1 − ε. No online (randomized) algorithm can achieve a profit more than
max{1, ε(1
ε
)} = 1 in expectation. However, the expected profit of the optimum offline
assignment is (1 − ε)1 + ε(1
ε
) = 2 − ε. Therefore without any additional assumption
one cannot get a competitive ratio better than 1/2. We overcome this difficulty by
considering the natural large-capacity assumption which arises in many applications
such as online advertising.
Our techniques can be used to design asymptotically optimum algorithms for other
resource allocation settings. For example another application in ad allocation is the
banner advertisement problem. Feige et al. ? propose a new automated system for
selling banner advertisements. In this system, each advertiser specifies a collection of
webpages which are relevant to his product, a desired total quantity of impressions
on these pages, and a maximum per-impression price. The problem of selecting a
feasible subset of advertisers with maximum total value does not have any non-trivial
approximation. This can be shown by a reduction from the Independent Set problem
on a graph; advertisers represent the vertices of the graph and webpages represent the
edges of the graph. Advertisers desire all the impressions of the relevant webpages.
Thus any feasible subset of advertisers would denote an independent set in the graph.
This shows that maximizing the total value does not have a non-trivial approximation.
Feige et al. present two greedy heuristics and discuss new techniques to measure their
performances. By considering some variants of the banner advertisement problem,
they show that their algorithms can achieve a competitive ratio between 0.1 to 0.3
which depends on the structural properties of the optimum solution. We show that
one can get near optimum solutions if the number of available impressions on each
website is at least k times the required impressions of each relevant advertiser.
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5.4.3 Preliminaries
Model. We consider the problem of assigning m items to n bins; items arrive on-
line in an arbitrary but unknown order; stochastic information is known about the
size/value of each item; the objective is to maximize the total value of the assignment.
Each item i ∈ [m] has ri possible types with each type t ∈ [ri] having a probability of
pit, a value of vitj ∈ R+, and a size of Sitj ∈ [0, 1] if placed in bin j (for each j ∈ [n]);
Sitj is a random variable which is drawn from a distribution with a CDF of Fitj if the
item is placed in bin j. Each bin j ∈ [m] has a capacity of cj ∈ N0 which limits the
total size of the items placed in that bin9. The type of each item is revealed upon
arrival and the item must be either placed in a bin or discarded; this decision cannot
be changed later. The size of an item is revealed only after it has been place in a bin,
furthermore an item can be placed in a bin only if the bin has at least one unit of
capacity left. We assume that m, n, cj, vitj and Fitj are known in advance.
Note that the assumption that all item sizes being in [0, 1] is WLOG because all
item sizes and the capacity of each bin can be scaled.
Benchmark. Consider the following linear program in which esitj = ESitj∼Fitj [Sitj];
the optimal value of this linear program, which corresponds to the expected instance,














esitjxitj ≤ cj, ∀j ∈ [n]X
j
xitj ≤ pit, ∀i ∈ [m] , ∀t ∈ [ri]
xitj ∈ [0, 1] ,
Theorem 40. The optimal value of the linear program (OPTGAP ) is an upper bound
the the expected value of the offline optimal assignment.
9Our results hold for non-integer capacitates, however we assume integer capacities to simplify
the exposition.
113
CHAPTER 5. THE GENERALIZED MAGICIAN’S PROBLEM
Proof. Let x∗itj denote the ex ante probability that item i is of type t and is assigned
to bin j in the optimal offline assignment. It is easy to see that x∗itj is a feasible
assignment for the linear program. Furthermore, the expected value of the optimal








itj which is equal to the value of the linear
program for x∗itj which is itself no more than the optimal value of the linear program.
Note that the optimal value of the linear program may be strictly higher since a
feasible assignment of the linear program does not necessarily correspond to a feasible
offline assignment policy.
Section §5.4.4 presents an online algorithm which obtains at least 1− 1√
k
-fraction
of the optimal value of the above linear program, where k = minj cj. Next section
presents a stochastic toy problem and its solution which is used as a black box in the
online algorithm of §5.4.4.
5.4.4 The Online Algorithm
We present an online algorithm which obtains at least 1− 1√
k
-fraction of the optimal
value of the linear program (OPTGAP ). The algorithm uses, as a black box, the
solution of the generalized magician’s problem.
Definition 36 (Online Stochastic GAP Algorithm).
1. Solve the linear program (OPTGAP ) and let x be an optimal assignment.
2. For each j ∈ [n], create a γ-conservative magician (Definition 31) with cj units
of mana for bin j. γ is a parameter that is given.
3. Upon arrival of each item i ∈ [m], do the following:
(a) Let t denote the type of item i.
(b) Choose a bin at random such that each bin j ∈ [n] is chosen with probability
xitj
pit
. Let j∗ denote the chosen bin.
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(c) For each j ∈ [n], define the random variable Xij as Xij ← Sitj if j∗ = j,
and Xij ← 0 otherwise10. For each j ∈ [n], write the CDF of Xij on a
box and present it to the magician of bin j. The CDF of Xij is Fxij(s) =
(1−Pt′ xit′j) +Pt′ xit′jFit′j(s).
(d) If the magician for bin j∗ opened his box in step 3c, then assign item i to
bin j∗, otherwise discard the item. For each j ∈ [n], if the magician of bin
j opened his box in step 3c, decrease the mana of that magician by Xij. In
particular, Xij = 0 for all j 6= j∗, and Xij∗ = Sitj∗.
Theorem 41. For any γ ≤ γ∗k, the online algorithm of Definition 36 obtains in
expectation at least a γ-fraction of the expected value of the optimal offline assignment
(recall that γ∗k ≥ 1− 1√k).
Proof. By Theorem 40, it is enough to show that the online algorithm obtains in
expectation at least a γ-fraction of the optimal value of the linear program (OPTGAP ).
Let x be an optimal assignment for the LP. The contribution of each item i ∈ [m]
to the value of bin j ∈ [n] in the LP is exactly Pt vitjxitj. We show that the online
algorithm obtains in expectation γ
P
t vitjxitj from each item i and each bin j.
Consider an arbitrary item i ∈ [m] and an arbitrary bin j ∈ [n]. WLOG, suppose




















The last inequality follows from the first set of constraints in the LP of (OPTGAP ).
Given that
P
i E[Xij] ≤ cj and γ ≤ γ∗k ≤ γ∗cj , Theorem 36 implies that the magician
of bin j opens each box with a probability of γ. Therefore, the expected contribution
10Note that Sitj is learned only after item i is placed in bin j which implies that Xij may not be
known at this point, however the algorithm does not use Xij until after it is learned.
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t xitjvitj in expectation which is at least a γ-fraction of
the expected value of the optimal offline assignment. Furthermore, each magician
guarantees that the total size of the items assigned to each bin does not exceed the
capacity of that bin.
5.5 Analysis of Generalized γ-Conservative Magician
We present the proof of Theorem 36 and Theorem 37. We prove the theorems in two
parts. In the first part, we show that the thresholds computed by the γ-conservative
magician indeed guarantee that each box is opened with an ex-ante probability of γ,
assuming there is enough mana. In the second part, we show that for any γ ≤ 1− 1√
k
(or γ ≤ 1− 1√
k
and assuming Xi ∈ {0, 1}), the thresholds θi are less than or equal to
k − 1, for all i, which implies that the magician never requires more than k units of
mana. It can be shown that a non-adaptive algorithm cannot guarantee a probability




) for opening each box.
Below, we repeat the formulation of the threshold based strategy of the magician.
Pr [Yi = 1|Wi] =
8>>><>>>:
1 Wi < θi
(γ − F−Wi(θi))/(FWi(θi)− F
−
Wi
(θi)) Wi = θi
0 Wi > θi
(Y )
θi = inf{w|FWi(w) ≥ γ} (θ)
Part 1. We show that the thresholds computed by a γ-conservative magician guar-
antee that each box is opened with an ex ante probability of γ (i.e., Pr[Yi = 1] = γ),
assuming there is enough mana.
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Pr [Yi ≤ w] = Pr [Yi = 1 ∩Wi < θi] + Pr [Yi = 1 ∩Wi = θi] + Pr [Yi = 1 ∩Wi > θi]






Pr [Wi = θi]
= γ
For Theorem 37, we must show that the thresholds computed by a γ-conservative
magician guarantee that each box is opened with an ex ante probability at least γ
when FXi stochastically dominates the actual CDF of Xi for all i and assuming there
is enough mana. Let xi = EXi∼FXi [Xi], i.e., xi is an upper bound on Pr Xi = 1 (recall
that xi ∈ {0, 1}). The proof is as follows.
(a) First we prove that Pr[Wi ≤ `] ≥ FWi(`) by induction on i. The base case is
trivial. Suppose the inequality holds for i ≥ 1, we prove it for i+ 1 as follows.
Pr [Wi+1 ≤ `] ≥ Pr [Wi ≤ `− 1] + Pr [Wi = `] (1− y`ixi)
= Pr [Wi ≤ `− 1] y`ixi + Pr [Wi ≤ `] (1− y`ixi)
≥ FWi(`− 1)y
`
ixi + FWi(`)(1− y
`
ixi) by induction hypothesis
= FWi+1(`) by (??)
(1.a)
Observe that all of the above inequalities are met with equality if every xi is the
exact probability of breaking wand for the corresponding box instead of just an
upper bound.
(b) Next, we show that each box is opened with probability at least γ. We shall show
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that Pr[Yi = 1] ≥ γ.
Pr [Yi = 1] =
X
`




y`i Pr [Wi = `]
= Pr [Wi < θi] + y
θi
i Pr [Wi = θi] because y
`
i = 1 for ` < θi
= (1− yθii ) Pr [Wi < θi] + yθii Pr [Wi ≤ θi]
≥ (1− yθii )FWi(θi − 1) + y
θi
i FWi(θi) by (1.a)
= FWi(θi − 1) + y
θi
i (FWi(θi)− FWi(θi − 1))
= γ by substituting yθii from (??)
Observe that all of the above inequalities are met with equality if each xi is the
exact probability of breaking a wand for the corresponding box instead of being
just an upper bound.
Part 2. Assuming γ ≤ 1 − 1√
k
(or γ ≤ 1 − 1√
k
and Xi ∈ {0, 1}), we show that
the thresholds computed by a γ-conservative magician are no more than k − 1 (i.e.,
θi ≤ k − 1 for all i). First, we present an interpretation of how FWi(·) evolves in i in
terms of a sand displacement process.
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Definition 37 (Sand Displacement Process). Consider one unit of infinitely divisible
sand which is initially at position 0 on the real line. The sand is gradually moved to
the right and distributed over the real line in n rounds. Let FWi(w) denote the total
amount of sand in the interval [0, w] at the beginning of round i ∈ [n]. At each round
i the following happens.
(I) The leftmost γ-fraction of the sand is selected by first identifying the smallest
threshold θi ∈ R+ such that FWi(θi) ≥ γ and then selecting all the sand in the
interval [0, θi) and selecting a fraction of the sand at position θi itself such that
the total amount of selected sand is equal to γ. Formally, if Gi(w) denotes
the total amount of sand selected from [0, w], the selection of sand is such that
Gi(w) = min(FWi(w), γ), for every w ∈ R+. In particular, this implies that
only a fraction of the sand at position θi itself might be selected, however all
the sand to the left of position θi is selected.
(II) The selected sand is moved to the right as follows. Consider the given random
variable Xi ∈ [0, 1] and let FXi(·) denote its CDF. For every point w ∈ [0, θi]
and every distance δ ∈ [0, 1], take a fraction proportional to Pr[Xi = δ] out of
the sand which was selected from position w and move it to position w + δ.
It is easy to see that θi and FWi(w) resulting from the above process are exactly
the same as those computed by the γ-conservative magician.
Lemma 10. At the end of the ith round of the sand displacement process, the total
amount of sand in the interval [0, w] is given by the following equation.
FWi+1(w) = FWi(w)−Gi(w) + EXi∼FXi [Gi(w − Xi)] ∀i ∈ [n] , ∀w ∈ R+ (FW)
Proof. According to definition of the sand displacement process, FWi+1(w) can be
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defined as follows.






Gi(ω − δ) dFXi(δ)
= FWi(w)−Gi(w) + EXi∼FXi [Gi(w − Xi)]
Proof of Theorem 38. The claim follows directly from Lemma 10
Consider a conceptual barrier which is at position θi+1 at the beginning of round i
and is moved to position θi+1+1 for the next round, for each i ∈ [n]. It is easy to verify
(i.e., by induction) that the sand never crosses to the right side of the barrier (i.e.,
FWi+1(θi+1) = 1). The following theorem implies that the sand remains concentrated
near the barrier throughout the process.
Theorem 42 (Sand). Throughout the sand displacement process (Definition 37), at
the beginning of round i ∈ [n], the following inequality holds.
FWi(w) < γFWi(w + 1), ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀w ∈ [0, θi) (FW-ineq)
Furthermore, at the beginning of round i ∈ [n], the average distance of the sand from
the barrier, denoted by di, is upper bounded by the following inequalities
11 in which
the first inequality is strict except for i = 1.












, ∀i ∈ [n] (d)
Proof. We start by proving the inequality (FW-ineq). The proof is by induction on i.
The case of i = 1 is trivial because all the sand is at position 0 and so θ1 = 0. Suppose
the inequality holds at the beginning of round i for all w ∈ [0, θi); we show that it
holds at the beginning of round i+1 for all w ∈ [0, θi+1). Note that θi ≤ θi+1 ≤ θi+1,
so there are two possible cases:
11Note that {z} = z − bzc, for any z.
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Case 1. w ∈ [0, θi). Observe that Gi(w) = FWi(w) in this interval, so:





by Gi(w) = FWi(w), for w ∈ [0, θi).
< EXi










FWi(w + 1)−Gi(w + 1) + EXi [Gi(w − Xi + 1)]

by monotonicity of FWi(·)−Gi(·).
= γFWi+1(w + 1) by (FW).
Case 2. w ∈ [θi, θi+1]. We prove the claim by showing that FWi+1(w) < γ and
FWi+1(w + 1) = 1. Observe that FWi+1(w) < γ because w < θi+1 and because of the
definition of θi+1 in (θ). Furthermore, observe that FWi+1(w + 1) ≥ FWi+1(θi + 1) = 1
both before and after round i all the sand is still contained in the interval [0, θi + 1].
Next, we prove inequality (d) which upper bounds the average distance of the
sand from the barrier at the beginning of round i ∈ [n].
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The last inequality follows because (1 − β)L + βH ≤ H for any β ∈ [0, 1] and any
L,H with L ≤ H. Note that at least one of the first two inequalities is strict except
for i = 1 which proves the claim.
Theorem 43 (Barrier). If
Pn
i=1 EXi∼FXi [Xi] ≤ k for some k ∈ N, and γ ≤ 1 −
1√
k
(or γ ≤ 1− 1√
k+3
and also Xi ∈ {0, 1} for all i), then the distance of the barrier from
the origin is no more than k throughout the process, i.e., θi ≤ k − 1 for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. At the beginning of round i, let di and d
′
i denote the average distance of
the sand from the barrier and from the origin respectively. Recall that the barrier is
defined to be at position θi+1 at the beginning of round i. Observe that di+d
′
i = θi+1.
Furthermore, d′i+1 = d
′
i+γE[Xi], i.e., the average distance of the sand from the origin
is increased exactly by γE[Xi] during round i (because the amount of selected sand
is exactly γ and the sand selected from every position w ∈ [0, θi] is moved to the right
by an expected distance of E[Xi]). By applying Theorem 42 we get the following
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inequality.






E [Xi] + di






, ∀i ∈ [n] (Γ)
In order to show that the distance of the barrier from the origin is no more than
k throughout the process, it is enough to show that the above inequality cannot hold
for θi > k − 1. In fact it is just enough to show that it cannot hold for θi = k − 1;
alternatively, it is enough to show that the complement of the above inequality holds
for θi = k − 1.
k ≥ γk + 1− γ
k
1− γ
Consider the stronger inequality k ≥ γk + 1
1−γ ; this inequality is quadratic in γ
and can be solved to get a bound of γ ≤ 1− 1√
k
.
Next, consider the case in which Xi ∈ {0, 1} for all i. Observe that the barrier
can only take integral values; therefore, to show that the distance of the barrier from
the origin is no more than k, it is enough to show that inequality (Γ) cannot hold
for θi = k; alternatively, it is enough to show that the complement of that inequality
holds for θi = k.
k + 1 ≥ γk + 1− γ
k+1
1− γ
Consider the the stronger inequality k+ 1 ≥ γk+ 1
1−γ which is quadratic in γ and




; this bound in fact imposes a looser constraint
than γ ≤ 1− 1√
k+3
when k ≥ 7. Furthermore it can be verified (by direct calculation)
that the inequality holds for k < 7 and γ ≤ 1− 1√
k+3
. That completes the proof.
123
CHAPTER 5. THE GENERALIZED MAGICIAN’S PROBLEM
Theorem 43 implies that a γ-conservative magician requires no more than k units
of mana, assuming that γ ≤ 1− 1√
k
(or assuming γ ≤ 1− 1√
k+3
and also Xi ∈ {0, 1}






Competitive Equilibrium in Two Sided Matching
Markets
In this chapter, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching
markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general
non-quasilinear setting is one of the biggest challenges in mechanism design. General
non-quasilinear utilities can for example model smooth budget constraints as a special
case. Due to the difficulty of dealing with arbitrary non-quasilinear utilities, a large
fraction of the existing work have considered the simpler case of quasilinear utilities
with hard budget constraints and they all rely on some form of ascending auction.
For general non-quasilinear utilities, we show that such ascending auctions may not
even converge in finite time. As such, almost all of the existing work on general non-
quasilinear utility function (Demange and Gale (1985); Gale (1984); Quinzii (1984))
have resorted to non-constructive proofs based on fixed point theorems or discretiza-
tion. In this chapter, we give the first direct characterization of competitive equilibria
in such markets. Our approach is constructive and solely based on induction. Our
characterization reveals striking similarities between the payments at the lowest com-
petitive equilibrium for general utilities and VCG payments for quasilinear utilities.
We also show that the mechanism that outputs the lowest competitive equilibrium is
group strategyproof. We also present a class of price discriminating truthful mech-
anisms for selling heterogeneous goods to unit-demand buyers with general utility
functions and from that we derive a natural welfare maximizing mechanism for ad-
auctions that combines pay per click and pay per impression advertisers with general
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utility functions. Our mechanism is group strategyproof even if the search engine and
advertisers have different estimates of clickthrough rates.
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching
markets with general utility functions. In these markets, agents form a one-to-one
matching and monetary transfers are made between matched agents. Utility of each
agent is a function of whom she is matched to and the amount of the monetary
transfer to/from her partner. For the most of this chapter, we work with simpler
markets consisting of a set of buyers and a set of heterogeneous good. In section 6.5,
we show that the more general model can be reduced to this simpler buyer/good
model. We assume that the utility of each buyer depends on the choice of good she
receives and the price she pays but it is not necessarily a quasi-linear function of the
payment. Non-quasilinear utilities can be used for example to model smooth budget
constraints.
A competitive equilibrium, in these markets, is essentially an assignment of prices
to goods together with a feasible allocation of goods to buyers such that every buyer
receives her most preferred good at the announced prices and every unallocated good
has a price of 0. This is also referred to as an envy-free equilibrium for the buyer/good
model. In the case of unit-demand buyers, each buyer would be allocated at most a
single good. With quasi-linear utilities, buyer i’s utility for good j as a function of
payment can be written as uji (x) = v
j
i − x where v
j
i is the valuation of buyer i for
good j and x is the payment. In this case, social welfare is well-defined and VCG
is applicable. The efficient allocation can be computed using a maximum weight
matching on the bipartite graph consisting of buyers/goods with the edge between
buyer i and good j having a weight of vji . The VCG payoffs/payments would then
correspond to a minimum weighted cover on this graph Leonard (1983). For general
utilities, the functions uji (x) could be any continuous decreasing function of x. In this
case, social welfare is not well defined and VCG is not applicable.
As a motivating example of a unit-demand market with non-quasi-linear utilities,
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consider a housing market in which each seller owns a house and each buyer wants to
buy a house. Typically, a buyer will have a smooth budget constraint. For example,
they may need to get a loan/mortgage to pay for the house and so the actual cost
will include interests, fees, etc. in addition to the actual payment made to the seller.
This cost may depend on the choice of the house as well (e.g., the interest rate may
depend on the condition of the house). With non-quasilinear utilities, this can be




i (x) in which c
j
i (x) is the cost as a function of the price of
good j.
6.2 Related Work
In the abstract mathematical form, the problem we are looking at is a one-to-one
matching with monetary transfers and general utilities as described by Demange and
GaleDemange and Gale (1985). In this model, the set of competitive equilibria corre-
sponds exactly to the outcomes that are in the core. Demange and Gale also proved
the lattice structure on the set of competitive equilibria although the lattice struc-
ture was already discovered by Shapley and Shubik Shapley and Shubik (1971) for
the case of quasilinear utilities. Demange, Gale and Sotomayor Demange et al. (1986)
proposed an ascending auction for the quasilinear setting to compute a competitive
equilibrium. The existence of competitive equilibria for general utilities was proved
by Quinzii Quinzii (1984). Quinzii showed that the game defined by this model is a
“Balanced Game” and for general n-person balanced games it was already shown by
Scarf Scarf (1967) that the core is non-empty. Using a different method, Gale Gale
(1984) showed that for a more general class of preferences (i.e., preferences are not
even required to be monotone in payment, yet they should still satisfy some other
milder conditions) a competitive equilibrium always exists. Gale’s proof is based on
a generalization of the KKM lemma Knaster et al. (1929) which is the continuous
variant of the Sperner’s lemma. Both of these proofs only show the existence of an
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equilibrium and are non-constructive. As such, they don’t help much in understand-
ing the properties of the equilibria. 1
Using a completely different approach, Kelso and Crawford Kelso and Crawford
(1982) studied the equilibria of the more general case of many-to-one matching with
monetary transfers using discretization, i.e. the prices are chosen from a discrete
set rather than from a continuum). Their approach can be considered an extension
of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley for college admission and
stable marriageGale and Shapley (1962). Kelso and Crawford state their problem
in the context of matching workers to firms. They introduce the notion of “Gross
Substitutes”(GS) and show that if firms’ preferences satisfy GS then the core is non-
empty. Later on, Hatfield and MilgromHatfield and Milgrom (2005) presented a
unified framework of many-to-one matching with contracts which subsumes the Kelso-
Crawford model. Their approach is also based on discretization. They replace the
finite set of discrete prices with a finite set of contracts where a contract could include
any general term which may include a monetary transfer amount as well. They
describe their model in the context of hospitals and doctors and show that if hospitals
preferences over the set of possible contracts satisfy GS and also if doctors have strict
preferences over the set of contracts then the core is non-empty. They show that the
set of core outcomes form a lattice and that the infimum of the lattice correspond
to the doctor optimal outcome while the supremum of the lattice correspond to the
optimal outcome for the hospitals. They provide an iterative procedure for finding
the core outcomes based on the discrete version of Tarski’s fixed point theorem. They
also characterize another condition which they call the “Law of Aggregate Demand”
under which the doctor optimal outcome is also group strategyproof for the doctors.
Recently, Hatfiled and Kominers Hatfield and Kominers (2010) generalized this to
many-to-many matchings with contracts.
Leonard Leonard (1983) first showed that in one-to-one markets with quasilinear
1Scarf’s proof actually provides an algorithm based on the pivoting algorithm of Lemke and
Howson Lemke and Howson (1964). When combined with Quinzii’s construction, that would lead
to a construction that requires 2O(n!) operations which runs on a matrix with O(n!) columns. Nev-
ertheless, the resulting algorithm is more of an exhaustive search algorithm and does not provide
any insight into the equilibrium structure.
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utilities, prices at the lowest competitive equilibrium equal VCG payments. Gul and
StacchettiGul and Stacchetti (1999) studied many-to-one matchings in the context of
allocation of indivisible goods to consumers with quasi-linear utilities. Their model
differs from the model of Kelso and Crawford in that they do not require discrete prices
but instead require the utilities to be quasi-linear in money. They show the existence
of competitive equilibria given that consumers’ preferences satisfy GS. They also show
that not only is GS sufficient but it is also necessary. Similarly, Bikhchandani and
Mamer Mamer (1997) showed the existence of competitive equilibria for the same
model but without indivisibility using a different approach. Their proofs crucially
needs the quasilinearity of utilities and their approach cannot be extended to general
utilities.
Ausubel and Milgrom Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) also studied the many-to-one
matching in the the context of allocation of indivisible goods to consumers with quasi-
linear utilities. They propose an ascending package auction to compute the outcome.
They assume that all the goods are initially owned by one seller and as such the
set of competitive equilibria is only a strict subset of the core. They consider the
core outcomes and not just the competitive equilibria. They present an ascending
package auction that always results in a core outcome even in the absence of GS
preferences. They show that if consumers’ preferences satisfy GS then the outcome
of their auction coincides with the VCG outcome. More specifically, they show that
their auction precisely computes the VCG outcome whenever the VCG outcome is
in the core. They also show that GS is the the necessary and sufficient condition for
the VCG outcome to be in the core. Their auction, however, requires payments to
be chosen from a finite discrete set. Their setting can be modeled as a special case
of the Milgrom and Hatfield matching with contracts Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
Their proofs also crucially depend on quasilinearity of utilities.
There are also related work that consider one-to-one matching markets with quasi-
linear utilities and hard budget constraint. Aggarwal et al.Aggarwal et al. (2009), con-
sider this problem in the context of Ad-Auctions with advertisers having slot specific
hard budget constraints. They prove the existence of a budget-feasible competitive
equilibrium and present a truthful auction mechanism based on that. They present
130
CHAPTER 6. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN MATCHING MARKETS
an extension of the Hungarian methodKuhn (1956) for computing the equilibrium
and their proofs are based on this construction. Ashlagi et al. Ashlagi et al. (2010)
also consider a similar problem but they assume a single hard budget constraint and a
single value per click for each advertiser and require separable click through rates. In
subsection 6.4.2, we discuss the major difficulty of dealing with soft budget constraints
as opposed to hard budget constraints.
6.3 Our Contribution
In this chapter we study the class of competitive equilibria in unit demand markets
with general utility function in continuous setting. We must emphasis that all of
the earlier works except for Demange and Gale (1985); Quinzii (1984); Gale (1984)
either crucially require quasilinear utilities or work in a discrete setting. Our main
contributions are the following:
• In Theorem 45, we present a construction using an inductive characterization of
prices/payoffs at the competitive equilibria that reveals interesting similarities
between VCG payments for quasilinear utilities and the prices at the lowest com-
petitive equilibrium for general utilities. In Theorem 46 we give a simple proof
for group strategyproofness based on a critical property of the lowset/highest
competitive equilibria. All of the earlier works only proved the existence of
a competitive equilibrium using either fixed point theorems or discretization
without providing an exact characterization of the equilibria. We present a
simple characterization that has a natural interpretation. Our characterization
provides a deeper insight into the structure of the equilibria.
• In section 6.6, we suggest a mechanism for ad-auctions that can naturally com-
bine both pay per click and pay per impression advertisers in a general setting
in which advertisers could submit a separate utility function for each slot as a
price of that slot. These utility functions could be any arbitrary function2 of
the price of that slot. Furthermore, our mechanism is group strategyproof even
2It has to be continuous and decreasing in the price of the slot and should become non-positive
for a high enough price.
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if search engine and advertisers have different estimates of clickthrough rates.
This also answers an open question raised by Aggarwal et al. (2009). Further-
more, our mechanism is welfare maximizing in the sense that it maximizes the
combined welfare of the search engine and any group of advertisers who have
quasilinear utilities and agree with the search engine on clickthrough rates and
assuming that the search engine has the correct clickthrough rates. In particu-
lar, if all advertisers have quasilinear utilities and agree with the search engine
on clickthrough rates, then the outcome of our mechanism coincides with the
VCG outcome.
6.4 Model and Main Results
In this section, we consider competitive equilibria in two sided markets with goods
on one side and buyers on the other side. Later in section 6.5, we consider the more
general model with agents on both sides and show that it can be reduced to the
simpler buyer/good model. In subsection 6.4.1, we formally define the problem and
our notation. In subsection 6.4.2, we explain the main challenges of dealing with non-
quasilinear utilities and explain why it is much harder to prove these results for non-
quasilinear utilities compared to their quasilinear counterparts. In subsection 6.4.3,
we present our main general theorems.
6.4.1 Model
In this subsection, we formally define the problem and our notation.
We denote by M = (I, J, {uji}), a market M with the set of unit demand buyers I
and the set of goods J such that the utility of buyer i for receiving good j at price x
is given by the monotonically decreasing function uji (x) which is privately known by
buyer i. We assume that for a large enough x, uji (x) becomes zero or negative
3. We
will use pji (·) to denote the inverse of u
j
i (·). Next, we formally define a Competitive
3This is to ensure that uji (·) is invertible. We also require the domain and the range of u
j
i (·) to
cover the whole R. Since at an equilibrium both x and uji (x) are positive, we can easily extend the
domain of any uji (·) to the whole R to meet this requirement.
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Equilibrium.
Definition 38 (Competitive Equilibrium). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), a
“Competitive Equilibrium” of M is an assignment of prices to goods together with a
feasible matching of goods to buyers such that each buyer receives her most preferred
good at the assigned prices and every unmatched good has a price of 0. Formally, we
say that W = (p,u) is a competitive equilibrium of M with price vector p and payoff
vector u if and only if there exists a “Supporting Matching” µ such that the following
conditions hold. We use µ(i) to denote the good that is matched to buyer i:





j) j = µ(i)
ui ≥ uji (pj) j 6= µ(i)
(6.1)
∀i ∈ I : µ(i) = ∅ ⇒ ui = 0 (6.2)
∀j ∈ J : µ−1(j) = ∅ ⇒ pj = 0 (6.3)
∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J : ui ≥ 0,pj ≥ 0 (6.4)
We denote an unmatched buyer or good by µ(i) = ∅ or µ−1(j) = ∅. Throughout
this chapter, instead of explicitly writing W = (p,u) , we use p(W ) and u(W ) to
denote the price vector p and the payoff vector u at W . We also use µ(W ) to denote
a supporting matching for W . Note that there could be more than one supporting
matching for a given W so we assume µ(W ) may return any one of them. We will
denote the set of all competitive equilibria for a market M by W(M).
6.4.2 The Main Challenges of Non-Quasilinear Utilities
In this subsection, we explain the main challenges of dealing with non-quasilinear
utilities. First, it is helpful to explain the connection between VCG and competitive
equilibria in unit-demand markets with quasilinear utilities.
VCG is based on maximizing the social welfare which is defined as the sum of the
utilities. Taking the sum of quasilinear utility functions makes sense because they
are measured in the same units and the payment terms cancel out. However, with
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general utilities, social welfare is not well-defined since different agents’ utilities are
not measured in the same units and are therefore non-transferrable (i.e. transferring
$1 from one agent to another does not transfer the same amount of utility). In
our problem, with quasilinear utilities, the utility functions would be of the form
uji (x) = v
j
i − x where v
j
i is the value of the agent i for good j. We could then
construct a complete bipartite graph with agents and goods in which each edge (i, j)
has a weight of vji . A social welfare maximizing mechanism like VCG would pick a









∀i ∈ I : Pj∈J xji ≤ 1













Notice that there is a one-to-one correspondence between solutions of the dual
program and the competitive equilibria (observe that by complementary slackness,
if xji > 0 then ui = v
j
i − pj). It is not hard to show that the prices at the lowest
competitive equilibrium (the one that has the lowest prices) correspond to the VCG
payments. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium of the market leads to a social
welfare maximizing allocation (this follows from strong duality). To compute a max-
imum weight matching in this graph we can use the Hungarian Method Kuhn (1956).
Interestingly, the Hungarian method is equivalent to the following ascending price
auction proposed by Demange, Gale and SotomayorDemange et al. (1986):
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Definition 39 (Ascending Price Auction). Set all the prices equal to 0. Find a
minimally over demanded subset of goods, i.e. a subset T of goods such that there is
a subset S of the buyers who strictly prefer the goods in T at the current prices and
|S| > |T |. Increase the prices of goods in T at the same rate until one of the buyers
in S becomes indifferent between a good outside of T and her preferred good in T .
At that point, recompute the minimally over-demanded subset and repeat this process
until there is no over demanded subset of goods.
In fact, all of the existing methods for computing the lowest competitive equilib-
rium, that we are aware of, are based on running an ascending auction of the above
form or a similar ascending auction. Furthermore, in all of the related work that
are based on such ascending auctions, the proofs are heavily tied with the way the
ascending auction proceeds and the fact that it stops in finite time. Essentially, all
of these auctions work as follows: They advance the prices at some rate to the next
point at which there is a change in the demand structure 4. Then, they recompute
the rates and repeat. For quasilinear utility functions, the ascending auction stop
after O(|I| + |J |2) iterations (Each time the combinatorial structure of the demand
changes we start a new iteration).
Unfortunately, these ascending auctions may not even terminate in finite time if
utilities are not quasilinear. The problem occurs when we try to raise the prices of
goods in set T . With quasilinear utilities, when we raise the prices of all the goods in
T at the same rate, for buyers in S, the relative preferences over the goods in T do not
change. However, that is not true for general utility functions. For general utilities,
we may need to raise the prices of goods in T at different and possibly non-constant
rates and even then the preferences of buyers in S over goods in T may change an
unbounded number of times. We demonstrate this in the following example:
Example 1. Suppose there are 3 goods and 4 buyers with utility functions as given
in the following table in which V ≥ 2 is some constant and x is the price of the
corresponding good:
4Note that since there are no structural changes, the prices are essentially jumped discretely to
the next point at which there is a change in the demand sets
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good 1 good 2 good 3
buyer 1 V + 1− x V + 1− x V + 1− x
buyer 2 0 V + 1− x 0
buyer 3 0 0 V + 1− x
buyer 4 V − x V − c(x) V − c′(x)
All buyers have quasilinear utilities except buyer 4 for whom c(x) = x+V−xV sin(V log(V −x))
and c′(x) = x+ V−xV cos(V log(V −x)). Notice that both c(·) and c
′(·) are strictly increasing
in x if V ≥ 2, so all utility functions are strictly decreasing in prices. Figure 6.1 shows
the prices of goods during the ascending auction. We should emphasis that in this
particular example, the ascending path of prices is unique. The ascending auction
can only increases the prices of goods that are over demanded, i.e., demanded by
at least two buyers. Furthermore, it can only raise the price of a good to the point
where the demand of that good is about to drop to 1. Therefore, for every good with
a positive price during the auction there should be at least a demand of 2. Observe
that the demand set of buyer 1 and 4 changes an infinite number of times during the
ascending auction. Specifically, the demand set of both buyer 1 and 4 include good 1
at all times. However, the demand set of buyer 1 includes good 2 and/or good 3 only
at the times in which the price curves of those goods overlap with the price curve of
good 1. Similarly, the demand set of buyer 4 includes good 2 and/or good 3 only at
the times in which the price curves of those goods do not overlap with the price curve
of good 1. Observe that the demand structure changes an infinite number of times as
the price of the goods approach V . So an ascending auction does not stop in finite
time.
The previous example, although contrived, illustrates what could go wrong with
ascending auctions and constructive proofs that are based on them. In general, as-
cending auctions are very sensitive to the structure of utility functions. Later, in
Theorem 45, we present a direct way of computing the lowest competitive equilib-
rium without running an ascending auction.
Hard budgets vs. Smooth budgets: Notice that with hard budget constrains,
utility functions are quasilinear except at the point where buyers hit their budget
limits. Therefore, the issue that was outlined in Example. 1 does not arise with
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The blue and red curves have been slightly shifted down to make the black curve visible.
Assume V = 11 and that the price of good 1 is increased at the rate of 1.
Figure 6.1: Prices of goods in the ascending auction of Example. 1.
quasilinear utilities and hard budget constraints. In fact, ascending auctions with
hard budget constraints converge almost as fast as ascending auction with quasilinear
utilities because each buyer may hit her budget limits at most |J | times (once per
each good) and beyond that they never demand that good again. This is what makes
general non-quasilinear utilities much harder to work with compared to quasilinear
utilities with hard budgets. It is worth mentioning that the related work of Aggarwal
et al. (2009) and Ashlagi et al. (2010) are based on such ascending auctions.
6.4.3 Main Results
In this subsection, we state our main theorems that capture the important properties
of competitive equilibria. Our main contributions in this section are Theorem 45
which characterizes the prices/payoffs at the higest/lowest competitive equilibria and
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Theorem 46 that establishes the group strategyproofness of the mechanism that se-
lects the lowest competitive equilibrium. Our characterization reveals a deep con-
nection between the way VCG computes its payments and the way prices can be
computed at the lowest competitive equilibria. We start by showing that the set of
competitive equilibria form a lattice.
Theorem 44 (Equilibrium Lattice). For a given market M = (I, J, {uji}), with the set
of competitive equilibria W(M), we define a partial ordering as follows. For any two
competitive equilibria W,W ′ ∈W(M), we say W ≤ W ′ iff p(W ) ≤ p(W ′) (or equiv-
alently u(W ) ≥ u(W ′))5. The partially ordered set (W(M),≤) is a complete lattice.
The inf and sup operators on the lattice are defined as follows. Let Winf = inf(W,W
′)
and Wsup = sup(W,W
′). Both Winf and Wsup are valid competitive equilibria (we




j(W ), pj(W ′))




µ(i) ui ≥ u′i






j(W ), pj(W ′))




µ(i) ui < u
′
i
µ′(i) ui ≥ u′i
(6.6)
In particular, the lattice has a unique minimum which we refer to as the lowest
competitive equilibrium (i.e. has the lowest prices and the highest payoffs) and a
unique maximum which we refer to as the highest competitive equilibrium (i.e. has
the highest prices and the lowest payoffs)6 .
Throughout the rest of the chapter, we use the lattice structure of the set of
competitive equilibria without making explicit references to Theorem 44.
Before we present our theorems, we define the following notation. Note that we
can fully specify a competitive equilibrium W by just specifying either u(W ) or p(W ).
5A vector is considered less than or equal to another vector if it is less than or equal to the other
vector in every component
6It is not hard to show that W(M) is a closed compact set
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Given either the price vector or the payoff vector, we can compute the other one by
taking the induced prices/induced payoffs as defined next.
Definition 40 (Induced Payoffs u(p), Induced Prices p(u)). We use u(p) to denote
the “Induced Payoffs” of buyers from price vector p which is the best payoff that
each buyer can possibly get given the prices p. Similarly, we use p(u) to denote the
Induced Prices of goods from the payoff vector u. The formal definition is as follows
(remember that pji (·) is the inverse of u
j
i (·)):
ui(p) = max({uji (pj)|j ∈ J} ∪ {0}) (6.7)
pj(u) = max({pji (ui)|i ∈ I} ∪ {0}) (6.8)
It is easy to see that if W is a competitive equilibrium then u(W ) = u(p(W )) and
p(W ) = p(u(W )) 7. Throughout this chapter, we use bold letters p and u to denote
variables representing price/payoff vectors and non-bold letters p and u to denote
functions returning price/payoff vectors. The next theorem states the main result of
this chapter. In what follows, ui(p) and p
j(u) denote the induced payoff and induced
price as defined in (6.7) and (6.8) respectively.
Theorem 45 (Inductive Equilibrium). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), a compet-
itive equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, the lowest and the highest competitive
equilibria can be computed inductively as follows. Let W be the lowest and W be the
highest competitive equilibrium of the market M . For an arbitrary buyer i and an
arbitrary good j, let W−i be the highest competitive equilibrium of the market M−i
(i.e. the market without buyer i) and let W−j be the lowest competitive equilibrium of
the market M−j (i.e. the market without good j). The following inductive statements
fully characterize the prices/payoffs at the lowest/highest competitive equilibrium of
M :
I. ui(W ) = ui(p(W−i)).
II. pj(W ) = pj(u(W−j)).
7The inverse is not true.
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Furthermore, the following inequalities always hold:
resume pj(W ) ≤ pj(W−i), in particular, if j = µ(i) then pj(W ) = pj(W−i).
resume ui(W ) ≤ ui(W−j), in particular, if j = µ(i) then ui(W ) = ui(W−j).
Note that just 45.I and 45.II are enough to fully characterize the lowest/highest
competitive equilibria because we can fully specify any competitive equilibrium by
specifying either the prices or the payoffs. Intuitively, we can interpret them as the
following:
• (45.I) We can compute the payoff of any buyer i at the lowest competitive
equilibrium of M by doing the following. Remove i from the market. Compute
the prices at the highest competitive equilibrium of the rest of the market. Then,
bring buyer i back to the market. The payoff that buyer i gets from her most
preferred good at these prices is equal to her payoff at the lowest competitive
equilibrium of the market M .
• (45.II) We can compute the price of any good j at the highest competitive
equilibrium of the market M by doing the following. Remove good j from the
market. Compute the buyers’ payoffs at the lowest competitive equilibrium of
the rest of the market. Then, bring good j back to the market. Ask each of
the buyers to name a price for good j that would give them the same payoff
as what they get in the lowest competitive equilibrium of the market without
good j. Take the maximum among the named prices and that will be the price
of good j at the highest competitive equilibrium of the whole market.
Next, we combine the above two characterization to reveal a striking similarity
between the prices of the lowest competitive equilibrium and VCG payments. Note
that social welfare is not even well-defined for a market with general utilities so VCG
is inapplicable.
By combining the (45.I) and (45.II) we get the following interpretations for the
prices of goods at the lowest competitive equilibrium. WLOG, we give the interpreta-
tion for some arbitrary good j which is allocated to buyer i at the lowest competitive
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equilibrium. Notice the striking similarity between these interpretation and the VCG
payments “The price that buyer i pays for good j is the lowest price at which the rest
of the market becomes indifferent between buying or not buying good j. i.e., the lowest
price for good j such that there is a competitive equilibrium for the market without i
and j such that no buyers would strictly prefer good j to her current allocation. In
other words, the price that buyer i has to pay to get good j is equal to how much good
j is worth to the rest of the market.”
Theorem 46 (Group Strategyproofness). A mechanism that uses the allocations/prices
of the lowest competitive equilibrium is group strategyproof for buyers, meaning that
there is no coalition of buyers that can collude and misreport their uji (·) such that all
of them get strictly higher payoffs (assuming that there are no side payments).
In the rest of this section, we give a sketch of the proof of Theorem 45. We start
by defining a Tight Alternating Path.
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Definition 41 (Tight Alternating Path). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}) and a
competitive equilibrium W of M with a supporting matching µ(W ), we define a Tight
Alternating Path with respect to W and µ(W ) as follows. Consider the complete




A tight alternating path is a path consisting of tight edges where every other edge on the
path belongs to µ(W ). A tight alternating path may start at either a buyer or a good
and may end at either a buyer or a good. In particular, the end points of the path may
be unmatched in µ(W ). For example consider a tight alternating path (i1, j1, i2, j2, i3)
where i1 is matched with j1 and i2 is matched with j2 and i3 is unmatched in µ(W ).




Definition 42 (Demand Sets). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), we denote the
demand set of a subset of buyers S at prices p by DS(p). Similarly, we denote the
demand set of a subset of goods T at payoffs u by DT (u). Formally:.
DS(p) = {j ∈ J |∃i ∈ S : uji (pj) = ui(p)} (6.9)
DT (u) = {i ∈ I|∃j ∈ T : pji (ui) = pj(u)} (6.10)
For a competitive equilibrium W of M , we use DS(W ) to denote DS(p(W )) and
DT (W ) to denote DT (u(W )).
Lemma 11 (Tightness). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), and a competitive equi-
librium W of M :
• W is the lowest competitive equilibrium of M iff for every subset T of the goods
with strictly positive prices we have |DT (W )| ≥ |T | + 1, i.e. at least |T | + 1
buyers are interested in T .
• W is the highest competitive equilibrium of M iff for every subset S of the buyers
with strictly positive payoffs we have |DS(W )| ≥ |S| + 1, i.e. the buyers in S
are interested in at least |S|+ 1 goods.
To see why Lemma 11 is true intuitively, assume that W is the lowest competitive
equilibrium of a market M but there is a subset T of goods such that |DT (W )| = |T |.
142
CHAPTER 6. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN MATCHING MARKETS
Then, we could decrease the prices of goods in T down to the point where either a
buyer out of DT (W ) becomes indifferent between her current allocation and some
good in T ; or one of the goods in T hit the price of 0. But then, we get a competitive
equilibrium less than W which is a contradiction. Although this lemma seems very
intuitive, its formal proof turns out to be quite challenging. Most of the appendix
is devoted to proving this lemma. The next lemma states a critical property of the
lowest/highest competitive equilibria.
Lemma 12 (Critical Alternating Paths). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), and a
competitive equilibrium W of M with a supporting matching µ:
• Iff W is the highest competitive equilibrium of M then for any good j there exists
a tight alternating path from j to a buyer with a payoff of 0 or to an unmatched
good. The alternating path must start with a matching edge or be of length 0.
• Iff W is the lowest competitive equilibrium of M then for any buyer i there exists
a tight alternating path from i to a good with a price of 0 or to an unmatched
buyer. The alternating path must start with a matching edge or be of length 0.
We refer to such a tight alternating path as a “Critical Alternating Path”.
Proof. We only prove the first statement since the second one is similar (completely
symmetric): If either j is unmatched or the payoff of buyer who is matched to j is 0
we are done. Otherwise, we run the following algorithm while maintaining a subset
T of goods and a subset S of buyers with strictly positive payoffs such that there is a
tight alternating path from j to each good in T and each buyer in S and µ(S) = T .
Initially, we set T ← {j} and S ← {µ−1(j)}. The repeating step is as follows: Since
all buyers in S have strictly positive payoffs, we can apply Lemma 11 and argue that
DS(W ) ≥ |S|+ 1 = |T |+ 1. So, there must be a buyer i∗ in S that has a tight edge
to some good j′ not in T . If either j′ is unmatched or i′ = µ−1(j′) has a payoff of
0 then we are done. Otherwise, add j′ to T and add i′ to S and repeat. Note that
we always find a critical alternating path in at most |I| − 1 iterations. The “only if”
direction is trivial by applying Lemma 11.
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Next, we give a sketch the proof of our main theorem. The complete proof can be
found in the appendix.
Proof sketch of Theorem 45. We only give a sketch of the proof of (45.I) and (?).
The proofs of (45.II) and (?) are completely symmetric to the other two.
The plan of the proof is as follows. We remove an arbitrary buyer i from the
market and compute the highest competitive equilibrium of the rest of the market.
We then show that the prices at the highest competitive equilibrium of the market
without i leads to a valid competitive equilibrium for the whole market (including
buyer i) but with a possibly different matching. We also show that the induced
payoff of buyer i from these prices is the same as her payoff at the lowest competitive
equilibrium of the whole market. The detail of the construction is as follows.
Choose an arbitrary buyer i ∈ I. Let M−i denote the market without buyer i
and let W−i be the highest competitive equilibrium of the market M−i. Note that
the market M−i is of size |I| + |J | − 1 so by inductively applying Theorem 45 to
M−i we can argue that there exists a competitive equilibrium for the market M−i,
so the highest competitive equilibrium of M−i is well-defined. Let p = p(W−i) be
the prices at W−i. We claim that using the prices p for the market M leads to a
valid competitive equilibrium W . In particular, all the prices/payoffs in W are the
same as the prices/payoffs in W−i and also the payoff of buyer i is ui(p) however the
matching might be different. To obtain a supporting matching for W , we start with
a supporting matching for W−i and modify it as follows. If ui(p) = 0 then we can
leave buyer i unmatched and the matching does not need to be changed. Otherwise,
if ui(p) > 0 then let j be the good from which buyer i achieves her highest payoff at
the current prices, i.e. ui(p) = u
j
i (p
j). By applying Lemma 12 to the market M−i,
we can argue that there is a tight alternating path from j either to an unmatched
good with a price of 0 or to a buyer with a payoff of 0. In both cases, we can match
good j to buyer i and then switch the matching edges along the alternating path to
get a new matching that supports W . Note that if the alternating path ends in a
buyer with a payoff of 0 then the last edge of the alternating path was a matching
edge and that buyer is now unmatched in the new matching, but she still has a payoff
of 0. The complete proof can be found in the appendix.
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Observe that from the view point of buyer i, this is a posted price mechanism
with posted price vector p(W−i) which does not depend on i’s reported utility (note
that the choice of i was arbitrary).
6.5 More General Models
In this section, we consider competitive equilibria in markets where both sides consist
of agents with general utility function. We show a reduction from this model to
the simpler model with goods and buyers. We also characterize a class of price
discriminating truthful mechanisms based on these markets.
Consider the matching markets of the form M = (I, J, {uji}, {q
j
i }) with two sets
of agents I and J such that if i ∈ I and j ∈ J are matched and x amount of money is
transferred from i to j, then the utility of i is given by uji (x) and the utility of j is given
by qji (−x) (note that x might be negative). We assume u
j
i ’s and q
j
i ’s have the same
properties we assumed in the buyer/good model (e.g. continuous, decreasing, etc). A
competitive equilibrium is also defined similarly. Despite its apparent generality, this
model can be reduced to the buyer/good model as the following theorem states:
Corollary 6. Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}, {q
j
i }) with agents on both sides,







(·)). Then, every competitive equilibrium in M ′ corresponds to a compet-
itive equilibrium in M and vice versa with the exact same payoffs. Therefore, all of
the results that we proved in the previous sections carry over to these markets. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism that selects the lowest competitive equilibrium of M ′ (which
is also the lowest competitive equilibrium of M) is group strategyproof for agents of
type I. Note that we could change the role of I and J and get a similar results for
agents of type J . Observe that the lowest competitive equilibrium of agents of type J
is the highest competitive equilibrium of agents of type I and vice versa.
Next, we present a class of price discriminating truthful mechanisms based on the
same idea:
145
CHAPTER 6. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN MATCHING MARKETS
Corollary 7. Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), the seller(s) can personalize the price
for each good/buyer by applying an arbitrary continuous and increasing function gji (·)
to the primary price of the good j. In other words, if the price of a good j ∈ J at the
equilibrium is pj then the price observed by agent i ∈ I is gji (pj). Note that g
j
i (·)’s
should be fixed in advance and should not depend on the reports of buyers. It is easy
to see that every competitive equilibrium in this market correspond to a competitive
equilibrium in the market M ′ = (I, J, {u′ji}) where u′
j




i (·)) and vice versa.
Consequently, all of the results that we proved in the previous sections carry over to
these markets/mechanisms.
Intuitively, the above two theorems suggest that we can write the utility functions
of the agents in set I in terms of the payoffs of the agents in set J (or in terms of the
primary prices in the case of personalized prices). We can then treat the agents on set
J as goods and their payoffs as the prices of these goods. Note that to maintain the
group strategyproofness, it is crucial that gji (·)’s be fixed in advance and not depend
on the reports of buyers. In the next section, we present a practical application of
this idea.
6.6 Application to Ad-Auctions
In this section, we present a truthful mechanism for Ad-auctions that combines pay
per click (a.k.a charge per click or CPC) and pay per impression (a.k.a CPM) advertis-
ers with general utility functions. In particular, our mechanism is group strategyproof
regardless of whether the search engine uses the correct clickthrough rates or whether
advertisers agree with the search engine on clickthrough rates.
We formally define our model as follows. Given a set of advertisers I and a set
of slots J , we assume that utility of advertiser i from slot j is given by uji (x)
8 where
x is payment per click for CPC advertisers and payment per impression for CPM
advertisers. We say that a CPC advertiser i has standard utility function if for all




i −x) in which v
j
i is the advertiser’s value for a click on slot j and
8uji (x) must be continuous and decreasing in x and for a high enough x it should become non-
positive
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cji is the advertiser’s belief about her clickthrough rate (CTR). We also say that a
CPM advertiser i has standard utility function if for all slots j: uji (x) = v
j
i−x in which
vji is the advertiser’s value for a click on slot j. Furthermore, we assume that search
engine believes that the CTR of advertiser i on slot j is ĉji which might be different
from cji (i.e., advertisers and search engine could disagree). Furthermore, we assume
that vji and c
j
i are advertiser’s private information but ĉ
j
i is publicly announced.
Before we explain our mechanism, let us consider what happens if we applied
VCG to this setting, assuming that we only have CPC advertisers with standard
utility function. We get the following LPs. The primal computes the social welfare











∀i ∈ I : Pj∈J xji ≤ 1















The set of solutions to the dual program would be the set of competitive equilibria
of the market and the one with the lowest prices would correspond to the lowest
competitive equilibrium which would also coincide with the VCG payments/payoffs.
However, the problem is that payments should be charged per click while pj represents
the expected payment, i.e., payment per impression. So, per click payments are given
by pj/ĉji . However, by dividing by ĉ
j
i , we lose the strategyproofness guarantee if c
j
i and
ĉji are not the same (i.e., if advertisers and search engine have different estimates about
clickthrough rates). Note that we cannot use pj/cji either because then advertisers
have the incentive to untruthfully report a higher cji which would give them a higher
chance of winning a better slot and at the same time would lower their payment.
Next, we present a mechanism that also addresses this problem.
Mechanism 1. Compute the lowest competitive equilibrium of the market M =
(I, J, {uji}) using the following personalized prices by applying Corollary 7. For each
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advertiser i and slot j we define a personalized price gji (·) as follows. If i is a CPC
advertiser then we define gji (x) = x/ĉ
j
i in which ĉ
j
i is the estimate of the search engine
for the clickthrough rate of advertiser i on slot j. If i is a CPM advertiser then we
define gji (x) = x.
Remark 4 (Interpretation of mechanism 1). We can conceptually reinterpret this
mechanism as an ascending auction as follows. Initially, we assign a primary price
of 0 to every slot and during the auction whenever the demand for a slot is more
that one, we increase the primary price of that slot. At any time during the auction,
each advertiser demands one of the slots at the current prices. However, different
advertisers see different prices. At any point during the auction, advertiser i observes
a price of gji (p
j) for slot j in which pj is the primary price of the slot j. The auction
stops when there is no over demanded slot. Intuitively, pj denotes the expected revenue
of the search engine from slot j and gji (p
j) is the price that advertiser i has to pay
for each click so that the search engine makes pj in expectation.
Next theorem summarizes the important properties of the above mechanism.
Theorem 47. Mechanism 1 is group strategyproof and also maximizes the social
welfare in the following sense. Let A be a group of advertisers with standard utility
functions who also agree with the search engine on the CTRs and let A′ be the rest
of the advertisers. Let s denote the search engine. Then mechanism 1 maximizes
the welfare of {s} ∪ A and also the presence of A′ may not decrease the welfare of
{s}∪A. In particular, if all advertisers have standard utility functions and agree with
the search engine on the CTRs then the outcome of this mechanism coincides exactly
with the VCG outcome.
Notice that mechanism 1 is group strategyproof regardless of whether the search
engine and advertisers have the same estimates about the clickthrough rates. This
answers an open question raised by Aggarwal et al. (2009). As for existing CPC ad-
auction mechanisms, that we are aware of, incentive compatibility relies on everyone
agreeing on clickthrough rate estimates made by the search engine.
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6.7 Other Results & Omitted Proofs
In this section, we present the missing proofs and several other results. Before we
proceed, we should mention that some of our theorems/lemmas mutually depend on
each other. However, this does not create a cycle in the proofs. The following diagram
illustrates the dependencies in the proofs. A solid arrow from A to B means that
when A is invoked on a market of size n, the proof of A invokes B on a market of
the same size. A dashed arrow from A to B means that A invokes B on a market of
strictly smaller size. We can then prove all of the lemmas/theorems by induction on
the size of the market. i.e. we assume that all of the lemmas/theorem are true for
markets of size less than n and then all of the lemmas/theorems can be proved for























Note that Theorem 44 is implicitly used by most of the other lemmas/theorems
so we didn’t display the dependencies on it in the above diagram.
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We proceed by defining Bounded Competitive Equilibrium:
Definition 43 ((u,p)-Bounded Competitive Equilibrium). Given a market M =
(I, J, {uji}) and a lower bound price vector p ≥ 0 and a lower bound payoff vector
u ≥ 0, we say that W is a (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium of M iff W is a
competitive equilibrium of M and p(W ) ≥ p and u(W ) ≥ u.
Note that for a given u and p, the (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibria of M
form a complete lattice which is a complete sublattice of all of the competitive equi-
libria of M . In particular, there is a lowest and a highest (u,p)-bounded competitive
equilibrium of M . Notice that for arbitrary u and p, a (u,p)-bounded competitive
equilibrium does not necessarily exist.
The next lemma provides the basic ingredient for the proof of Lemma 11.
Lemma 13 (Continuity). Assume a market M = (I, J, {uji}) with |I| = |J | and lower
bounds p ≥ 0 and u ≥ 0 on the prices/payoffs, such that a (u,p)-bounded competitive
equilibrium exists. Then, at the lowest (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium, there
exists at least one good j∗ ∈ J whose price is exactly equal to its lower bound (i.e.
pj
∗
). Similarly, at the highest (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium, there exists at
least one buyer i∗ ∈ I whose payoff is exactly equal to her lower bound (i.e. ui∗).
To give more intuition on the above statements, consider the following immediate
corollary which we can derive by setting no lower bounds (i.e. a lower bound of 0)
on the prices/payoff:
Corollary 8. Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}) with |I| = |J | the following statements
are always true:
• At the lowest competitive equilibrium, there is at least one good that has a price
of 0.
• At the highest competitive equilibrium there is at least one buyer that achieves
a payoff of 0.
As another immediate corollary, Lemma 13 shows that there is a continuum of
equilibria between the lowest and the highest competitive equilibria:
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Corollary 9. Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}) with |I| = |J |, with W and W being
the lowest and the highest competitive equilibria respectively, there is a continuum of
equilibria between W and W .
Proof. Define p(t) = (1 − t)p(W ) + tp(W ). Now by applying Lemma 13 we can
get a continuum of equilibria by computing the lowest (0, p(t))-bounded competitive
equilibrium for each t ∈ [0, 1].
Before we can proceed further, we need two more lemmas. The next two lemmas
show very basic properties of competitive equilibria in unit-demand markets:
Lemma 14 (Entanglement). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}) and a competitive
equilibria W of M . If buyer i is matched with good j at W then the price of good
j and the payoff of buyer i are entangled in any other competitive equilibrium of M
which means at any other competitive equilibrium like W ′ if the price of good j is
higher then the payoff of buyer i must be lower and vice versa. Note that this claim
is true regardless of wether buyer i and good j are actually matched to each other in
W ′.
Proof. Let W ′ be any other competitive equilibrium of M . Partition the buyers to S,
S ′ and S ′′ such that buyers in S have a higher payoff at W , buyers in S ′ have a higher
payoff at W ′ and buyers in S ′′ have the same payoff at both W and W ′. Similarly,
partitions the goods to T , T ′ and T ′′ such that goods in T have a higher price at W ,
goods in T ′ have a higher price and W ′ and goods in T ′′ have the same price at both
W and W ′. It is easy to show the following statements are true using the definition
of competitive equilibria and the fact that both W and W ′ are competitive equilibria:
• At W , all buyers in S must be matched to goods in T ′ so |S| ≤ |T ′|.
• At W ′, all goods in T ′ must be matched to buyers in S so |T ′| ≤ |S|.
From the above statement, we can conclude |S| = |T ′| and buyers in S and goods
in T ′ must be matched to each other at both equilibria. Similarly:
• At W , all goods in T must be matched to buyers in S ′ so |T | ≤ |S ′|.
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• At W ′, all buyers in S ′ must be matched to goods in T so |S ′| ≤ |T |.
So, we can conclude |S ′| = |T | and buyers in S ′ and goods in T must be matched
to each other at both equilibria. Furthermore, we can then conclude that buyers in
S ′′ and goods in T ′′ may only be matched to each other. That proves the claim of
the lemma.
Lemma 15 (Conservation of Matching). Given a market M = (I, J, {uji}), for any
i ∈ I, if there exists a competitive equilibrium W of M at which buyer i has a strictly
positive payoff (i.e. ui(W ) > 0) then buyer i is never unmatched in any competitive
equilibrium of M . Similarly, for any j ∈ J , if there exists a competitive equilibrium
W of M at which good j has a strictly positive price (i.e. pj(W ) > 0) then good j is
never unmatched at any competitive equilibrium of M .
Proof. Let W ′ be any other competitive equilibrium of the market. Partition the
buyers to S, S ′, S ′′ and partition the goods to T , T ′, T ′′ as in the proof of Lemma 14.
In the proof of that lemma, we showed that the matching pairs can only be from S
and T ′ or S ′ and T or S ′′ and T ′′. Let i be any buyer with strictly positive payoff
at W , if i has strictly positive payoff at W ′ then it must also be matched at W ′.
Otherwise if the payoff of buyer i is 0 at W ′ then i must belong to set S. We know
that |S| = |T ′| and that all the goods in T ′ must have strictly positive prices so they
must all be matched and therefore all buyers in S, including buyer i, must also be
matched. The second statement can be proved by a similar argument for good j .
Proof of Lemma 13. We only prove the first claim. The proof of the second claim is
similar (completely symmetric). The plan of the proof is as follows:
First, we define a transformed market M ′ = (I, J, {u′ji}) with u′
j
i (x) = u
j
i (x +
pj) − ui. We claim that there is a one-to-one mapping between (u,p)-bounded
competitive equilibria of the original market and the competitive equilibria of the
transformed market. Formally, a (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium W of M
corresponds to a competitive equilibrium W ′ of M ′ such that p(W ′) = p(W )−p and
u(W ′) = u(W ) − u and µ(W ′) = µ(W ). We then show that there is competitive
equilibrium of M ′ in which there is a good with a price of 0 which then means in the
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corresponding competitive equilibrium of the original market the price of that good
is equal to its lower bound and therefore at the lowest (u,p)-bounded competitive
equilibrium of M the price of that good must also be equal to its lower bound which
proves the claim.
We now prove that there is a good with a price of 0 at the lowest competitive
equilibrium of M ′. We choose an arbitrary buyer i from M ′ and remove it from the
market. Let W−i be the highest competitive equilibrium of the remaining market.
By the assumption of the lemma, we know |I| = |J | and so in W−i there are more
goods than there are buyers so there must be an unmatched good which we denote by
j∗. Note that the price of j∗ in W−i must be 0. On the other hand, by applying The-
orem 45 to M ′ and using (?) we have pj(W ) ≤ pj(W−i) for every good j. Therefore,
it must be that the price of j∗ in W is also 0 and that completes the proof.
There is a subtlety that we should point out about the one-to-one mapping be-
tween the competitive equilibria of the original market and those of the transformed
market. It is clear that every (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium of M can be
transformed to a competitive equilibrium of M ′. However, for the other direction,
we need to show that all goods/buyers are matched, otherwise after applying the
inverse transform we may end up with an unmatched good/buyer that has a positive
price/payoff. To show that all buyers/goods are matched in every competitive equi-
librium of M ′, we can apply Lemma 15. To apply that lemma, we only need to show
that there is a competitive equilibrium of M ′ in which all goods have strictly positive
prices and then by that lemma all the goods must always be matched (and so do all
buyers because |I| = |J |). Notice that if there is no competitive equilibrium for M ′
in which all goods have strictly positive prices then either in every (u,p)-bounded
competitive equilibrium of M there is a good whose price is equal to its lower bound
or M has no (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium at all which either way trivially
proves the claim of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 11. We only prove the first statement. The proof of the second
statement is similar (completely symmetric).
First, we prove the “only if” direction. Assume that W is the lowest competitive
equilibrium of M . For every subset T of goods with strictly positive prices, we prove
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that DT (W ) ≥ |T | + 1, i.e. there are at least |T | + 1 buyers who are interested
in some good in T . The proof is as follows. Since all the goods in T have strictly
positive prices, they must all be matched. Let S be the subset of buyers that are
matched to T . Notice that S ⊂ DT (W ) and |S| = |T |. So, to complete the proof
we only need to show that there is one more buyer not in S who is also interested
in a good in T . Let p be the prices induced by payoffs of buyers not in S, i.e.
pj = maxi∈I−S p
j
i (ui(W )). Similarly, let u be the payoffs induced by the prices of
goods not in T , i.e. ui = maxj∈J−T u
j
i (p
j(W )). Notice that W is a (u,p)-bounded
competitive equilibria of the market M ′ = (S, T, {uji}). Furthermore, if we replaced
the part of W that corresponds to S and T with any other (u,p)-bounded competitive
equilibrium of M ′, we would get a valid competitive equilibrium for M which implies
that W must be the lowest (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium of M ′ as well
because otherwise we could replace the part of W corresponding to S and T with
the lowest (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium of M ′ and get a lower competitive
equilibrium for M which would contradict W being the lowest competitive equilibrium
of M . Because W is the lowest (u,p)-bounded competitive equilibrium of M ′, by
applying Lemma 13 to the market M ′, we can argue that there is a good j∗ ∈ T
such that pj
∗
(W ) = pj
∗
. Since all the goods in T , including j∗, have strictly positive
prices, pj
∗
must also be strictly positive and because of the way we defined p there




i∗ (ui∗). That means i
∗ must be
interested in good j∗ and therefore {i∗}∪S ⊂ DT (W ) which proves that there are at
least |T |+ 1 buyers interested in the goods in T .
The proof of the “if” direction is trivial. The proof is by contradiction. Let
W be a competitive equilibrium of M such that for every subset T of goods with
strictly positive prices we have DT (W ) ≥ |T | + 1. Let W be the lowest competitive
equilibrium of M and assume that W and W are not the same. Let T consist of all
the goods that have a higher price at W compared to W . We know that there are at
least |T |+ 1 buyers interested in T at W and these buyers must have higher payoffs
at W because the prices of the goods in T are strictly lower. Therefore, the goods
assigned to these buyers at W must have lower prices and so there are at least |T |+ 1
goods that have higher prices at W compared to W which contradicts the assumption
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that T was the set of all the goods that had higher prices at W .
Next, we present the complete proof of Theorem 45:
Proof of Theorem 45. We only prove (45.I) and (?). The proofs of (45.II) and (?)
are completely symmetric to the other two.
The plan of the proof is as follows. We remove an arbitrary buyer i from the
market and compute the highest competitive equilibrium of the rest of the market.
We then show that the prices at the highest competitive equilibrium of the market
without i leads to a valid competitive equilibrium for the whole market (including
buyer i) but with a possibly different matching. We also show that the induced
payoff of buyer i from these prices is the same as her payoff at the lowest competitive
equilibrium of the whole market. The detail of the construction is as follows.
Choose an arbitrary buyer i ∈ I. Let M−i denote the market without buyer i
and let W−i be the highest competitive equilibrium of the market M−i. Note that
the market M−i is of size |I| + |J | − 1 so by inductively applying Theorem 45 to
M−i we can argue that there exists a competitive equilibrium for the market M−i,
so the highest competitive equilibrium of M−i is well-defined. Let p = p(W−i) be
the prices at W−i. We claim that using the prices p for the market M leads to a
valid competitive equilibrium W . In particular, all the prices/payoffs at W are the
same as the prices/payoffs at W−i and also the payoff of buyer i is ui(p), however the
matching might be different. To obtain a supporting matching for W , we start with
a supporting matching for W−i and modify it as follows. If ui(p) = 0 then we can
leave buyer i unmatched and the matching does not need to be changed. Otherwise,
if ui(p) > 0 then let j be the good from which buyer i achieves her highest payoff at
the current prices, i.e. ui(p) = u
j
i (p
j). By applying Lemma 12 to the market M−i, we
can argue that there is a tight alternating path from j either to an unmatched good
with a price of 0 or to a buyer with a payoff of 0. In both cases, we can match good
j to buyer i and then switch the matching edges along the alternating path to get a
new matching that supports W . Note that if the alternating path ends in a buyer
with a payoff of 0 then the last edge of the alternating path was a matching edge and
that buyer is now unmatched in the new matching, but she still has a payoff of 0.
155
CHAPTER 6. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN MATCHING MARKETS
Next, we prove each one of our claims:
• Proof of Existence : By induction, we assumed that M−i must have a com-
petitive equilibrium. We then took the highest competitive equilibrium of M−i
and constructed a competitive equilibrium for M . So M has a competitive
equilibrium.
• Proof of (?) pj(W ) ≤ pj(W−i) : Notice that we constructed a competitive
equilibrium W of the market M which has the same prices as the W−i. The
prices at the lowest competitive equilibrium of M are no more than the prices
at W so p(W ) ≤ p(W ) = p(W−i).
• Proof of (?) pj(W ) = pj(W−i) when µ(i) = j : Notice that since i and j are
matched, if we remove both of them the rest of W is still a valid competitive
equilibrium for M−j−i . Let W
−j
−i denote the lowest competitive equilibrium of
M−j−i . Note that both W and W
−j
−i are valid competitive equilibria for M
−j
−i but
W−j−i is the lowest, so the prices of goods J − {j} might only be lower at W
−j
−i
and so the payoffs of buyers I − {i} might only be higher at W−j−i and so the
price induced by buyers I − {i} on good j might only be lower at W−j−i than
the price induced by them on good j at W . However, by applying Theorem 45
inductively on market M−i and using (45.II), we get that p
j(W−i) is exactly the
induced price of buyers I −{i} on good j at W−j−i . Therefore, pj(W−i) must be
less than or equal to the induced price on good j at W which is itself less that
or equal to pj(W ). On the other hand, from the previous paragraph we have
pj(W ) ≤ pj(W−i), so the two must be equal.
• Proof of (45.I) ui(W ) = ui(p(W−i)) : If i is matched with j in W then ui =
uji (p
j(W )) and by the previous statement pj(W ) = pj(W−i). Therefore ui(W ) =
uji (p
j(W−i)) = ui(p(W−i)). The last equality follows from the fact that we chose
j to be the good from which buyer i obtains her highest payoff at prices p(W−i).
Proof of Theorem 46. To prove that the mechanism that uses the lowest competitive
equilibrium for allocations/payments is group strategyproof for buyers, we must show
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that there is no coalition of buyers who can collude such that all of them achieve
strictly higher payoffs (without making side payments). The proof is by contradiction.
Let S be the largest subset of buyers who can collude and possibly misreport their
uji ’s and all of them achieve strictly higher payoffs. Let W be the lowest competitive
equilibrium of M with respect to the true utility functions and let W ′ be the lowest
competitive equilibrium with respect to the reported utility functions assuming that
buyers is S have colluded. Let T be the subset of the goods that are matched to
S at W ′. Since all the buyers in S are achieving strictly higher payoffs at W ′, they
cannot be unmatched at W ′ (i.e. |T | = |S|) and the prices of the goods in T should
be strictly lower at W ′. That means the goods in T must have had strictly positive
prices in W . By applying Lemma 11, we argue that there must have been a subset
S ′ of buyers of size at least |T | + 1 who were interested in some good in T at W .
Observe that all of the buyers in S ′ must be getting a strictly higher payoff at W ′
because the prices of all the goods in T are strictly lower. But S ′ is larger than S
which contradicts our assumption that S was the largest set of buyers who could all
benefit from collusion.
Proof of Theorem 47. The group strategyproofness follows from Theorem 46. So we
only prove the second part: Assuming the mechanism has computed a lowest com-
petitive equilibrium W as the outcome with price vector p, the expected utility of
advertiser i from slot j is given by uji (g
j
i (p
j)) where pj is the base price of good j and
gji (x) = x/ĉ
j
i is the personalized price of slot j for advertiser i. So for each advertiser










i , we can simplify
the utility function and get uji (p
j) = cjiv
j
i −pj. Now, consider the complete bipartite
graph G with advertisers and slots. Let the weight of each edge (i, j) be cjiv
j
i . Note
that for each advertiser i ∈ A we have ui(W ) + pj(W ) ≥ cjiv
j
i in which W is the
outcome of the mechanism. Therefore, the total expected welfare of the coalition
{s} ∪ A is at least as much as the weight of the maximum weight matching in the
absence of A′. Furthermore, if A′ is empty (i.e. everyone agrees on the CTRs), the
mechanism computes the efficient allocation (i.e., a maximum weight matching) and
the outcome is the same as the VCG outcome.
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Next, we present the proof of the lattice structure. The proof does not use any
other lemma.
Proof of Theorem 44. To simplify the proof, we add |J | dummy buyers and |I|
dummy goods so as to make sure that we can always get a perfect matching. We
set uji (x) = −x whenever either i or j or both are dummy. By doing this we can
always make sure that for every competitive equilibrium W there is a perfect match-
ing µ that supports the equilibrium. Note that (6.2) and (6.3) ensure that for any
unmatched buyer i, ui = 0 and for any unmatched good j, p
j = 0 so we can ar-
bitrarily match the unmatched buyers/goods to the new dummy buyers/goods and
then match the remaining dummy buyers/goods together. Observe that by adding
dummy buyers/goods we don’t need to be concerned about (6.2) and (6.3) anymore
9.
• First, we prove that Winf is a valid competitive equilibrium :
– We first show that µinf is a valid matching. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose it is not. Then, there should be i, i′ ∈ I such that µinf(i) =
µinf(i
′) = j. Since both µ and µ′ are valid matchings, j should be matched
to i in one of them and to i′ in the other one. WLOG, assume that µ(i) = j
and µ′(i′) = j. From the definition of µinf and because µinf(i) = µ(i), we
can argue ui ≥ u′i. So we have u
j
i (p




pj ≤ p′j. On the other hand, by repeating the same argument for i′ instead
of i, we can conclude that ui′ < u
′
i′ (note that according to the definition
of µinf , µinf(i
′) = µ′(i′) if ui′ < u
′
i′) and so we have u
j
i′(p
j) ≤ ui′ < u′i′ =
uji′(p
′j) which means pj > p
′j. We have a contradiction because we just
proved pj ≤ p′j and pj > p′j. Therefore, µinf must be a valid matching.
– We show that Winf satisfies the (6.1). WLOG, assume µinf(i) = µ(i) =
j. So uji (p
j) = ui ≥ u′i ≥ u
j
i (p
′j) which means pj ≤ p′j. Therefore,
pj(Winf) = p
j. Together with the fact that ui(Winf) = ui and µinf(i) = µ(i)
9Remember that for non-dummy buyers, uji (0) might be negative so we may not be able to match
the 0 priced items and 0 payoff buyers. This is a technicality that arises when we transform the
market in the proof of Lemma 13
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we can argue that Winf satisfies the first part of (6.1) because W satisfies
it. Similarly, for any j′, ui ≥ uj
′
i (p



















the second part of (6.1) is also satisfied.
• Next, we prove that Wsup is a valid competitive equilibrium :
– We first show that µsup is a valid matching. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose it is not. Then, there should be i, i′ ∈ I such that µsup(i) =
µsup(i
′) = j. Since |I| = |J | and there are two buyers that are matched
to the same good, there should be another good j′ to which no buyer is
matched. On the other hand, both µ and µ′ are valid perfect matchings
so j′ must be matched in both of them. Let s = µ−1(j′) and s′ = µ′−1(j′).
Notice that s 6= s′ otherwise µsup(s) would be j′ as well. Because j′ is
not matched in µsup, it should be that µsup(s) 6= j′ which means µinf(s) =
j′. Similarly, it should be that µsup(s
′) 6= j′ which means µinf(s′) = j′.
However, that means µinf(s) = µinf(s
′) = j′ which means µinf is not a
valid matching which is a contradiction since we already proved µinf is a
valid perfect matching.
– We show that Wsup satisfies the (6.1). WLOG, assume µsup(i) = µ(i) = j.
Let i′ = µ−1inf (j). It must be that µ
′(i′) = j (because we already know that
µ(i) = j so µ(i′) 6= j, but i′ must be matched to j in µ or µ′). That means
uji′(p
′j) = u′i′ ≥ ui′ ≥ u
j
i′(p
j), so p′j ≤ pj and therefore pj(Wsup) = pj. We
also have ui(Wsup) = ui and µsup(i) = µ(i) so Wsup must satisfy the first
part of (6.1) because W satisfies it. On the other hand, since we assumed
µsup(i) = µ(i) = j, for any j

















In chapter 2 and chapter 4, we presented optimal reductions and approximately op-
timal reductions from a multi agent Bayesian mechanism deign problem to single
agent subproblems. We showed that an exponential increase in the complexity of
the underlying optimization problem can be avoided by such reductions. chapter 2
presented reductions by decomposing the problem using the interim allocation rule.
Such decomposition allows computation of the optimal mechanism in polynomial
time, however the approach may not be practical as it makes use of the ellipsoid
method. chapter 4 presented reductions by decomposing the problem using the ex
ante allocation rule. Such decomposition allows efficient computation of approxi-
mately optimal mechanisms and also yields practical algorithms. It also leads to the
following conclusions.
• Market size. As the ratio of the maximum demand to supply (e.g., 1
k
) de-
creases, less coordination is required on decisions made for different agents; i.e.,
as 1
k
→ 0, the optimal mechanism treats each agent almost independently of
other agents. Observe that all of the approximation factors in this thesis only
depend on k (i.e., 1− 1√
k+3
) and not on the number of agents. It suggests that,
for characterizing asymptotic properties of such markets, the right parameter to
consider is perhaps the ratio of the maximum demand to supply; in particular,
notice that the number of agents is irrelevant.
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• Computational hardness. For mechanism design problems in a variety of
settings, the difficulty of making coordinated optimal decisions for multiple
agents can be avoided by losing a small constant factor in the objective (i.e.,
losing only a 1√
k+3
fraction of the objective), therefore the main difficulty of
constructing constant factor approximation mechanisms in multi dimensional
settings stems from the difficulty of designing single agent mechanisms, which
ultimately stems from enforcing the incentive compatibility constraints in the
single agent problem.
In chapter 5, we presented a generalization of the magician’s problem from
chapter 4. We also presented applications of the magician’s problem in prophet
inequalities (section 5.3) and online stochastic generalized assignment prob-
lem(section 5.4).
In chapter 6, we studied the class of competitive equilibria in two sided match-
ing markets with general utility functions. We presented an exact inductive
characterization of the competitive equilibria and gave a constructive proof for
its existence and various other properties. All of the previous known proofs were
non-constructive. Our characterization provides a deep insight into the struc-
ture of the equilibria and reveals striking similarities between the payments
at the lowest competitive equilibrium for general utilities and VCG payments
for quasilinear utilities. We also presented a social-welfare maximizing truthful
mechanism for pay per click Ad-auctions where the search engine and the adver-
tisers may disagree on the clickthrough rates (VCG is inapplicable if payments
are per click).
Our characterizations raise the question of whether it is possible to generalize
this result to more general matchings (e.g., the many-to-one matchings) with
general utilities. Another challenge is to find more efficient algorithms for com-
puting the competitive equilibria.
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